The new risks of Turkey's new foreign policy

It is an indisputable fact that Turkey's domestic and foreign policy openings are greatly increasing its influence both in the region and in the world. Each of the newly established relations further expands Turkey's sphere of international politics, and the more it penetrates these spheres, the more it increases Turkey's capacity to solve problems and to obtain political gains through these solutions. The goal of "zero problems with neighbors" put forward in the foreign policy vision is supported by these openings as an ideal.

Up to here everything looks rosy, but it is increasingly seen that Turkey's growing power, while bringing it closer to the "zero problems" goal, is also creating other, entirely unexpected problems. While Turkey's coming so much to the fore in peace initiatives, its growing stronger, its making its political influence felt so much, is met with appreciation and welcome in many circles, it must also be seen that this growth process has a very important risk.

The risk is the possibility that, even if it solves problems and eases the work of nearly everyone concerned, a power growing in this way will be met with resistance and antipathy as it gradually shifts the balances of power in the international arena. Thus, it is understood that, paradoxically, as it runs toward the "zero problems" goal, this run may lead to growing a great problem opposite it.

Turkey's, together with Brazil's, persuading Iran to the uranium swap agreement and the international reactions displayed against the signing of this agreement constitute the first big sign of this development.

Although from the beginning Turkey's initiatives in this direction were supported by the US and EU countries themselves, they evidently acted out of a prejudice that no result would be obtained on this matter and a confidence created by it. Look, as soon as a result was obtained, the permanent members of the UN Security Council along with Germany hastily began working on a new sanction in order to declare that they do not recognize this agreement. By doing so they are unable to hide that they have fallen into a panic because the problem has entered the road to a solution.

Is the real cause of this panic of the great powers Iran's having agreed to the deal, or the fact that this difficult agreement has brought new and alternative actors such as Turkey and Brazil to the fore? İbrahim Karagül's in-depth questioning around this question, which he rightly asks by saying "So what do you want?", is frankly thought-provoking. They have no wish for agreement; in fact their concern to sustain an order they have somehow established is increasingly noticeable.

On Wednesday, at the meeting of the Middle East Studies committee at the European Parliament's headquarters in Strasbourg, I spoke in a session in which Turkey's possible contributions to the Middle East peace process were assessed. One of the subjects European parliamentarians are most interested in these days is the sustainability and reliability of the agreement made with Iran. But the impression I gained in more private conversations is that, unlike what is expressed in official statements, Turkey's taking on these roles is not at all met with unreserved welcome. Moreover, they do not trust that Iran will remain faithful to the agreement, but in fact this is not a matter of concern but a matter of wish. They already strongly wish that Iran will annul this agreement as soon as possible

That Turkey is involved in everything, while solving problems, also diminishes their importance. Increasingly, Turkey's position can be seen by them as a kind of antipathetic officiousness. But as long as the problem stands, it also invites taking initiative. That mediation is by no means a small position in international relations is understood most clearly on the occasion of these events. Those who bring the parties together, who solve the problem, naturally also earn the right to have a say over the new situations that form.

The Armenian genocide bill's being brought before Turkey more and more recently as Turkey grows stronger is in fact a consequence of this. This is a reaction to actually changing international balances. It is of course also possible to predict that once a certain threshold of strengthening is crossed, such a matter will no longer even be mentioned. But up to this threshold we can foresee that the problem will disturb Turkey further in ways that involve serious risks.

The foreign policy vision that Turkey is pursuing in an extremely accurate direction contains such a risk, perhaps one needs to know this, but one must also not forget that the only way to eliminate this risk is again to advance in the same direction and to deliver a strong diplomatic performance.