What kind of disaster does Turkey's election promise, and for whom?

As Türkiye moves quickly toward the elections, we are beginning to hear, in a louder tone and with greater openness, voices showing that the results of these elections are not limited to Türkiye. Hear is hardly the word; some are openly, directly joining the election campaigns as if they were a party to them. In fact, however much this situation disturbs the People's Alliance in particular, and however much it may feel like speaking from the sidelines, or even interference, I think all these outbursts, these comments against the AK Party or Erdoğan, have a valid excuse: the achievements and accumulation of power that the AK Party, under Erdoğan's leadership, has produced during its 20 years of rule on its own, and whose effect is felt more each day in the international community.

Thanks to these achievements and this accumulation of power, the elections held in Türkiye today are not limited to Türkiye; in fact, in general, what happens in Türkiye is not limited to Türkiye. This is the reality that led the Washington Post (WP) to run the headline "the most important election," saying that the results of many elections to be held in the world in 2023 could be neglected, but that the elections in Türkiye will have an effect on all world politics.

The capacity of elections in one country to affect other countries and international balances is, to a great extent, the most important proof of that country's power. That is why, for example, the US elections concern everyone. The WP openly speaks of how both Erdoğan's winning and his not winning will change many things.

The current leaders of the US and EU countries do not hesitate to wish that Erdoğan not win, because Erdoğan has dared, in effect, to freeze the functioning of NATO in favor of his own country. Whereas in an equation without Erdoğan, Türkiye would not dare to use its veto right in NATO, and the process there could run smoothly with Türkiye neglected. Meanwhile, the support of NATO member countries for terrorist organizations against Türkiye could continue, and despite this they too could be made members of the alliance without facing a veto from Türkiye.

Instead of appreciating Erdoğan's effective leader diplomacy in the Ukraine war, the article in the WP also voices concerns that this accumulation of power has taken Türkiye out of control and made it headstrong. Seeing the matter as getting closer to Putin, rather than as a country looking after its own interests, is their own delusion. They are the ones who, when it suits them, hold a lovers' gathering even with the devil.

Now the cover through which the Economist expressed its attitude toward the Turkish elections is also being talked about. The magazine, which placed the silhouette of President Erdoğan on the crescent on the Turkish flag on its cover, used the expression "Türkiye on the brink of catastrophe" in its election analysis. Whatever they represent, it is understood that, from their standpoint, Erdoğan's winning the elections is a catastrophe, and they state this openly.

So why should it be a catastrophe, for the circles the Economist represents, that a government of 20 years receives approval from its own people, by a democratic choice, for another 5 years? Do they hope to live through something worse than what they have lived through in 20 years?

Undoubtedly Erdoğan has shown what he will do, by what he has done over 20 years. Even if he wins another 5 years in power, he will win it not by his own authoritarian decision but by the people's vote, that is, through elections, the clearest manifestation of democracy. Why is this a catastrophe for the Economist and those behind it, who claim to take democracy as their basis?

In fact, the catastrophe is that, because of Erdoğan's coming victory, all the investments made in the opposition will come to nothing. Because, as Türkiye got out of their control over 20 years, they thought that this time they could really topple Erdoğan, whom they had somehow put up with, and these hopes appear to have come to nothing in the current picture. For they see that the opposition facing Erdoğan does not give hope and will not be able to topple Erdoğan. After the analysis in the WP states that the opposition has put forward no vision in the economy or in any other area, it expresses with great disappointment that Erdoğan leads in the polls that follow.

The catastrophe the Economist sees is no different: the disappointment created by the opposition in which they invested and which they supported, in doing what they want.

What is more interesting is that, with these external actors' packages of expectations, an election campaign in Türkiye would serve only Erdoğan.

Because what they openly want is for Türkiye to behave more compromisingly in NATO, in relations with Greece, in the Eastern Mediterranean, in relations with the EU, and in the fight against terror, to stop its investments in the defense industry, and to give up seeking different alliances to meet its own defense needs. When Erdoğan's politics has made Türkiye an important international power in all these matters, which campaign would have a chance of success against them? Which promise built on making concessions in these areas could appeal to the Turkish people, and how could it convince them?

Of course, this is not the Economist's first position against Erdoğan on the opposition front in elections. It had similar outbursts in earlier elections, but it was seen that it had no effect on the elections in Türkiye.

Türkiye's election is one that can be influential across the world, but in these elections only citizens of the Republic of Türkiye vote. This is the most important point that the opposition, especially in seeking allies and support from outside Türkiye, must not forget for a single moment.