What more would they have wanted?

From the very beginning there were those who invested in the thesis "Türkiye will lick up what it spat out" regarding the meaning and outcome of the stance Türkiye put forward against Sweden's and Finland's NATO membership. These are the "usual investors" against everything Erdoğan does. Citing the fact that he has changed ideas, stances and policies on many matters in the past, they expected that the same thing would happen now, that Türkiye would behave like the US's order-taking private and give up all its theses. To say they expected it is an understatement; they hoped for it.

In fact, all the events they cite from the past are the moves of a master politician who has gained unparalleled experience in international politics. They want to make this master politician a player in the narrow-mindedness of picking something up from one place and reading it without looking at its outcome or at the whole of the event. Politics, especially international politics, requires being as pragmatic as possible. Though I do not like at all to say this, since Türkiye's foreign policy in this period has always rested not on an unprincipled pragmatism but on an approach that necessarily also takes values into account. Otherwise we would be no different from those we ourselves criticize, even those we consider enemies. As we recall frequently these days, from the wise King Alija Izetbegović: "You lose the war not when you are defeated by your enemy, but when you become like him."

You can reread even the whole of Turkish history with this tremendous saying, but now let us return to our subject. Even while upholding principles, Türkiye never gave up its interests. Indeed, thanks to the principled, values-based policy it has followed, it has also achieved serious interests. Of course the one who upholds principle does not aim at simple interest, but acting on principle certainly comes with a reward given by divine providence. It is not easy, of course, to include its gains in analyses of international politics, but the results are plain to see.

Erdoğan is in his 20th year of leadership as Prime Minister and President, and world histories are being written during this time. At the NATO summit there is no leader more senior than he. The leaders of every country have changed many times, but he has been the leader representing Türkiye for twenty years. It is not only leaders that change; politics and sociologies change, but Erdoğan is expected not to change in anything. Looked at from any angle this is a strange expectation in politics, and above all it rests on a mentality that works against politics, that wears down and consumes political action from underneath. Of course, that there is no deep philosophy underneath is the good side of the matter, but the worse side is that no issue is treated at any depth, being squandered for the sake of everyday political opportunism.

Yet everything is plain as day. Erdoğan did not say he would never agree, under any condition, to the membership of these two countries; he said he would not agree unless his conditions were met. Indeed, with the ultimatum he issued on new members to NATO and the outcome he obtained from that ultimatum, he has perhaps scored one of the greatest victories in his history of leadership. From any angle it is a great step in Türkiye's foreign policy, on the road to Türkiye's showing effectiveness in world politics.

Türkiye, perhaps the feeblest, even most cowed member of the alliance before, found for the first time such an opportunity to stand out as an actor that voiced and exercised its rights arising from membership to the fullest.

He confronted two European countries, Finland and Sweden, with the activities they had carried out against Türkiye until now, and called them to account. In fact, in doing so he did not only call them to account; he also made other countries doing the same thing, and still NATO members, admit most openly the wrongness of what they were doing.

With this move Türkiye achieved many gains, but in my view two most important points need to be underlined.

First, Türkiye did not say what it had to say only to Finland and Sweden, as supposed. In fact, everything it said to them it said at the same time to all NATO members. So to speak, it said, "I am telling you, Sweden, Finland, so that you, US, France and Germany, may hear." For it is these that directly support the PYD and JPG in Syria and, through them, indirectly the PKK, and until now they had never been obliged to take any of Türkiye's warnings so seriously and so closely; now they have been. It is of course not hard to guess what they will do from here on. But even at this point Türkiye has brought to the agenda the consistency, functions and usefulness of the NATO alliance. The question of whom and how an alliance that is involved in every kind of plot and terrorist activity against its own members will protect its members when the time comes is now NATO's most important question. As things stand NATO has not even been able to protect Ukraine, which it encouraged and incited to join.

Second, Türkiye, which for years has been open to the scrutiny of European countries over whether it would be admitted to the EU and has suffered the agony of this as a nation, has on this occasion, through two European countries, gained a position to scrutinize all European countries. Sweden and Finland, according to the agreement Türkiye has concurred with, have of course not yet been admitted to membership. Under the accession procedure, their activities, and whether they will act in accordance with the promises and commitments they have given, will be monitored by Türkiye. If they do not comply with the conditions, Türkiye's right and authority of veto is reserved. Whatever anyone says, this is a first in the history of relations in at least two hundred years.

Leaving aside those who say that Erdoğan again talked big and swallowed his words, to those who say Türkiye obtained nothing in Madrid: what more would they have wanted?