The "secret of success" in the PKK

First of all, it must be said that saying that the PKK is taking on the recently escalating terror on behalf of someone else, with a subcontractor's mission, means denying neither the Kurdish question nor the PKK's influence over a broad base. Second, the organization's ability to carry out actions whenever and wherever it wishes cannot be explained by the organization's social base alone.

Looking at the stories of negligence and even collaboration that are coming to light in more and more cases, it is very clearly seen that the organization cannot carry out these actions with its own means and its own skill alone. From Dağlıca to Aktütün, from Reşadiye to İskenderun, from mine explosions to Şemdinli, in nearly all of the actions the evident favors of an invisible hand toward the organization appear before us as the "secret of success" in the organization's shocking actions.

Saying this, pointing to this invisible hand, does not require ignoring the PKK's indisputable influence over Kurdish politics at present. Although it affects all dimensions of it, the problem must at some stage definitely be distinguished.

The continuing armed clashes increase the PKK's influence on the people further with each passing day. Because after every operation the "PKK dead," pronounced with relish as if giving statistical figures, add a story of national heroism to the living spaces of the region, and from the sum of these stories ever more deeply rooted Kurdish-nationalist feelings are fed. However compassionately the state approaches, however far the government can take its opening policies, the people look at how these policies will be perceived from within the hot fight in which even their own children are involved. For this reason, as long as the climate of conflict continues, the state has no chance whatsoever of winning over the Kurdish people. Because every clash keeps the bitter memories accumulating in the region constantly fresh and wastes every kind of opening policy like seeds sown on barren soil.

In this respect, the "hidden hand" that rushes to the PKK's aid in each of the concrete attacks arrives in keeping the climate of conflict continuing at all times, in the KCK operations that are conducted irresponsibly against the favorable wind of the opening, in handcuffing those arrested in these operations, and finally in the arrest of those who surrendered by entering through the Habur gate trusting the word of the state, and it provides a strong psychological environment for the PKK's legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

Let no one reduce all of the problems to the Kurdish question. Of course, saying this should not be taken to mean that we belittle the Kurdish question, but there is no complete parallelism between the existence of the Kurdish question and the PKK's recently increasing activity. On the contrary, a "hidden hand" that insistently tries to make the PKK and its terror the main item on the agenda draws attention as a "secret of success."

It must be understood that the PKK is constantly watched over by the same hidden hand, through the very good use of an existing problem and, if need be, through bringing that problem to a depth that can feed the PKK more.

The fact that Öcalan, who had been residing in Syria until 1998, could be expelled from Syria with a sudden ultimatum somehow did not sufficiently raise the question of why this ultimatum had not been given until then. Yet the dimensions and logic of the intimate relations between Öcalan, who had been in Syria until then, and today's detained members of Ergenekon had still not been sufficiently explained. Everyone saw that those who appeared in the cozy images with Öcalan in the Bekaa were at the same time organizers of a fascist nationalism, but today the voices that refer to this relationship are somehow being drowned out as conspiracism in a bombastic style. What exactly is not understood about pointing out that the only actor that will benefit, in today's conjuncture, from the latest terror acts, which bring no contribution or benefit whatsoever either to the Kurdish people or to the people of the region, is the Ergenekon structure?

Let the rising actions not be presented as an indicator of what a colossal power the PKK has reached. Let this hidden hand be severed, and the PKK will have been pulled out from between the Kurdish question and the will to solution.

The question of how a structure organized as a small-scale state can be run through a command-and-control system established from an isolated prison like İmralı, only through meetings with lawyers, is a simple but extremely illuminating question. What task was given to Öcalan, who, when captured, said "I am at your command, I am ready to serve the Turkish state"? From that hour on, did Öcalan change his mind, or is the role he plays today a part of that task? What is the relationship between the hand that rushes to help every PKK action with logistics, intelligence and sometimes actual contribution, and the hand that gave that task? Is it not worth asking, or worth listening to the answer?