Politics and responsibility for a new constitution

We continue to discuss the picture that the election results have placed before us. It is quite natural for everyone to draw conclusions from this picture according to their own temperament. In the end, however clearly instructive and enlightening it may be, no event or situation removes the difference in people's approaches. This is a simple reflection of the boundless freedom of that unknown reality called the human being himself. Politics is likewise an operation that is best carried out on a ground where this freedom is secured. But this ground is also one on which everything anyone says can be objected to, debated or adopted.

The prime minister's balcony speech, in which, as a leader who emerged from the elections with an absolute victory, he spoke with a humility beyond what was expected of him and asked for forgiveness for anyone he may have offended during the election, was generally received positively. But Kılıçdaroğlu and Bahçeli, who were his real addressees, put forward an "apology" as a condition for mutual forgiveness, while Demirtaş first put forward the condition that 2000 KCK detainees be released and that the injustices done to the Kurds be accounted for.

Mutual forgiveness is one of the very functional and deep gestures of our culture and world of values. As a result of periods in which politics is conducted on a ground that is excessively confrontational and makes dialogue impossible, if politics is to continue on its way, this cultural value has a very restorative and path-opening function. Generally the side from which the request for mutual forgiveness comes is the side that assumes magnanimity. Putting forward conditions against this magnanimity is not at all well regarded. Spurning the opportunity for mutual forgiveness means having no intention either of reconciliation, or of understanding one another, or of doing anything together.

Yet since 12 June, looking at the picture that came out of the election, we make or hear interpretations that society has made its demand for a new constitution conditional on all parties working together. Indeed, for a new constitution all the parties in parliament need to contribute one way or another. For this, it is everyone's duty to take attitudes that ease rather than complicate dialogue as a result of the election; provided, of course, that everyone has received the message of responsibility to the same degree on the subject of a new constitution.

In my view, the AK Parti's not having obtained a number that could change the constitution alone or take it to a referendum has largely relieved it with respect to this responsibility. Indeed, on 12 September it reached most of its goals regarding a new constitution in terms of its own priorities. In this respect it can even be counted perhaps as the party among the existing ones that will need a new constitution the least. Whenever it wishes, it can say that the people gave it a very great mandate and power for a strong government but did not give the mandate it asked for a constitution, and extricate itself.

But such a renunciation would mean its giving up with its own hands the revolutionary role it has played in Turkish politics for the last 9 years. Which, in terms of the demands of the base that the Ak Parti represents, I think does not have the luxury of shedding this role. For a new and civil constitution, great responsibility undoubtedly falls on it too; it too must watch its behavior and discourse, see its need for the other parties in this work, and not destroy the ground of dialogue. Granted, for this reason the gestures of mutual forgiveness and withdrawal of lawsuits are a good beginning in keeping with this. But the other parties too need to know that the sole responsibility for this work no longer rests on the AK Parti.

Above all the CHP, in spite of all the opposition from within, if it is to be a party of Turkey, must see that it has no option other than turning the steering wheel toward competing with the AK Parti on democratization. It must also see that this is the only field in which it will compete with the AK Parti. The constitutional proposal it announced before the elections is not a bad proposal at all; in many respects it is more advanced than the AK Parti's, and this was hit exactly right. However, the task now is to prove that it is truly sincere on this matter.

The BDP, for its part, because it aspires to solve the problems of the masses from which it receives its votes, represents the side that should be far more constructive in its discourse. Even if the AK Parti, which it has so far had to regard as the sole interlocutor on the solution of the Kurdish question, contributes to the very end, it is no longer in a position to give it sufficient support in the Assembly. The number of interlocutors it must persuade has increased. From now on it must persuade the CHP as much as the AK Parti.

This will require the BDP to use a more measured, political and diplomatic language in its discourse. The election results enabled it to enter the Assembly in greater numbers but also placed on it a political weight and responsibility. One advantage is that both of its interlocutors have come to a certain common line on many of its demands. The definition of citizenship and the recognition, even if at different levels, of Kurdish and of exclusively Kurdish political representation is an important line. This line is sufficiently favorable for representing its own voters and defending their rights.

The BDP members must take special care to do justice to this line in order to be able to solve the problems of the masses who voted for them. This line is a political line on which every kind of problem can be discussed as never before in the history of the Republic of Turkey. It is a real gain of the democratic forces within this history. Seeing these gains, and trying to protect and develop them, is a separate responsibility. It is our right to expect this, if not from anyone else, from the BDP members who claim to represent the segments that have been victims of the anti-democratic, assimilationist, denialist policies in Turkey.