The problem of understanding Öcalan

It was said that the PKK attack in Silvan was at the same time a blow against Öcalan. For Öcalan had said not long ago that the talks with the state were going well, that he had received a strong declaration of will from the government on resolving the problem, and for this reason he had ordered the continuation of the ceasefire that was due to end on 14 July.

For years the PKK had, for better or worse, got both the state and Turkish public opinion to accept the line that "Öcalan's will is our will." Yet at the very moment when this very demand was being met, the PKK moved to the most sensational and provocative action, contrary to Öcalan's will, and this was naturally regarded as a clear sign that it disregarded Öcalan's will. Granted, Cemil Bayık in Kandil, while on the one hand taking refuge in certain ambiguities in Öcalan's statements, on the other hand went down the path of reconciling the action with Öcalan's person by saying that Öcalan had been misled or stalled by the state, and that this ambiguity itself therefore contained a separate message. Thus he in effect said that, although Öcalan appeared to want the ceasefire to continue, it was understood that the KCK could make its own assessment of the situation and develop its own initiative. Although the first perceptions of the link between the Silvan attack and Öcalan's reflected will were that a blow had been struck against Öcalan, the "perception regarding Öcalan's will" was soon restored in line with the will of Kandil.

In fact this incident was a perfect example of what kind of phenomenon Öcalan has become. The debate that emerged in Kandil from the day Öcalan was arrested, over "how much a leadership position held captive in enemy hands can be taken into account," was soon settled in favor of Öcalan's authority. His own lawyers' accounts showed how this came about. An Öcalan authority over the PKK was needed, and this authority would have little to do with Öcalan's person. Öcalan was a symbol, and the PKK and Kurdish nationalism would be run by making use of this symbol.

Today, although it is insisted upon that Öcalan is the sole authority regarding the Kurdish or PKK problem, no one notices that the will reflected from Öcalan is ultimately an ambiguous text that has passed through several filters. The notes taken from what Öcalan tells his lawyers are passed through several filters and virtually rewritten, and the desired texts are announced to the public through Fırat News. If no one is left to care how much this text still has to do with Öcalan's intention, then everyone must have been seized by a state of ideological frenzy.

This is very common especially in ideologies based on a cult of a dead person. There is a monopoly of interpretation over that person's statements. Those who hold this monopoly of interpretation, which is called orthodoxy, present their own interpretation as "the meaning most faithful to the original," and in the name of that ideology they also establish a status quo. Yet if one scrutinizes it a little, the person in whose name they speak is of no importance at all. They themselves make him speak as they wish.

One of the closest examples we have lived through is Kemalism. Those who established Kemalism as an ideology reinterpreted Atatürk whenever and however they wished, and from him they produced, whenever they wished, a fascist figure, and at other times socialist, nationalist, populist, coup-making figures. When they wanted to stage a coup they relied on Atatürk; when they wanted to apply a Western lifestyle or policies, they ran an Atatürk discourse suited to that. When some dissidents, having discovered this usefulness of Atatürk, dared to produce their own Atatürks, the armed guardians of orthodoxy cried "hey!" "Interpreting Atatürk correctly is not your business." Let us recall the harsh reaction of Çevik Bir against Erbakan, who said during the 28 February period, "If Atatürk were alive, he would be a Refah supporter."

Yet Atatürk had nothing to do with either Kemalism or all of these discourses. He was someone who, in the period in which he lived, had taken his own test, for better or worse, in the face of certain events, and it was out of the question for him to take a stance toward events after his death. Yet it has become a ritual routine for the status quo defenders to reserve an Atatürk seat right beside wherever they stand in the face of every event.

The monastery priests' delivering their own messages to the people in the name of idols they themselves erected, from behind those idols, is likewise a typical pagan scene. Whom this idol represents is not very important. Unfortunately, sometimes very good people (even prophets such as Jesus and Moses) can be turned into instruments of this pagan way of establishing authority. Of course, they are innocent of the conduct of those who turned them into idols.

What is being done to Öcalan's person today is the same thing. What he says is not important at all. What matters is under what conditions he is made to say what, and I do not at all think that Öcalan himself has any control over what is made to be said in his name.

The tragic side of this for Öcalan is that all other orthodoxy figures fall victim to this instrumentalization only after they die, that is, from a moment when they have no control left over how their statements will be understood. Yet Öcalan is subjected to this treatment while still very much alive. Before he dies, his idol is erected and made to say whatever is wanted. When the things made to be said by him do not work, the things he is supposed to have said can immediately be disregarded and interpreted in whatever ways are desired. Because of the level of sanctity to which he has been raised, no one can directly clash with him, and even those who do can only dare to do so with a different interpretation that reconciles with him.

Of course, sanctity is not the only source of this timidity; there is also an armed force imposing that sanctity, just as in the crudest forms of all orthodoxies...