Running off with the party of one who says "I have a coup"

The biggest wiretapping scandal in the history of the Republic has come to light. In the scope of a single investigation alone, seven thousand people, related and unrelated, were wiretapped. The scope of the investigation was founded on a fabricated subject, on a baseless tip-off letter; by manufacturing a virtual criminal organization called "Selam," they put their ear to the receiver of whomever they wished in connection with it.

Had the government done these things, the opposition would normally now be rightly raising the roof. More normally still, it is in fact generally governments that do these things, and the opposition does its job as opposition precisely here. Even if not the government but a criminal organization had done this, the opposition would look in it for the government's negligence, fault or turning a blind eye, and would again do its job as opposition on that account. What is more, in this wiretapping case those ears had also listened to their own telephones.

Of course, what is not normal at all is that the opposition has no complaint whatsoever about such a wiretapping scandal. A spy network that secretly listened to it for years and kept archives on it is being exposed, and no one hears the main opposition party, the CHP, complaining about it. Instead, at best, it serves by providing political protection to the wiretap recordings that this wiretapping network serves up, so that they can be served up. Even if the audio recordings were genuine, they would be enough for the main opposition as a crime, as a scandal, but on top of that it turns out the audio recordings are also a montage. In one respect the situation is a portrait of the opposition having come unhinged.

It is easy to say "If there is a coup, I will be the first to stand in front of the tank." But what if the coup is carried out without using any tanks at all? The main opposition leader who said this earlier has never refrained from supporting any coup attempt set in motion against the government up to now. In these days when we are leaving behind 17 years since 28 February, it draws, in another respect, the picture that we have never managed to form a consensus against coups.

The community media says it has nothing to do with the audio recording alleged to have taken place between the prime minister and his son, which turned out to be a montage, but by its news reports it shows that it has taken this job upon itself. Just as it has owned all its other illegal activities, the networking within the judiciary, and the 17 December operation with all its elements. With all these activities it is plain as day that the community is involved in a coup attempt, and Kılıçdaroğlu owns this coup too.

What does it show that Kılıçdaroğlu, who earlier owned all the coup processes such as Balyoz, Sarıkız, Ayışığı and Eldiven, saying "tell me where the Ergenekon terrorist organization is so I can go and join," has now signed up to the coup attempt of the community that stood against those coup attempts? Is it simply Kılıçdaroğlu's coup addiction? Could there be an addiction so complete that it takes away one's mind to the point of being driven to go and enlist wherever he smells a coup, regardless of who is carrying it out?

What does it mean that Kılıçdaroğlu, who for years has all but adopted Silivri as his identity, is now enrolled in the coup attempt of the Community that has all but waged war on those in Silivri? These are presumably the behaviors either of someone who does not know what he is doing, or of someone who has been part of an intrigue against those in Silivri from the start.

It is also, I think, worth remembering that the Ergenekon case, which began properly, was watered down after a certain point, and that its real culprits were never reached.

We can also ask why "number 1," who occupied the agenda for a long time and was a matter of curiosity, was never reached. That "number 1" could not be reached with this technology, with this organizational and intelligence capacity, is in itself significant enough. It is better understood from the style of intelligence and politics whose every detail is now coming to light that the knowledge of number 1 and all the numbers around him was reached and that at some stage an agreement was reached with them, and that all the crimes were loaded onto those who had been caught earlier and the job was finished.

In fact, if one looks at where those who were named as the usual suspects for Number 1 in those days stand afterwards, and especially these days, the missing parameters of this settlement are also completed. How else can we explain that the unease felt in the same circles during the Ergenekon investigation has turned in these days into a militant insolence in the community's ranks?

And what other meaning could there be in Kılıçdaroğlu's having tied his entire election campaign to materials served up by the community's intelligence apparatus?