On political practice and political theory: lessons from Ibn Khaldun

Political scientists and philosophers have abundant views and theories about politics, political action or practice: ideal politics, the ideal state, ideal political practice, and so on. But when it comes to the political practice of those who produced those theories and philosophies, the history of politics has only very rarely offered brilliant examples. Perhaps no one has done better than Plato, regarded as the father of the idea that the politician should also be a philosopher, of the "philosopher king" type. A chance opportunity even came his way to put into practice the Ideal State he had designed in his mind, but his hasty flight from Syracuse, before even a month had passed in making use of that opportunity, is also part of this history.

The political practice of Plato, the philosopher of ideal politics, thus ended in a complete fiasco, but of course this does not show that there must always be a distance between politics and philosophy or the wise. Perhaps, however, one needs to separate wisdom from scholarship or philosophical pursuit. Not every scholar becomes wise, and wisdom does not always require the pedantry that a scholar's does. Perhaps one of the historical exceptions is Alija Izetbegović, to whom everyone has conceded and applied the title "Wise King." But the history of scholar-politicians apart from him is not so brilliant.

What we read these days from some scholars or philosophers on ideal politics or on the relationship between ethics and politics makes one think how far these philosophers themselves are from practical wisdom, and makes one ask how they can be that way.

While I was thinking about exactly this, what should I come across but the heading in Ibn Khaldun, which I had read many times before: "On the Fact That Among Human Beings, Scholars Are the Furthest from Politics and Political Approaches." Of course, here the word scholars has a rather broad meaning in Ibn Khaldun's usage.

I would of course never want it to have an effect that would justify excluding scholars, and especially social science, entirely from politics. Indeed, I may be contradicting myself by including such a heading when I consider that one of our most serious problems today is that for quite some time the accumulated knowledge of the social sciences has not been drawn on as it used to be, but the other problem is not of a kind to be underestimated either. So let us listen to Ibn Khaldun on why scholars have little political foresight or faculties, without letting go of caution.

Ibn Khaldun begins: "The reason for this is as follows:"

"Scholars are accustomed to theoretical thinking, to diving into the depths of meanings, to abstracting those meanings mentally from what is perceived by the senses and turning them into comprehensive and general rules, and to issuing general judgments with these rules, not about a particular matter, person, generation, society or class. Then they apply these comprehensive judgments to the external world. Likewise, because of their habit of analogy in jurisprudence, they compare the matters they encounter with their likes.

Therefore all of the judgments and assessments they make remain in the mind, and their conformity to the matters in the external world (in terms of applicability) is achieved only after (long and detailed) research and evaluation. Or in general there is no question of such conformity at all. For what is outside is seen as the branches of what is in the mind. Just like the case of the religious rulings (derived from the Qur'an and the Sunna). These rulings are branches of the (fundamental principles and rulings) found in the Qur'an and the Sunna, and the principle is that matters in the external world conform to them. But the case of views and assessments in the rational sciences is different. For in the rational sciences the principle is that these views and assessments conform to matters in the external world.

Scholars are accustomed to (abstract) mental and intellectual thinking in all their views and assessments, and they know nothing beyond it. The political personality, on the other hand, must observe and take into account things outside (outside the mind) and the conditions relating to them. These are quite uncertain. Perhaps in them there are factors that prevent subjecting them to the rulings of their likes and applying comprehensive rulings to them. None of the social conditions can be compared with another. For even if two conditions resemble each other in one respect, they may not resemble each other in other respects. But since scholars are accustomed to generalizing rulings and comparing matters with one another, they take up political matters too within these molds of thought and assessment, and most of the time fall into errors. Therefore they are not to be trusted in these matters.

By contrast, an ordinary person of sound nature and moderate intelligence, being far from a high capacity for thought, is content to handle each matter within its own ruling. Likewise he evaluates every point concerning persons and situations within its own particular conditions. He does not carry the ruling of one over to another by way of analogy and generalization. Most of the time he does not go beyond the concrete framework perceived by the senses in his assessments and does not pass to abstract mental thought. Just as when the sea is rough, the swimmer does not leave the land (the shore). The poet says: When you swim, do not venture far out / For salvation lies on the shore.

For this reason an ordinary person of sound nature and moderate intelligence is secure in his political assessments and accurate in his views in his dealings with people. In the end he has a good life, far from calamities and harms. Above every possessor of knowledge there is One who knows. From all of this it is understood that, because of the abundance of generalizations and abstractions, one cannot be sure of not falling into error in the art of logic."

These words of Ibn Khaldun in fact overlap considerably with contemporary sociological findings on charisma. I discussed these at length in an article titled "Charisma, Popular Culture and Fascism" in my earlier book Karizma Zamanları.

Is it not significant enough that none of the political scientists or philosophers who, failing to find a philosophical or intellectual performance in the charismatic political figure, set about reciting ghazals from the outside, has had a chance or aptitude for political success?

This paradox calls for more philosophy.