The impossible Akşener consented to, and the Kurdish question as a problem of livelihood

The 11-point declaration in which the HDP announced its stance before and after the 2023 elections, and the declaration by İYİ Party Chair Meral Akşener that she aspires not to the Presidency but to the Prime Ministry, show that each member of the Nation Alliance is answering a call for a political regrouping that goes beyond any one of them.

As is known, the "stubborn insistence" Akşener has displayed so far on being a presidential candidate created a kind of spoiler within the alliance and made it difficult to get the calculations to add up. The prime ministry that Akşener aspires to in today's system is somewhat a politics of the impossible, something that will not and cannot happen. Even if the alliance's candidate wins, it is difficult to open the way for a process that would bring about a return to the parliamentary system, and even if it were opened, it is impossible for the winning presidential candidate to agree to return to the parliamentary system. For those who in their own parties do not share their powers with anyone and keep centralizing them still further to renounce the presidential powers they have won by election is beyond impossible.

That Akşener out of the blue declares of her own will that she consents to the impossible is also a serious problem in terms of the criterion of "transparency in politics" that we have always sought. In the period before 15 July, when she was constantly telling everyone that she would be prime minister on 15 July, she was in fact aspiring to the impossible. Because there was no visible way that would allow her to become prime minister. The only way could have been an extraordinary situation, and that day the coup attempt did indeed take place. Is it not the right of every citizen in Türkiye to ask what kind of plan lies behind this promise that is apparently impossible today?

The interpretation of the impossible always drags one toward the interpretation of the absurd. Let us step back from this a little and move on to the HDP's declaration. Although it deliberately gives the impression of playing a different tune from the alliance, it was perceived as a declaration that put the alliance at ease. But beyond that, the HDP claims to lay out a framework for its general policies.

Truly, every step the HDP has taken or will take toward becoming a party of Türkiye should be welcomed. After all, when you are the party of an ethnic group in Türkiye, by way of nationalism against nationalism, even racism, you do nothing but increase the racism, bigotry and closedness of both sides, indeed of all sides.

If we have a serious nationalism problem in Türkiye today, we cannot ignore that Kurdish nationalism has one of the largest shares in it. Of course, without overlooking that years of policies of denial and assimilation toward the Kurds also fed this kind of nationalism. But after a certain point, things in Türkiye reached a certain normal.

In the last twenty years, Türkiye has reached a level of ethnic consciousness that could not even have been imagined before. Türkiye's ethnic multiculturalism was recognized by the state and ceased to be a matter of complex. The childish and primitive conceptions of identity of earlier years gave way to a more recognition-based, embracing politics.

The interesting part is that the ones most disturbed by this were the PKK and its political extensions, who try to justify themselves with the existence of this problem. From this point on, in fact, the matter of ethnicity has ceased to be a serious problem in Türkiye. In the past, when it was said that there is no Kurdish problem, this meant the denial of both the Kurds and the problem. But after the Kurds have been recognized and the denials and pressures on the Kurdish language and identity have been lifted, saying "there is no Kurdish problem" can have no meaning other than expressing the pride of having solved that problem.

That the HDP's declaration still says that Türkiye's most important problem is the Kurdish problem is understandable up to a point; after all, targeting a political mass and wishing to bring it into being as a political subject is one of the most reasonable tasks of politics. As long as this is a matter of political debate and dialogue, no one can say anything. But the moment you say "negotiation, not weapons" as a method, the meaning, scope and purpose of everything you say becomes something else.

In Türkiye, armed terror is spoken to with arms, political forces on the ground of politics. It is not so easy to account for politics trying to make an armed terrorist organization, to which a chance was once given in the solution process that it did not deserve at all, a negotiating counterpart, and referring to it the file it opened as the "Kurdish problem."

The PKK is currently being addressed in a language it deserves. In fact, at best it chose, by its own greed, to be addressed in this language. At a stage on the way to resolving a chronic problem of decades, if it had had the slightest sincerity, it could have used the opportunity presented to it truly for peace, truly for democracy and truly for the benefit of the Kurdish people. Instead the PKK chose the way of taking the Kurds, or whatever it calls the "Kurdish Problem," hostage and making of them a living shield for itself.

It is seen that even in the HDP's discourse the Kurdish problem is still pronounced in fact to open the door of negotiation with the PKK, to make the PKK a political counterpart.

After so many democratic openings and so much distance covered on the way to solving the Kurdish problem, the HDP needs to state somewhat more clearly what it demands on behalf of the PKK. What is left unresolved in the Kurdish problem, and why does the HDP need the PKK for resolving it?

After so much distance, is anything left other than a partition that would establish a state for the PKK? Is this what the HDP wants? Where is the claim of being a party of Türkiye?