"Rauf, did you see… the value of the state, of office and of its support?"

An anecdote we recounted in our piece titled "What If There Had Been No Vahdettin" struck those who read the history of the National Struggle (Millî Mücadele) with great naivety, in terms of the role they attribute to Mustafa Kemal, as quite surprising, as one might expect. Thankfully it only struck them as surprising; no one leveled an accusation of insult over it. After all, nobody has been insulted here, though there is, it seems, a mentality in which even saying that Vahdettin was not a traitor can be counted as insulting someone.

Besides, those who relate the anecdote are by no means people who would let a speck of dust fall on Atatürk. The incident is an account so certain as to be nearly mutawatir (universally attested). Indeed, now that the occasion has arisen, it is worthwhile to relate other details of the event and so clarify most sharply the distribution of roles in the very first days of the National Struggle.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir describes the event that reflects the state Mustafa Kemal was in, up to the moment in Erzurum when Kazım Karabekir finally stepped in and told Mustafa Kemal, "I am at your command, Pasha! I, my officers, my soldiers, my Corps, all of us are at your command!", as follows:

"Two important events take place on 10 July. One is a blow he had not expected. According to Rauf Bey's memoirs, it is the event that gave Mustafa Kemal the deepest despair of his life. Although at first glance the event looks insignificant. The Chief of Staff, Kâzım Bey, stands before him:

— Pasha, you have resigned from the army. I no longer have any possibility of continuing this duty of mine under your command. To whom shall I hand over the papers?

Mustafa Kemal's reply is a sorrowful moan. He sinks into the armchair he is sitting in, buried in deep despair:

— Is that so, sir? Very well, sir...

Rauf Bey, who was beside him at that moment, relates the event in his memoirs thus:

'I have known Mustafa Kemal since 1909. I have witnessed many of his anguished moments. But on that day, there, I never saw such dejection as at the moment when the Chief of Staff, having gathered his papers, stood before him and spoke those words...

The Chief of Staff leaves the room "with his characteristic swagger." Mustafa Kemal has collapsed into his armchair. He is despondent: he looks as though he cannot speak. But he speaks all the same. He turns to Rauf Bey.

"— Rauf, did you see? Did you see the value of the state, of office and of backing?" (Aydemir, Tek Adam, 1997: 102-103).

Rauf Orbay recounts in his memoirs that, as the episode continued, Mustafa Kemal said: "If this goes on, the only thing left for you and me to do is to withdraw to a safe place so as to avoid being trampled underfoot" (Feridun Kandemir, 1965, Hatıraları ve Söyleyemedikleri ile Rauf Orbay, İstanbul: Sinan Matbaası, p. 1965: 41-43).

Perhaps it is imagined that, with Mustafa Kemal's extraordinary charisma and command ability, he was a savior recognized, known and awaited by everyone in order to get out of the crisis the whole country was experiencing; but there is no such thing. It is well known how and why such a perception was created over time, but the nature of the matter dictates this: the only reason Mustafa Kemal was recognized and accepted was that he was Vahdettin's aide-de-camp and had been assigned by him. As a commander he may have had some name recognition, but no more than many other commanders like him. Moreover, he was the commander of the 7th Army of the Yıldırım (Thunderbolt) Army Group during the collapse of the Palestine front, which led the Ottoman Empire to accept the Armistice in the final phase of the war of destiny.

That is, he is known as one of the actors of the great defeat in which, instead of fighting and resisting, forces retreated rapidly before the British, so that the whole of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria fell into British hands within a short span of some 40 days. Or rather, even this is not really known. Had it been known, perhaps it would have been much harder for him to lead the National Struggle.

Whether because names mattered not at all, or because the Unionist (Committee of Union and Progress) commanders already carried a negative image, it is impossible that Mustafa Kemal's name was known as that of an expected savior for a movement of National Struggle in its own right.

This is a truth one can reach immediately by considering just one or two simple historical facts and respecting historical logic. Of course, for those who wish, the documents also amply confirm this. But already in the first article of the fourteen-article Law on High Treason (Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu), issued only 6 days after the establishment of the Grand National Assembly (BMM), that is, on 29 April 1920, the Assembly's allegiance to the Caliph and Sultan was strongly emphasized, and thus, while these two offices were pointed to as the source of legitimacy even of the Ankara government, it was also stated that any wrong committed against these two offices would be treated as treason against the homeland:

"Those who, by word, deed or writing, oppose or sow corruption in a manner that amounts to rebellion against the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly, which was formed with the aim of delivering the exalted seat of the caliphate and sultanate and the well-guarded imperial dominions from the hands of foreigners and of repelling their attacks, shall be deemed traitors to the homeland." (İstiklal Mahkemeleri, vol. 1, TBMM, Ankara 2015, p. 43, Beyhan 2024: 119.

Mahmut Soydan, deputy for Siirt, who stood at Mustafa Kemal's side from the first years of the Republic and, as one of his official Kemalist ideologues, published the newspaper Milliyet, conveys in very clear terms, in his memoir titled Ankaralı'nın Defteri (Mahmut Soydan, İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007), precisely the atmosphere that prevailed over the Assembly and the cadres of the National Struggle:

"Mustafa Kemal Pasha's aim is clear... Taking advantage of this situation, he wants to count the Caliph and Sultan as outside the cadre, outside the cadre of the state. Alas, the general tendency is the opposite: the idea prevails that 'the Caliph and Sultan are wronged, saving him is a duty. After deliverance, we must gather once again around the throne of the sultanate!' Indeed, some deputies are making proposals toward establishing contact with the Seat of the Sultanate as soon as possible and seeking ground for an understanding with the Istanbul Government" (p. 13).

Soydan's statements state very clearly that the understanding that prevailed in the First Assembly, and in a significant part of the Second Assembly as well, was the rescue of both the sultanate and the caliphate. The fact that Mustafa Kemal later used the strength he drew from a movement formed for this purpose to abolish the sultanate and the caliphate and to proclaim the Republic and his own presidency obviously came about as a deviation from this agreed understanding, and moreover without following any democratic procedures at all.