The AK Party at 25 (I) The first quarter-century: a strengthened state, a developed society

Amid the excitement of celebrating the 25th anniversary, reminding ourselves of these things may not be especially cheering, but let us begin our words this way and pull things together afterward: Political movements, like people, have lifespans. Some are exhausted before they are even born; some come to power but withdraw without leaving a mark; and some not only govern but change the direction of their era. As for the AK Party (Justice and Development Party), at the end of the 25 years it leaves behind today, it deserves to be assessed no longer merely as a political party, but as a historical experience that has stamped Türkiye's last quarter-century and that is, from a far longer perspective, in fact unparalleled.

Anniversaries of this kind are important opportunities not only for celebrating the past but also for taking stock. For the real value of achievements emerges to the extent that we can understand the transformation of mentality that made them possible.

Undoubtedly, the AK Party's greatest achievement is not the completed projects that we will see presented in abundance during these very celebrations. Of course city hospitals, highways, airports, the domestic automobile, natural gas discoveries, breakthroughs in the defense industry, armed drones (SİHAs), energy investments and export records are important, and highly valuable as the realization of a world that could not even have been dreamed of. But all of these are parts of a larger transformation.

The real change is the considerable distance traveled on the road to becoming a state, even a nation, able to make its own decisions, having emerged from the order of tutelage to which Türkiye had been accustomed for many years.

There was once a Türkiye in which outside centers largely decided which weapons we would buy, which countries we would have relations with, and how we would behave in which crisis. Today there is a Türkiye acting on its own strategic reasoning across a broad geography stretching from Libya to Somalia, from Karabakh to Syria, from the Balkans to Africa.

This change is a transformation that no one of sound mind, reason and conscience could belittle.

Localization in the defense industry is not merely a technical development; it is one of the most concrete indicators of political independence. Investments in the energy field are also not merely economic projects; they are a condition for conducting foreign policy more independently. And diplomatic openings do not simply mean opening new embassies; they are Türkiye's reestablishing contact with, embracing and restoring relations with its own civilizational basin.

In recent years, the Development Road Project, the opening to Africa, the new balances established in the Caucasus and, finally, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan should likewise be read as continuations of the same strategic line.

These developments show that Türkiye has reached a capacity to shape not only its own security but also the regional security architecture.

In fact, the last twenty-five years can be summarized in a single sentence: Türkiye has ceased to be the object of equations set up by others and has become a subject that sets up its own equations. And this is by no means an easily won gain.

The struggle waged on the night of 15 July, the determination shown in the fight against terrorism, the energy diplomacy conducted in the Eastern Mediterranean, the support given to Azerbaijan in Karabakh, the security belt established in Syria, and being able today to stand at the center of regional cooperation axes are different stations of the same historic march.

For this reason, the AK Party's first quarter-century should essentially be read as the rebuilding of independent state capacity. A rebuilding that is the work of a strong leadership and of a strong cadre acting in harmony with that leader... The greatest advantage that made possible this performance of the AK Party, which can be described only as a "revolution," is without doubt the strong leadership embodied in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

However, at the end of 25 years, how much has been achieved, in terms of social, economic and political justice, in the first part of the undisputed revolution that has taken place in the second part of the AK Party's name, namely "justice," is the most vital question before us, and it will be the most important burden on the AK Party's mission for another 25 years.

The questions this burden raises take us back, in fact, to the initial question of the relationship of Muslims in Türkiye with politics. Should we have worked to reach a good, just, Muslim society and to develop it, or to reach a developed society and to heal it? "Good" people who let themselves be swept along by the current of politics somehow arrived at a developed society, but the goods postponed for the sake of the priorities of the development process have brought us to quite a different place. Of course not a very distant place; it is not at all a place from which there is no return from the turns taken, nor one where no improvement can be made at this stage, but it is also quite clear that it is harder. Of course, the strengthening of the state and the development of society do not necessarily bring about the realization of justice. Roads can be built. Factories can be established. Armies can be modernized. The economy can grow. But all of this alone is not enough to produce a strong and just society.

What the AK Party set out to achieve was not merely strong institutions, but a strong, just, moral society. Perhaps the most important question of the coming period arises right here:

The greatest success of the first 25 years was that Türkiye became once again a state able to stand on its own feet. But the success of the second quarter-century will be measured not only by building a stronger state, but by putting forward a stronger society, a sounder family, a more self-confident youth, and a civilizational claim wholly rid of the remnants of the colonial mentality.

Because raising the state to its feet was hard, but raising the human being to his feet is harder still. And perhaps the real issue of the next 25 years is precisely this.