The illusion of precedent

Kılıçdaroğlu and the CHP members in general sometimes tend, especially lately, toward a correct political line on democratization. That they are eager for a democratization race with the AK Parti is a good sign. Former chairman Deniz Baykal's defiant proposal to abolish Article 15 of the Constitution in the struggle against coup makers, and current chairman Kılıçdaroğlu's proposal, in a similarly bold tone, to abolish Article 35 of the TSK Internal Service Law, are results of this eagerness.

This eagerness is fine, but their inability to sustain the same insistence in bringing about the result of this eagerness puts them in a difficult position every time. It is understood that the CHP was truly put in a difficult position when the government, seeing the bluff, immediately responded positively and added Article 15 to the constitutional package. Because in this way it came out that they had no problem at all with Article 15, indeed that Baykal loved Kenan Evren, even the September 12 men, terribly, passionately. Then they were forced to oppose, going to extraordinary lengths, the repeal of provisional Article 15, which is the constitutional obstacle to trying September 12.

The same thing happened with Article 35. It is clear that the CHP members had based their entire calculation on the government's being wary of confronting the TSK. When the government declared that it had no reservations whatsoever on this, they officially left their proposal, in Cemil Çiçek's analogy, out in the mosque courtyard. The change they proposed would, out of the blue, formally recognize for the TSK a "right to stage a coup" that does not exist even in its present form.

Otherwise, in fact, the CHP too wants to be democratic, even to enter a race with the AK Parti for democratization when necessary. But with this government, no game of bluffing is ever played with any relish on this subject; it takes it seriously at once. It sees the bluff immediately. Whereas democracy, anti-militarism, should not be such a thing to be taken so seriously, right?

Now, regarding the situation that emerged in the YAŞ process, Kılıçdaroğlu, by saying that the government should not interfere in the TSK's customs, makes his own, but more genuine, contribution to democratization. The customs that the military formed by itself, and that for years no government has even dreamed of objecting to, supposedly must be observed.

Why is that?

Is the military the military of another republic? Does the military have another constitution? Are customs above the constitution? Evidently, the customs up to now had made civilians accept, as a de facto situation, an order above the constitution. That is why civilians could never see themselves as the government vis-à-vis the military. Because the mysterious power circulating around the word "custom" made it possible to see the constitution, the laws, power and civilian life differently.

Yet when you dare to be just yourself, when you remember that the constitution and laws were not written merely for show, you realize that the field of power established through customs is nothing but an illusion.

The laws have clearly placed the military under the command of civilian authority. Indeed, even if there is an ambiguity in the text of these laws, this ambiguity must by all means be clarified most explicitly around this principle. In civilized countries the armed forces are nothing but technical cadres under the command of civilian forces; they have neither superiority nor inferiority over other segments of society on account of the work they do. There can be no more natural right than that of the government to choose for itself the command cadres it will work with

All the more, the government's attempts to regulate the security field cannot be criticized in any way, when it is a government that has to answer for the reality of terror that has escalated as if running wild since the moment it came to power. How will a government that exercises no authority or initiative in shaping the command echelon, leaving this job entirely to the TSK, answer for terror?

It is quite clear that this is an unfair sharing of responsibility and authority. The TSK, which exercises a kind of autonomy and immunity with its own customs, neither stops the terror it is charged with stopping nor agrees to answer for its clear failure in the fight against terror. Worse, it does not refrain from laying on governments the account of all its failures that occur entirely in its own autonomous domain, in a domain into which it has never allowed anyone's interference. Frankly, this is a great injustice.

Of course the YAŞ customs cannot be left to the TSK's autonomous domain. Quite apart from the authority-responsibility framework mentioned above, it is also a separate oddity that commanders who do not hide their hostile attitude toward the government regard promotion by government decree as their natural right. These oddities may not have been seen clearly enough so far because of the illusion of custom, but now, with new customs forming, the oddity of the matter is seen a bit more clearly. There is great benefit in everyone trying to see through the window of the new customs.