"Let the state found a state for us"

We are living through an interesting event in which the matter of "saving Kobani" has suddenly become the world's first priority. Of course, we should also separately note in this process how ISIS, against which 40 countries have formed a coalition, has itself become a subject of advertising through this very coalition.

It is only fitting that the lion's share of this advertising again goes to Turkey, of course. After all, dealing with the world's largest and most dangerous organization, which 40 countries, among them the world's most powerful, have not been able to cope with by coming together, has been made to depend on Turkey's decision, on its joining this struggle. Only Turkey, it seems, can save the world from an organization that has taken the world captive. If Turkey did not give support, the world would sink into the ground.

All the analyses we have read lately about Kobani and ISIS give these messages in covert or overt forms.

We know that Turkey is quite important and powerful, but it is very clear that there is a cunning in the "Turkey's power and importance" talk that these discourses appreciate and feed. Turkey is the country that saves the world, yet at the same time it is portrayed as the country that withholds this help of its own, while the whole world expects this role of it.

Either something is really happening to the world, or in the new course of this strange world the game being played against Turkey is bigger than supposed. We have watched before a game in which Saddam was led into Kuwait through subtle encouragement and then punished for entering and had the world made narrow for him. The first moves of this game perhaps could not be applied because of Turkey's spoilsport behavior, perhaps they even lost their validity. But to reach the desired goal the rules of the game, even the game itself, may have been changed. For neither these roles assigned to Turkey nor to ISIS, nor even this role America has assigned to itself, seems natural.

As a matter of fact, it is seen that all the actors in the region, including Iran and Israel, are living in a serious role confusion. The Lebanese thinker Munir Shafiq, whom I talked with in Sudan on the occasion of the National Congress Party's congress, expresses this role confusion thus: "I have watched politics for forty years; what I have lived through in the past year has made me break all the set patterns I knew about Middle Eastern and world politics, and has left all my theories in ruins."

In this political stage, America is not behaving like America; the huge superpower, with the whole world behind it, has trailed off after an upstart organization. Iran has fallen into worry about Israel's security and warns America that if Assad falls, Israel's security will be endangered. In Iraq a structure called ISIS is occupying all of Iraq and Syria, and this occupation proceeds despite all the countries of the world; in Yemen another organization with no social base, the Houthis, is about to seize nearly all of Yemen. Egypt, which could not secure the safety of the coup in its own country and is of no benefit even to itself, attempts to export a coup to Libya, and so on.

Of course all these happenings are strange events, events whose like has not been lived before. And there are also the never-changing attitudes of the never-changing actors. It goes like this:

As the Kobani events began, the PKK and HDP circles, who raised an uproar saying "Let the state permit us to go and fight," created a fait accompli and went, and as soon as they saw that the shoe was more expensive than it looked there, they came back toward Turkey. Because fighting ISIS required a pitched battle different from the ambushes and the slaughter of people attacked in their most defenseless state that they had been accustomed to until now.

This time we began to hear messages of "let the state open a corridor so that we can send weapons there." Although American weapons left no need for the weapons Turkey would send, when the PYD could not make progress in the war, this time they displayed exactly their classic attitudes and behavior: "Let the Turkish army go and fight, let it not remain a spectator to the tragedy in Kobani, let it save Kobani."

A more accurate translation of saying "let the Turkish army save Kobani" is in fact this: "let the state go and fight there for us, and while it is at it, let it establish a state for us."

This demand is in fact also the exact translation of the political line of the HDP and PKK line until now. Whatever the HDP wants, it does not want it by addressing the free will of the Kurdish people, by persuading it, and thus by gaining its free support behind it. The HDP never thought of a path that would express the demands of the Kurdish people and voice these demands before the state. On the contrary, it imposed its own organization's demands on the Kurdish people. It forcibly imposed its own line on those among the Kurdish people who did not find it reasonable. And from the state it asked permission for these practices against the Kurdish people.

In short, what the HDP demands of the state is not the freedom of the Kurdish people but its tutelage. The PKK does not ask for the tutelage of the Kurdish people from the Kurdish people itself; it asks it from the state. And since it knows that the first and strongest objection to this will come from the Kurdish people itself, it tries to persuade the Kurdish people by the methods it knows, that is, by threat, pressure and violence. It demands that this relationship of tutelage it has built over the people with ornate discourses like Democratic Autonomy be recognized by the state, and even beyond that that the conditions for it be provided; that is all.

In Kobani, strangely, this demand comes out a little more clearly. Seeing that the path of violence it knows best did not pay off either, it asked the state to undertake this too, and tried to say:

"It is our right to establish a state, but we do not have the strength for it, so at least let the state establish a state for us."