← All articles · Turkey and politics
Time for justice for the AK Party

The AK Parti, which has been governing Turkey alone for 9 years, has left behind 10 years since its founding. From the hour it was trying to come to power to all the time it has remained in power, it struggled, like an opposition, against a continuous state-centered resistance. In the first general elections it entered, its leader was banned, and it was a rising force toward which all the state actors of the time, beginning with the president of the time, did not hide their cold, even hostile, looks and attitudes.
This look of the state created an interesting environment that required the AK Parti to play the role of opposition even while in power. The AK Parti obtained every gain by wresting it from forces that held a distrustful and hostile attitude toward it. When democratization, as an oppositional discourse and program, became integrated with its position in power, a strange situation of course emerged.
In view of the question that Mümtaz'er Türköne sought an answer to in yesterday's piece, the failure of an opposition to the AK Parti to emerge during this time stems partly from this special position of its. But as much as this special position, the ontological closeness of the CHP, which is expected to be the (main) opposition in appearance, to the forces in power is among the most important reasons for this opposition vacuum. While the AK Parti spent most of its time in power like an opposition party that demands things and gets them one way or another, the CHP and its supporting circles were busy organizing state resistance against the opposition demands the AK Parti was voicing. We can say that this picture did not change at all until the 12 September referendum.
Perhaps the new situation that began with 12 September and was consolidated with the results of the 12 June elections is forcing government and opposition to settle into their places. Because of the position it was in, the AK Parti had no difficulty moving immediately into the role of governing party. The CHP's adapting to the role of opposition, however, still seems likely to take time. The discursive back-and-forth within the party stems partly from a search forced by its circumstances. The CHP should keep searching. There is great benefit for the country in its finding suitable fields, discourses and gaps for a beneficial opposition. Although the present cadres do not yet look very promising for this task, in general the CHP will find, at the end of this search, a ground for a real opposition that corresponds to something. It has no other choice.
Today the AK Parti has emerged and become prominent as an important political brand through which Turkey has been able to establish its influence in world politics. As much as its inspiring effect in the process called the Arab Spring, the AK Parti is seen to appeal to a strong buyer base as an attractive Turkey brand. While all the parties established in Egypt, Islamist and secular, Sufi and Salafi, show a special interest in the Turkish experience, almost all of them do not hide their desire to take the AK Parti as a model. Among them are even those who have translated it entirely, with its name and program, and are implementing it in Egypt. In Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria too, the AK Parti is a significant source of interest for political movements.
The change it has pioneered at home in "development"-oriented areas such as health, education, transportation, informatics, finance and administration is reflected in these countries also through its foreign policy performance. The closeness shown to regional problems in foreign policy and the self-confidence displayed vis-à-vis Western countries, while increasing Turkey's power and effectiveness, also bring the AK Parti forward as the actor that lifts Turkey up.
In the ten-year accounting of the AK Parti, it can be said that the emphasis on identity has remained somewhat vague in the face of this performance displayed in development. Truly, both the language of the openings in foreign policy and the party's performance in democratizing the country against the military and bureaucratic tutelage institutions may leave no need for any emphasis on identity. Perhaps another and no less important factor is that the position attributed to the party, via the theme of "lifestyles," by those who oppose the party from the position of power, meets the party's need for identity more than its own definition does.
Yet there is a clear contradiction between the reformist will displayed and the "conservative" identity the party has assumed. In the party's accounting of identity, therefore, this distance between conservatism and reformism has always been confusing. Developmentalism does not meet a need for identity; yet "justice" in the party's name could be emphasized as an identity and civilizational reference, by being given its due a bit more and worked on much better.
It is astonishing that the AK Parti has not worked on the theme of "justice" as much as it has worked on conservative democracy, for example that it has organized neither a workshop nor a symposium on it. What has been done on judicial reform and the fair distribution of prosperity is very important in parallel with other things done, but creating an awareness on this matter is also very important. Otherwise it would never be possible to develop a sensitivity about the importance and historical direction of what has been done, and neither could the value of the gains be known nor could measures for sustaining these gains be taken.
The AK Parti has been in power alone for three terms. The thought that this power is a historical necessity requires a kind of determinism in which the role of the human being is entirely ignored, which does not suit us. Erdoğan's undisputed charisma and the political performance he has displayed throughout the whole process do not tell a story like "whoever it was in this period would have done the same." Of course historical conditions put opportunities before us, but meeting these opportunities with a sound and intelligent appraisal and with a firm and persevering performance is precisely what reveals the difference of will bestowed on human beings.
Yet one must also see the danger that this charisma may become routinized early and turn into something that produces no value other than a corrupting power. Precisely for this reason, it is necessary to cling to "justice" in the party's name as a value and to develop a strong consciousness and awareness of it.