The Republic at 103: Making History or Writing History?

As of the 103rd anniversary of the founding of the Republic, our knowledge regarding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the process in which a new administration was established in its place remains very limited. The expectation that the fogs surrounding our recent history would dissipate on its centenary was not fully met. This history, which is not so distant at 100 years, paradoxically continues to be the most difficult history to understand and learn. It is difficult to understand because narratives of this period are told through the language of an epic or a myth rather than history, and every call regarding the truth of the matter is attempted to be drowned out by a great noise. Because in this history, there are still figures that are sought to be protected and narratives of those figures that are never wished to be questioned.

The perception that Turkey came into existence with the Republic, as if nothing noteworthy regarding this nation existed prior to it, has been engraved upon young minds for a century.

This fit very well with the narrative of "creation ex nihilo" as a theological narrative. Because indeed, "liberation" was not from the enemy that had occupied the country, but rather a liberation from the Ottoman Empire itself—a state that had made these lands a homeland, permeated their soul, and taken root prior to the Republic. A much more intense war, which began with the blowing of the war's final whistle, started targeting the Ottoman Empire and the values and institutions upon which it rested. The enemy was not the invading West, but the Ottoman Empire, its worldview, and its order.

This was what actually happened. But in the official discourse, a war had been fought against the seven powers and they had been defeated, and despite the enemy never wanting it, the Republic was established, and Turkey began making its way on the path of contemporary civilization with firm steps, despite and against the contemporary civilized world.

Ultimately, everything is a narrative. After all, as the founding leader said: "Writing history is as important as making history, indeed even more important than it."

This statement has achieved an unassailable status precisely because the written history, despite being miles away from the lived history, has been successfully drilled into all minds.

However, if the written history is ultimately not faithful to the truth, it turns around and sweeps away both the one who wrote it by distorting it and the stories that were written.

This is what is actually beginning to happen increasingly today. Although official shields still continue to protect a narrated history, unofficial narratives do not give up on the pursuit of the truth.

The myths regarding the founding of the Republic are being questioned one by one. For instance, was the Republic founded against and despite the occupying enemy British? Was the National Struggle taking place in Anatolia in a state of war against the British just as it was against the Greeks? Did the British really view the National Struggle movement in Anatolia as a movement attempting to disrupt their own plans and therefore one that had to be smothered?

This is the story in the official or Kemalist ideological narratives of the War of Independence. Any narrative implying the contrary does not merely correct history; it is also treated as displaying a great heresy against the Kemalist genesis. One could easily find oneself labeled a British agent in an instant.

Yet today, there are abundant documents showing that the founding of the Republic, the moving of the capital to Ankara, and Turkey being governed by the movement formed in Ankara under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal instead of the Istanbul government were things that the British had also wanted from the very beginning. In fact, even all existing official documents adequately demonstrate this reality. That is to say, no new document has emerged on this matter; even the existing documents state this, but ah, that issue of "narrated history." It can cause us to see even the events right before our eyes in a different light.

For instance, it is an important part of the narrative that after the Allied forces entered Istanbul following the armistice signed on October 30, 1918, their occupation and authority remained confined only to Istanbul. However, along the entire route of Mustafa Kemal extending to Samsun, Amasya, Erzurum, Sivas, and Ankara, the British were present with their representatives and military units, officially exercising the authority to inspect whether the terms of the armistice were being fulfilled. This authority was also accepted by those leading the National Struggle.

When Mustafa Kemal arrived in Erzurum on July 2, 1919, he met multiple times with British Colonel Alfred F. Rawlinson, one of the most prominent intelligence officers in the region, and his contacts with Rawlinson continued subsequently. Rawlinson, who was also the nephew of Lord Curzon, later met more frequently with Kazım Karabekir, conveying the views of the British government to the Kuva-yi Milliye (National Forces) and continuously gathering information from them regarding the movement's philosophy, future plans, and actions through his inquiries.

What is clearly understood, both from Rawlinson's account and from what is reflected in the memoirs of Mazhar Müfit and Kazım Karabekir, is that Mustafa Kemal told Rawlinson that they were a revolutionary movement and that the congress did not recognize the Istanbul administration. Yet, during those days and in the following days, Mustafa Kemal—who had crossed over to Anatolia through the appointment and extraordinary powers granted by Vahdettin—was still telling both the Congress members and all his subsequent comrades-in-arms that they remained under the command of Istanbul and that their primary objective was to save the Sultan and the Caliphate.

We had previously recounted, referencing Rauf Orbay's memoirs, the state of helplessness he fell into when he was informed that his legitimacy at this level stemmed from this duty and that the Sultan's authority had been taken from him for a moment. “Do you see, Rauf,” Mustafa Kemal had said to Rauf Orbay in a deeply distressed manner, “Do you see the importance of the uniform and military authority? Without our military uniform and authority, we could achieve nothing; the best thing would be to step aside so as not to be crushed in between.”

The fact that Mustafa Kemal expressed these views in his meetings with Rawlinson immediately after his status and duty were restored through Kazım Karabekir very clearly confirms that there was common ground for an agreement with the British from the very beginning regarding the dismantling of the Ottoman administration and the establishment of a government under his own leadership in its place.

Indeed, upon parting, he promised to send him the “Closing Declaration” of the Erzurum Congress. Mustafa Kemal kept this promise and indeed sent the Declaration to Rawlinson through Kazım Karabekir, asking him to convey it to London.

When Mustafa Kemal reached Ankara, Kazım Karabekir transmitted to him Lord Curzon's message, which had reached him via Rawlinson. This message undoubtedly carries a significance that requires a different perspective on the entire history of the National Struggle and the founding of the Republic. Why this message, which was not even secret, has not received the place it deserves in written history is, of course, a separate question. Kazım Karabekir sent the message from Lord Curzon that reached him to Mustafa Kemal via the following telegram:

“To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha

I request that this be kept strictly confidential.

Rawlinson arrived; we met. His apparent duty is to investigate whether the armistice terms are being fulfilled in the 15th and 13th Army Corps. However, his real duty, unofficially, is to meet first with me and then with you, without drawing the attention of outsiders, insiders, or even our own government.

Lord Curzon said:

‘Since we have not seen a strong government in Turkey so far, it has not been possible to make peace. Nor do we see any strength in the current government. We consider it necessary for Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who has gained the trust of the nation, to either be present at the Peace Conference or to accept the peace decisions.’”

Rawlinson requested that this matter be conveyed to you. Furthermore, he wishes to meet with you to learn what you think about peace, and perhaps engage in some minor discussions.”

After conveying these points, Kâzım Karabekir reported both his response to Rawlinson and the details of Curzon’s message to Mustafa Kemal in the same telegram. Let us write about these later as well.