The Kurdish politician's problem

The problem of the Kurdish politician appears to run much deeper than the Kurdish question. Today, when the state has opened the way for the Kurdish question to be recognized and discussed in all its aspects on an increasingly democratic ground, the question of with what will and competence the Kurdish politician can take part in this discussion is a serious problem.

The way Abdullah Öcalan received, in his meeting with his lawyers at İmralı, the words of Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir, who told a visiting European delegation that "armed struggle has outlived its time today," reveals some dimensions of this problem.

As one might expect, Öcalan's criticism does not occur merely as criticism; at best it means a heavy scolding, and at worst a threat on one's life, and for anyone in the BDP or the organization who is on the receiving end of this scolding, objecting to it requires risking one's life. Baydemir's failure to stand by his words in the face of Öcalan's scolding, and his respectful reception of Öcalan's heavy insults "as a right of criticism," made the weight of the military tutelage to which Kurdish politics is subjected thoroughly felt.

That Kurdish politics displays this picture while we live in Turkey at a level of democratization where generals can be removed from office by civilian politics is thought-provoking.

Given that intra-party democracy in Turkey is already dragging along the ground, one might expect this development to be met with understanding, but this incident is, beyond a debate inside a party, a show of the armed authority over the party. To be sure, this tutelage is no longer a secret, but it is also quite clear that the BDP, which has democracy in its name and stresses democracy at every opportunity, and which frankly commands one's admiration for the democratic courage it shows toward the state, needs a serious democratic opening regarding Öcalan and Kandil.

Of course we cannot expect the BDP to call the PKK a "terrorist organization." We can understand what such words would mean in the region and that they would instantly end all of the BDP's legitimacy and power, but it must also be said that under military tutelage the BDP constitutes more of a problem than a solution for the Kurds.

We are not in the times when Kurds were under a Kemalist policy of denial, and Turkey's political structure promises both Turks and Kurds far more democracy, human rights and respect for identity than ever before. Today Kurdish politicians can voice, in an extremely democratic environment, against every level of the state, the criticism they cannot direct at Öcalan or the PKK. But these same Kurdish politicians cannot discuss anything among themselves and against one another. No political option for the Kurds can emerge from this environment.

On the other hand, why Öcalan objected to what Baydemir said is also an important matter. Normally Öcalan himself says similar things. The process called ceasefire or non-conflict today was reached as a result of exactly this kind of assessment. Why, then, does Baydemir's merely repeating this statement, which has by now become almost the official discourse of the PKK, provoke this anger in Öcalan?

In my opinion the most important reason for this question is the PKK's hardened official policy that no one be made a partner in Öcalan's leadership. There are, of course, those who explain this by Öcalan's personal jealousy, but that the PKK be run only by Öcalan is a point on which those running the PKK project are also generally agreed. Let us not forget that the restoration of Öcalan's authority, which had ended after his capture as "a prisoner in enemy hands," was accomplished by a very complicated route to which some state forces also contributed. But earlier, too, the elimination of every charismatic figure who stepped forward in the name of the PKK is almost the very history of the PKK. Even Leyla Zana's being the object of excessive attention, even while in prison, had been a source of serious discomfort.

Osman Baydemir, for his part, was drawing the profile of a strong politician with a style of his own within Kurdish politics, and this profile was growing stronger every day. He is one of the most suitable names for those who want to hear the Kurdish question from the mouths of Kurdish politicians, and he has serious leadership potential. If there is such a thing as a Kurdish cause, and if its general interests are to be looked after, then the emergence of Baydemir and names like him should be regarded as both a success and a stroke of luck for that movement with respect to the success of that cause. But for the PKK and Öcalan, standing out this much is dangerous and forbidden.

In striking Baydemir for words that in fact do not go beyond the PKK's current official line, Öcalan on the one hand tests and consolidates his power over the BDP, and on the other settles a personal score with someone who has stepped too far forward.

Today, with Turkish politics fully determined to resolve the Kurdish question together with the violence it has produced, will this heavy tutelage that Öcalan and the PKK have established over Kurdish politics also be recognized? Will some kind of privilege be granted to this tutelage?

Setting aside whether Öcalan will be treated as an interlocutor on the road to resolving the Kurdish question, will Öcalan, in the meantime, be recognized together with his tutelage over Kurdish politics?

If so, what will the Kurds have gained once everything is over? Nothing but a dictator who humiliates their own politician and has turned his weapons against his own people...

More importantly, who will confront this question? The Kurds? The BDP? The Ak Parti?