Diplomasi ve Cumhuriyet

After relaying the information he had received from Rawlinson, Kazım Karabekir also conveys to Mustafa Kemal the British questions about the separation of the caliphate and the sultanate, the move to a republic, and the relocation of the seat of government from Istanbul to Anatolia. The answer he gave to these questions shows, with complete clarity, the distance between what he said and what happened afterwards: according to Karabekir, the caliphate and the sultanate could not be separated from each other; both had to be preserved. Karabekir reports to Mustafa Kemal, by telegram, the answer he gave Rawlinson and the dialogue between them in the following words:

"The nation has announced its decisions at the Sivas General Congress. I believe that Mustafa Kemal Pasha cannot change these decisions, nor add anything to them or remove anything from them.

As for signing the peace terms, only a government that has won the confidence of the nation, and a delegation commissioned by that government, can do so. A signature put down by anyone else would carry no weight for the nation.

In any case, there is very little time left before the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies convenes. Soon you will find the nation and the government that rests on it before you."

Rawlinson said:

"Today in Britain there are very powerful political parties that strongly support the existence and independence of Turkey. The British government has also accepted that the tranquillity of our colonies in Asia can be secured only in this way.

Even if other states wish to dismember Turkey, this will not be permitted.

Britain will work to guarantee Turkey's existence and independence and to help its economic development.

There is only one point that worries us: that after all these sacrifices Turkey may one day go over to the side of Britain's enemies. Because of this concern, Britain wishes to reach an understanding with people in Turkey who will truly be friends of Britain.

Naturally, these must also be people who have influence and standing over the Turkish nation. Not people like the members of the government we have seen so far, who have no connection with or influence over the regions outside Istanbul."

I said:

"If you win Turkey, a delegation of ours made up of a few officers and religious scholars can establish calm in places where your hundred thousand soldiers cannot make themselves heard. Of course, the opposite is equally true.

As for your concern, know well that the German friendship of the past was the work of a limited number of people who had no real influence over the public. Today every member of our nation, consciously or unconsciously, is in favor of friendship with Britain."

Rawlinson:

"We understood this too. Now I will ask you for your private opinion. For example, is a republic better, or a sultanate?

I am in favor of a republic. The fashion for kingdoms and empires has passed. Instead of all this display and expense, the nation governs its own affairs itself."

I replied:

"If you ask this about European nations, very few nations are left that are not governed by a republic. If you ask about us, a republic cannot exist among us. First, there is great respect and love for the traditional sultanate. Second, we have only ten years of experience of constitutional government. Therefore we cannot think as far ahead as Europeans." (Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, p. 415 ff.).

Indeed, the distance between Karabekir's answers here and what happened afterwards makes the importance of the message even greater. Here it is perfectly clear that the British expectation of a republic, their wish to set the sultan aside and deal with a pro-British administration in Turkey, and even that Kazım Karabekir himself promised this friendship; and also that they wanted the capital to be moved out of Istanbul into Anatolia. Moreover, all of the topics on which the British wanted to learn Mustafa Kemal's views would come to pass within a few years. The capital would be moved from Istanbul to Ankara; the sultanate would be abolished, the republic proclaimed, and the caliphate abolished. While Karabekir was arguing that the caliphate and the sultanate should be preserved together, history would flow in exactly the direction of the changes that Curzon asked Mustafa Kemal about. Is it possible, now, to consider these developments independently of the political possibilities the British had probed in advance?..

Another point that must be emphasized in Curzon's message is the assessment of why peace was not made at once with the Istanbul government after the Armistice of Mudros. According to the British, it was not enough to face an administration that merely bore the title of government. They wanted a government that had won the confidence of the majority of the nation and was strong enough to keep its word. They expected such a government to give assurances that it would not pursue a hostile policy toward Britain. They knew that the guarantees of a weak government would carry no value, because it had neither the power nor the social legitimacy to enforce those guarantees on behalf of the country. In other words, it is clear that the Istanbul government did not meet British expectations, and that they were searching for an alternative to the Istanbul government. In the movement developing in Anatolia they found a possible counterpart, and they tried to build a guarantee.

In return for this guarantee, Britain also set out its own commitments. According to Karabekir's published account, Curzon declared that Turkey would not be allowed to be partitioned among other states, that the Greeks would be removed from Anatolia, that the occupations would be ended, and that Turkey's territorial integrity would be preserved. Help for Turkey's economic development was also among the promises voiced in this framework. Therefore this is not merely a one-sided relationship in which Britain asked a government for assurances; it is a political exchange in which, in return for a strong administration with the nation's trust giving guarantees to Britain, Britain also made promises about Turkey's future.

This detail also explains why Britain treated Mustafa Kemal as its interlocutor. It saw the Istanbul government as weak, far from winning the nation's confidence, and unable to keep the promises it made to the British. It regarded Mustafa Kemal as a leader who had won the nation's trust and who would have to attend the peace conference or accept the decisions that would be taken. What it sought was not merely an interlocutor who would express opinions, but a government that would give assurances that it would not pursue a hostile policy toward Britain, that could enforce those assurances across the country, and that could make peace on behalf of Turkey.

To look for British support of the National Struggle only in the form of weapons, money, or open military aid narrows this relationship. It is also possible by opening the way for a movement, recognizing its representatives, declaring the rival government inadequate, giving the movement's leader standing as an international interlocutor, and discussing with him the guarantees under which a future administration would operate. The British did not regard the movement in Anatolia as a temporary rebellion or as a force that had to be eliminated at all costs. They regarded it as a political cadre movement that could replace the Istanbul government, govern the country, and reach an agreement with Britain. Curzon's message shows this assessment and how the way was opened for this movement.

Thus the tension between the two separate political languages of the National Struggle also becomes clear. In the discourse that set the people and the military cadres in motion, the rescue of the sultan, the caliphate, and the Ottoman order was put forward, while in the contacts with the British what was discussed was the future of a movement that did not recognize the Istanbul government and was establishing a new center in Anatolia, and the nature of the new administration to be established. Karabekir had said that the caliphate and the sultanate could not be separated and that both had to be preserved. Yet despite this objection of his, the sultanate was abolished; the capital was moved to Ankara, the republic was proclaimed, and the caliphate was abolished. This is not only the frustration of Karabekir's foresight; it is also an indication of which of the different visions of the future within the National Struggle was eliminated.

So it is not possible to fit Britain's role into the sentence "they were hostile to the National Struggle and tried to destroy it." In the message relayed by Karabekir, Britain explains why it could not make peace with the Istanbul government; says that it is looking for a strong administration that has won the nation's confidence; expects from this administration assurances that it will not pursue a hostile policy toward Britain; and in return makes promises concerning Turkey's territorial integrity, the end of the occupations, the removal of the Greeks, and help for economic development. At the same time it wanted to learn Mustafa Kemal's views on the sultanate, the caliphate, the republic, and the capital.

This picture leads to a conclusion that is more specific and more tied to documents than saying that Britain founded the new regime: from the very beginning Britain recognized the National Struggle movement as a new center of power capable of governing the country; it established a relationship with its leader through guarantees and counter-commitments; it discussed with Mustafa Kemal the main headings of the transformation that would end in the end of the Ottoman sultanate; and on this path it supported him against both the Greeks and the Sultan, holding both under its control.

Indeed, what happened afterwards shows both that these questions were not asked at random and how this support worked. In narrating the founding of the republic, we must see together not only who fought whom at the front, but also who was talking with whom while the war went on, which guarantees were demanded, what was promised in return, and finally which political order was established.

For more detailed information see Sinan Tavukçu, İngilizler ve Erzurum Kongresi, https://sinantavukcu.com/2012/10/10/ingilizler-ve-erzurum-kongresi/