The algorithm in the candidate lists

The lists of parliamentary candidates are regarded as the most important indicators of political parties' promises and programs. What people are promised is, at first glance, and somewhat naturally, measured or perceived by who is put before them. If you say "clean society, clean politics" and yet place in the secure spots of your list names known for their close ties to the underworld and to loan sharks, then whatever you promise, the names on the list become the decisive element in the party's policies or in the credibility of its discourse.

That is why parties give their first message, even before their party programs, through the names they place on their lists.

In the end, for the coming elections all the parties have shaped their candidate lists and come before the public. The search for change in the CHP, through the various effects of its own internal dynamics, has in the end produced a "different" CHP. In the parliamentary candidate list, in which this finds expression, a change seems to have occurred, in the final analysis, from Ergenekon lawyering to Ergenekon defendant-hood. Still, we can also see that, however hesitantly and contradictorily, it has tried to give an appearance of internal diversity, with the headscarf, secularism, Kurdishness, the people, populism, family insurance and so on.

In this diversity, it is quite normal that no reliable direction can be discerned as to what the party's real policies will be, because the CHP shows very well that opening up to different people cannot be achieved merely by putting someone from that segment on the list. A list that pulls the party in opposite directions, in which the effect of one cancels that of another, ultimately has a de-politicizing effect on the party. It is very important that the idea of an opening be internalized and given meaning within the party's existing frame of reference. One should not think that this can be carried out only through lists.

This applies not only to the CHP but undoubtedly to all parties. It is striking that the AK Party, compared with the previous term, has chosen not to give emphatic messages through the names that entered its list... One clearly feels that, especially in the Southeast, it did not respond to the attractive list that the BDP produced as a result of openings that push its own limits. It seems that against the BDP's names that have by now become quite popular, it has almost deliberately and especially fielded new and unassuming names who have never been heard of. Moreover, the fact that names such as Abdurrahman Kurt and Emin Ekmen, who impressed with their performance in the previous term, have been eliminated further reinforces this impression of intentionality.

Is this really intentional, or is it an ordinary situation produced by simple political rivalry?

This situation may be interpreted differently, especially by those with different expectations. However, once the algorithm within the overall picture that has emerged is deciphered, it becomes clear that the AK Party is trying to give a different message through its list policy. What message is implicit in the list in the Southeast can, I think, be better understood only when one also looks at the lists in other regions.

By not fielding, against the BDP's candidates known for their extremely harsh and fierce personalities, names that would answer them, the AK Party signals that in the coming period it will speak a different language on the Kurdish question. Perhaps it is thought that talking too much about the problem serves not to solve it but to enlarge it further. It may also seem possible to focus on a solution with an executive mindset, without talking about the problem. The placing of Faruk Çelik, the state minister responsible for the Alevi opening, at the head of the Şanlıurfa list can be read as a signal of such an approach to the Kurdish question.

As against the effect, in the end, of politicians known for their Kurdish identity on the Kurdish question, which further deepens Kurdish identity, it seems that it will prefer to answer the problem from the center in its own language. Meanwhile, by not placing on its list the names with an MHP background that were expected, it also calculates on escaping from being caught between two nationalisms (Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms) in the face of the Kurdish question.

Whether this message will be sufficiently understood and whether it will be accepted by the people will of course emerge on 12 June.

When you try to convey the message with an algorithm that is this hard to decipher, you have to expect that it will be deciphered with a corresponding mental effort. Can political communication bear such subtle messages? Frankly, I am not sure.

In the end, the AK Party's successful periods of performance and Erdoğan's personal charisma, which is also nourished from abroad, may enable all this algorithm to be deciphered quickly, without the need for much mental effort.