Political notes from Cairo

In Egypt, where we are for ATCOSS 2012, we are not neglecting our observations and conversations on the state of Egypt and of the revolution. Looking at the traffic on the streets of Cairo, we can say that nothing has changed. There is a traffic that was, as before, extremely fast and seemingly chaotic, but behind this chaotic appearance there is an order working with extraordinarily strong reflexes, in which everyone can adjust themselves to everyone else very quickly. Although there are traffic lights at very few points, no long, insurmountable jams form at the intersections. This form of traffic can be used as a model-metaphor for Egypt's political and social structure.

After the revolution, the most important issues of all political circles are focused on the economy and security. There seems to be a tacit agreement on the aspects of the political regime concerning especially religion-state relations, because with the Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafis' Nour Party taking nearly 75 percent of the votes, the debate over Egypt's being an Islamic state and Islamic law's being the source of legislation seems to have ended. The debate is therefore concentrated rather on what kinds of possibilities Islamic law holds with respect to human rights, freedoms and the requirements of democracy. The debates held on this subject and the views put forward seem set to produce new discourses and ijtihads in terms of Islamic political philosophy.

In Egypt's post-revolution political situation there is a calendar that works, albeit slowly. But the calendar's being spread over a long period also increases the feeling of uncertainty. The constitution has not yet been prepared. For that reason, a parliament has been formed through elections that began at the end of November and concluded toward mid-January, but neither its powers nor its relations with the government are yet determined. Even though elections have been held, the government determined by the military is still in office. There is no structural change in the military's relations with the government, the economy and society in general, but its role in all these areas is being loudly questioned, and it is stated that the revolution will be complete only when the military too is drawn back to a certain line.

One of the revolutionaries we spoke to in their tents in Tahrir Square, referring to the debate on secularism that Prime Minister Erdoğan started during his visit to Egypt, said, "We need secularism not in religion-state relations but in military-state relations." Indeed, however controversial the expression Turkish model may be, in all the debates that need to be held this model is somehow remembered, and Turkey's being a model is expressed most indisputably when it comes to military-civilian relations. As in many matters, in this one too, Erdoğan's having subordinated the military to the civilian will is regarded as one of the most important features of his leadership.

In the presidential race that will begin in May, the candidates are becoming increasingly clear. Apart from Amr Moussa and Mohamed ElBaradei, the names of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who left the Brotherhood because he announced his candidacy, and Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, the Salafis' candidate, stand out.

On the lower floor of the Cairo University Faculty of Economics, where we were organizing the congress's meetings, there was intense activity starting from the campus garden. The reason was that Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh was going to meet university students and give a speech in the three-hundred-seat amphitheater. There was a crowd in the hall so dense that a pin dropped would not reach the floor, and an even larger crowd had to watch the speech on screens outside. We have no room to go into the content of Aboul Fotouh's speech, which we had the chance to listen to for an hour, but for the man himself we will say this much: He definitely has leadership qualities, a high oratorical ability, a broad vision, and strong acceptance among different segments of the people, especially young people.

The two most important problems making themselves felt after the revolution in Egypt are the economy and security. The economy was not very good before either; indeed, it was one of the most important reasons that persuaded the masses to rise up. But after the revolution, it is seen that there is a serious lawlessness regarding security and that this has created serious unease among the public. These are the two important issues on whose concrete solutions political parties and discourses too are increasingly choosing to concentrate.

On this subject the assessments of Prof. Seyfettin Abdülfettah, a faculty member of Political Science at Cairo University, were very interesting: "Until now, the only thing Egyptian security forces cared about and specialized in was the protection of the regime. When the Mubarak regime disappeared, the security forces did not know what to do, because they had not developed an expertise in protecting the people, ensuring the people's security. This creates a serious internal security vacuum."

Indeed, isn't the sum of the process called the Arab Spring, in part, the collapse of the mukhabarat regimes that protected their regimes against their own peoples?

From an Islamic perspective, Seyfettin Abdülfettah formulates the two most important attributes of a state with reference to Surah Quraysh of the Holy Quran: "Removing hunger and ensuring security." These appear to be the two priority issues of Islamist parties in Egypt today.

In sum, the revolution in Egypt is a long-haul process and struggle. We have tried to present a small cross-section of this process's present appearance.