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Will Rouhani change Iran's Syria policy? Or "The Rouhani Era in Iran"

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Hassan Rouhani, who won Iran's presidential election held in June, officially took over the office from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Friday after receiving the approval of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Yesterday he was sworn in at the Iranian Parliament in a ceremony attended by invited international statesmen. This is the first time since the Revolution that a leader who won an election in Iran has taken the oath in a ceremony with this kind of international participation. This is seen as the first harbinger of Rouhani's opening in Iran's foreign policy from now on.

Throughout the election, Rouhani gave messages of change in both Iran's domestic and foreign policy. Although these messages did not have a radical tone, they created great hope among those in Iran who favor change, and toward the end he managed to gather all the votes of the opposition known as the Green Movement in 2009. Even so, unlike the Green Movement, whose leading members, above all Hossein Mousavi and his wife Zahra Rahnavard, are in detention, he did not build his discourse as one opposed to the system. Indeed, throughout the campaign he constantly emphasized his loyalty to the religious leader, to Khamenei, and insistently explained that change would take place with the permission and under the patronage of the religious leadership. Even this much was enough both to gather the opposition's votes and to show that a certain degree of change in Iranian politics from now on is also a quest and demand of the system in Iran. There are internal and external compelling factors pushing the system toward this quest. It is thought that the prestige Iran has recently lost, particularly because of its Syria policy, in the Arab-Islamic world, where it was previously viewed with great sympathy because of its contribution to the Palestinian cause, has reached alarming proportions for Iran. At home, the economic and political problems that made daily life considerably harder in the Ahmadinejad period are forcing this change. The election results, as they stand, have brought Iran an incomparable relief compared with the past. The 2009 elections, instead of reducing tensions in society, had increased them further, and Iran had witnessed prolonged, tense demonstrations.

Foreign Minister Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu attended Rouhani's swearing-in ceremony on behalf of Turkey. Yusuf Ziya Cömert from the daily Star and Akif Beki from the daily Radikal accompany him, and on the plane, we first ask him about the meaning of the messages of change Rouhani has given. In Iran, where the elements of the system that share all the mistakes of the previous period are very strong, what can Rouhani change? What might be the reflections of this change, especially on Syria policy?

Davutoğlu first gives a long analysis of the Iranian political system, and explains that, because very influential actors can be effective on the system at the same time, it would be wrong to load everything onto Rouhani at once and to expect a very radical paradigm shift from him. In fact, Rouhani will surely have his own line, but this can materialize only as a difference of line and tone rather than a paradigmatic change.

AD: "The Iranian system also contains special institutions that are one of a kind. Like the position of Khamenei, like Rafsanjani's Expediency Council, the parliament has a special place. Within all this, we will see what kind of change there will be in the rules and customs settled within Iran's deep-rooted state tradition."

Davutoğlu relates that, precisely because of this feature, during the nuclear talks he told Catherine Ashton, "Negotiations with Iran can only be held in Iran; negotiations held outside have no chance of succeeding because they do not take into account the existence of these decision centers."

Question: Even if the basic parameters remain the same, you expect differences within them. Where do you expect them?

AD: First of all in Syria. Considering that Hezbollah has entered the field and fought in Syria in person, Iran's Syria policy has recently moved beyond taking a diplomatic position and assumed the character of being a direct party on the ground. This worries all of us in terms of Iran's general image in the region and the contribution it will make to the region. Today the region needs peace and stability. Iran's attitude is an important element for there to be this peace and stability. We hope that this element will be assessed correctly. A serious reconsideration by Rouhani, especially of the policy of the last two years, will also contribute to regional peace. But if the same policies continue as if everything were going right, Rouhani's term may lead to a new disappointment in the region. We would not want such a disappointment to be experienced. Rouhani has an accumulation of experience from past policies that could make him effective. He has weight both because of his identity coming from within the religious tradition and because he conducted serious negotiations in the most critical periods. He has also been perceived positively in the outside world. As a leader who combines these two identities, he can continue Khatami's line by reinforcing it with new elements and in this sense can open a new era.

Question: So what will be the sign of this new era? Where will we feel whether there is change in Iran?

AD: The basic sign is of course a change in Syria policy. There would be a few indications of this.

One, Hezbollah's military presence in the field and Iran's indirect presence in the field must be limited and withdrawn, so that it ceases to be a party.

Two, it must take steps that show that its concern is not with one person or one segment of Syria but with Syria as a whole. A policy based on the necessity of keeping in power, no matter what, someone who massacres his own people is not a policy that looks at Syria holistically.

Three, it must now bring to the fore the elements it attributes to itself as fundamental values. You cannot say you are against Israel's oppression and at the same time show tolerance for similar oppression. For example, hundreds of mosques have been destroyed, and among them were mosques of very high symbolic value. It needs to take a clear stand against these destructions and massacres. It needs to show that it respects all religious sites without distinguishing between Shiite and Sunni. It is not right to remain silent while the Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque is razed to the ground in Homs, yet take positions toward the protection of Shiite sites. For us there is no distinction between Shiite and Sunni sites; the Umayyad Mosque and the Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque are as important as the Sayyida Zaynab shrine. These are changes to be made in the messages given to the peoples of the region. Perhaps it is not right to expect it necessarily to stand by the opposition, but at the very least it must not give such a legitimizing role to the regime's oppression.

According to Davutoğlu, there are expectations of Rouhani on 3 different levels.

The domestic expectation is the people's expectation: the improvement of the economic situation and the taking of steps toward this end.

The international expectation is that the nuclear program be brought to a path of resolution and that there be an improvement on this matter.

The regional expectation is a review of the policies in Syria.

Question: In the context of the Rouhani period, where will Turkish-Iranian relations go?

AD: Turkish-Iranian relations are also among the most deeply rooted relations in the region. In bilateral relations there was an atmosphere of mutual trust in the period of the Tehran agreement. In the Ahmadinejad period, despite mutual disagreements, we were able to make progress in certain areas. Now, in the Rouhani period, again despite disagreements, we are ready for a more open and sincere dialogue on regional issues, Syria above all. In this sense, it is important that a new perspective be added. We believe there is the possibility of a new dialogue with Rouhani.