15 July, beyond a coup, in its intentions and results

Should we see the day of July 15, 1996 as a day of admonition on which our people were subjected to a coup, or as a day of victory on which they were delivered from such a coup? This dilemma may seem absurd at first. After all, had this people not been subjected to such a coup, it would not have mounted that glorious resistance to be saved from it, and such a glorious victory would not have been written into Türkiye's history. Of course, looking at it this way, we would also be saying that those who secretly attempted the coup had embarked on an undertaking that ended well because of this victory.

The conspiracy theories that came into play not immediately after July 15 but after a short while relied heavily, partly in order to exonerate the coup plotters, on this kind of secular-theological causality. Because in the end, since the saving force that moved against the coup had prevailed, the coup plotter must have been lured into the coup by this saving force. The rumors of a "controlled coup" were very attractive to coup plotters in a rush to be cleared of the crime of the coup, and they seized upon it with both hands. At first it was a feeble discourse like a bad joke; over time, through excessive repetition, it began in many places to have an effect that mitigated the treachery behind July 15 and diluted the nobility of the resistance and of the story of deliverance from the coup.

A coup is in itself a great conspiracy. To persuade people of a coup's rightness, reality has to be distorted very well, good pretexts have to be created, things have to be made out of nothing, and of course before all this one has to be well organized, without anyone noticing, at the armed, unarmed, media, political, intelligence, national and international, even popular levels, enough to pull off the coup. This secret-esoteric organization in itself requires an extraordinary distortion of reality, an illusionist blackout.

That the coup plotters, caught red-handed in their attempt, immediately after their initial silence, surrender and helplessness in defense, went not only into defense but even into attack, trying to place the entire culpability for the crime of the coup on the forces that suppressed it, and that this story of theirs can find quite a few buyers, shows that the danger that led to July 15 has still not passed.

What appears to be a paradox here is that the defense against the coup could perhaps enter a struggle that it could not have entered otherwise only thanks to the coup. It really would not have been possible to purge the coup plotters otherwise from a state they had infiltrated for 50 years and had almost entirely made their own. But everything was on a knife's edge; had the coup succeeded, Türkiye would be in a much different place today.

The most important dimension distinguishing this coup from an ordinary coup was that it was not simply a change of power within the country but, on the contrary, a full-fledged attempt at occupation. On the night of the coup, connected to Al Jazeera from the mosque of the Grand National Assembly, I think I was the first person to mention that this would remain an attempt and would be rejected by the people. In that talk I explained that this could not be dismissed as simply a coup, that it was an occupation attempt by certain countries with designs on Türkiye. In Türkiye's Southeast, the PKK terrorist organization was putting forward the masses it had mobilized with the trenches it had dug as the auxiliary forces of this occupation.

That night, had the coup succeeded, God forbid, the first thing we would have seen was the Southeast of Türkiye slipping completely out of control through a path in which the forces begun some time ago in Syria and supported by the US with tons of weapons would have merged with their extensions in Türkiye. God knows how much of Türkiye's territory would have been severed from this body. In fact, the treachery that for 30 years had reduced all of Türkiye's fight against terrorism to a fight with mountains and rocks, thwarting it and letting it make no headway, was also part of this formation. Indeed, with the purges that took place after July 15, the TSK, having rid itself of the treacherous cadres within the army, was able in a short time to cover the distance that could not be covered in 30 years. Within 6 years, today, when terror has been brought to a level where it is nearly zeroed out, military operations carried out inside Syria have also brought under Türkiye's control a region nearly three times the size of Northern Cyprus. In the war that ended the 30-year Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the TSK's support to Azerbaijan was decisive.

In Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean too, the presence of the TSK made itself felt as a deterrent and result-producing force.

These are, in a way, the consequences of July 15 that the coup plotters never wanted. Whatever one strives for, whatever one serves, whatever one intends, whatever lot befalls!

On the new ground of struggle created by the coup attempt, the treachery that was purged gave Türkiye the opportunity to take revolutionary steps in many fields. Those who, looking at these opportunities, say the coup was a conspiracy, of course simply ignore causal relations and, more importantly, the divine calculation.

The coup itself was of course a conspiracy, and as a conspiracy it reckons that it can be eliminated only by another conspiracy of the same kind. Yet a conspiracy can be resisted simply by standing upright, but the journey (seyr-ü sefer) that emerges as a result of the matter integrates the event with an entirely different divine destiny. The ignorant call that too a human conspiracy, whereas what is manifested is nothing other than the truth that God is the best of those who plot.

However, although a much stronger Türkiye has emerged 6 years after the coup, we are at a point where the esoteric culture of grudge, which will always pose a threat to Türkiye's national security, has accumulated even more. Unfortunately, the sociology, psychology and political science of the matter have not been sufficiently weighed in the fight against FETÖ. Perhaps the movement's extreme prevalence, and the esoteric, secretive, conspiratorial identity and culture it imposed on its members, which makes everyone who has been touched by it untrustworthy, prevented a more delicate approach in the struggle. But by doing so it perhaps also led to a certain mass of sympathizers, who might have woken up on July 15, being pushed entirely into the arms of the organization. Thus the possibility that the process of fighting FETÖ would strengthen FETÖ even more has in a way become real. It is still seen that cases are being opened, on the basis of some weak links from 10-15 years ago, against some people who now have no connection left with that structure. How can it not be seen that all these approaches form a source of manpower for FETÖ?

Yet over time a segment has also emerged that has truly severed its already weak ties with FETÖ but has developed a discontent with society on account of the grievances it has suffered.

For a healthier body politic and bodily integrity, it would be useful at this stage to bring a more sociological eye into play as well.

In the end, July 15, just like February 28, was a quest for absolute evil, but from that evil many good things emerged. Those who do not understand this and explain the matter with a "controlled coup" or a counter-conspiracy have evidently lost their mental hierarchy. Yet what is not understood is that the divine sunnah always operates this way: If you take something to be evil, it may be that there is good in it. How would you know?