Mutual forgiveness instead of reckoning at the YAŞ

The Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), as far as can be seen, ended up with results quite different from how it began. The atmosphere created before the Council by the resignation of the force commanders had given the impression that the government would determine the TSK entirely according to its own considerations. For the process that led to the resignations of Koşaner and the other force commanders, although the commanders did not aim at this with their resignations, resulted in leaving the whole field to the political will.

By contrast, the uncompromising attitude of both President Abdullah Gül and the prime minister from the very beginning, the prime minister's strong underlining that he is the chairman of the YAŞ, and his statement that he would not accept the imposition of custom in the shaping of the command echelon, raised expectations considerably regarding appointments and assignments. Yet judging by the YAŞ decisions, apart from preventing Saldıray Berk and Arslan Güner from being appointed to force commands and placing some Balyoz and Ergenekon defendants in passive posts, most appointments and promotions came out in the direction that the resigning command echelon also wanted.

Even so, we can see the picture that emerged from a week of YAŞ agenda as a real gain in terms of military-civilian relations. The image of the prime minister alone in the chair at the YAŞ meeting has already been recorded as the most symbolic expression of these gains. Truly, although the decisions, appointments and promotions that came out were realized more in line with the wishes of the military wing than of the politicians, this result came about not as an imposition of the military side but perhaps as a gesture given in response to its request. With this gesture, said to have been made to give the new Chief of the General Staff a good opportunity for a start, the oversight, permission and approval of the political will were recognized as an indisputable condition for what comes after as well. This produced a strange equation, but given the current structure of the YAŞ, it was the most realistic equation the government could set up with the means at its disposal.

First of all, the fact that the political will is decisive in the YAŞ process was, for the first time, so thoroughly taken for granted both by the military and by the whole public, with its opposition and media. If the military gives assurance that it will adopt democratic standards and stay within these lines, it is unthinkable for anyone, especially the government, to be in a revanchist or hostile attitude toward TSK members in the first place.

The aim is a strong army structure that can perform its well-defined duties within democratic limits in the best way, and a level of civil-military relations likewise established on democratic standards. In the end, if the desired changes can be made in mutual understanding and dialogue, there is no benefit to anyone in preferring conflict, tension and opposition.

It is possible that Erdoğan, feeling assured that the military has been drawn sufficiently into its own lane on this matter, has preferred "reconciliation (helalleşme) instead of settling accounts." There is of course no guarantee that reconciliation will put everything right, but it is certain that at certain stages of politics it is a very beneficial thing.

However, how right reconciliation is, if the wrongs or injustices that gave rise to the problem continue to be committed, is also an important question. The problem is not only that relations between this particular prime minister and that particular command echelon are good. Let us not forget that in the Tansu Çiller period too, perhaps not to this extent, Doğan Güreş, the Chief of the General Staff of the time, in describing his relations with the prime minister, said "the Prime Minister commands snap, I do it crack," and perhaps displayed an apparently very ideal example for civil-military relations, but everyone knew the relations were not at all like that.

Therefore even for a "legitimate and honorable reconciliation" to be possible, justice must have been established. As long as the current structure in civil-military relations, and especially in the YAŞ institution, continues, the photograph the prime minister will give this year, and probably in the coming years, will always remain an exception. What is wrong is the TSK's being in a structure completely independent of politics and of public oversight. In the YAŞ's structure, decisions being taken by majority vote never leaves the prime minister or politics, even though he is chairman, the possibility of having the last word in case of dispute. The structure of the YAŞ always rests on an arrangement in which the soldiers have the last word. Therefore the prime minister and the defense minister have no influence at all on decisions taken within an institution that is under the prime minister's command. In this year's YAŞ too, in fact, the prime minister and the president could be effective only through their own particular performances; otherwise the legislation did not fail to allow, as always, larger crises and images of military tutelage.

For the photograph given at the YAŞ meeting to become permanent, the YAŞ law must by all means be overhauled in a manner befitting a democratic country. Here it is imperative that the YAŞ be turned into a purely advisory body and that, as defined by law, the civilian will be made the sole determinant in commanders' appointments and promotions. In addition, by attaching the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defense, the situation that actually came about at this year's YAŞ meeting must be made a beneficial occasion for creating a legal ground.

Ultimately, a reconciliation that will also satisfy the sense of justice in all hearts can be made possible by a constitution that has established justice.