How will the TSK get out of the Cold War concept?

A week from now we enter the 2011 Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) process once again. We are already experiencing, indeed have been for quite some time, the tremors of this process. The YAŞ process makes itself felt every year with effects that either announce themselves or do not, but that invariably reflect on Turkish politics and even on social life. On the occasion of the approaching YAŞ process, the Institute for Strategic Thinking yesterday announced to the public the final report of a workshop in which it also put military-politics relations in Turkey on the table.

The promotions, appointments, term extensions or dismissals at the YAŞ have not merely determined Turkey's command echelon up to now. As long as the military's influence over politics and civilian life, which is not seen in normal democracies, continues, the YAŞ process concerns everyone. In normal democracies, who reaches which command level concerns very few people, because the military is already under the orders of politics, so the matter that people are primarily interested in is whom they have brought to the political decision-making mechanism. In Turkey, however, it has until now not been so important who the politicians actually coming to office are; who comes to the command levels has been taken almost more seriously. The scale of military tutelage over politics has turned this situation into a de facto reality.

On the other hand, while Turkey's economy has risen to 16th place among the nearly 200 UN member countries, it is still in 87th place among the 110 countries governed by democracy. How should this contradiction be explained? And this is so despite the visible democratization openings of recent times that can be felt in everyday life.

Indeed, one of the first points looked at in democratization measurements is military-politics relations. The areas in which Turkey has made progress are still insufficient, and the military's tutelary position over the system continues to keep it low in the ranking of democratic countries.

The military's tutelage over politics by various means, through the presence of military representatives in many institutions related or unrelated to them, or through keeping the military presence in the MGK in a position of oversight over many matters of the country, again related or unrelated, are only a few of the reasons for the low level of democracy. This tutelage, which it maintains over matters with which it has no connection at all, makes the TSK inefficient within itself and brings it to a weakness even in its own affairs. Today, in a more open society, we can state these findings with examples that are easier to draw attention to.

Another important subject is the structure at the YAŞ. It seems that the military bureaucracy's internal structuring has reached dimensions that cannot be left to the military. The events of last year's YAŞ crisis showed that the elements referred to as "custom" in matters such as appointments, promotions and dismissals at the YAŞ have no measure whatsoever. The history of the YAŞ's change from a consultative body to a decision-making body in these matters is again closely related to the history of coups. Again in a coup environment, the soldiers established all the rules concerning their own promotions, appointments and cadre-building by taking measures that would entirely sideline civilians. Sustaining this situation in a democratic environment is impossible.

Last year, despite the government's opposition, the YAŞ decided to promote 3 generals who were defendants in the Balyoz Case to a higher rank. Thereupon the Government and the President did not sign the promotion and appointment decrees of the commanders in question. These commanders applied to the AYİM for "annulment of the act of not promoting them to a higher rank." The AYİM ruled that these 3 generals be promoted. In the ruling it was determined that the promotion decision had been signed by all YAŞ chairmen and members without any dissenting note, that this signed decision was legally valid, that is, that the President's approval was not necessary for YAŞ decisions to be valid.

With this ruling, quite apart from the above-politics independent position in which the YAŞ places itself, its insistence on the promotion of the commanders had been turned into an altogether separate matter of proving its existence. Yet there is no need for this at all. What is sought with this is not the weakening or wearing down of the TSK, but a search for a system for a more efficient and effective TSK structure. Indeed, in its present form the TSK has proven both its inefficiency and sluggishness and its unsuitability for a democratic environment.

In the simplest terms, the logic on which the promotion mechanism rests is the reflection of a weakness that can be identified in terms of the most basic organizational sociology data. According to Article 49/d of the TSK Personnel Law No. 926: of the generals and admirals whose continued service in their rank is deemed necessary owing to service and duty needs, at most 36 generals and admirals each year may continue serving in the same rank for one more year on the proposal of the Chief of the General Staff and the decision of a two-thirds majority of the YAŞ. As a result of promotion being treated like an acquired right, and moreover without any "state of necessity" being defined, this figure is exceeded by far every year, and the number of generals and admirals is raised to far above (363) the normal (301). The idea that the soldiers detained because of Balyoz and Ergenekon would create a weakness in the TSK also becomes meaningless when one looks at these figures.

One of the most concrete images of this sluggishness is that at least one third of all officers are currently on duty in Ankara. Undoubtedly this has as much to do with the wish to maintain tutelage over the government in Ankara as with sluggishness.

That the TSK is still structured according to the needs of the Cold War era and to internal and external enemy-threat concepts is also one of the points emphasized in the report. Yet there is no longer any logic in maintaining armies on account of enmities with Greece and Russia. Especially, keeping armored units in Ankara entirely according to the definition of an "internal enemy" has no explanation today. These do not strengthen Turkey's defense; on the contrary, they create very important weaknesses.

Time is passing for a new and stronger TSK. But who will do this, and how? That is also a question. The part of the answer that is known for certain is that this matter greatly exceeds the TSK. This answer is not based on any logic of "othering the military"; it is entirely owing to the realities of organizational sociology. The reform of an institution of this scale cannot be left only to the members of that institution. And political responsibility is of course the most important side of the matter.