Cold War rote assumptions in foreign policy

What is happening in international politics today is probably the kind of thing that poses significant difficulties for international political scientists who have so far carried out their work on the basis of certain theories. In simpler terms, what is going on is not something that can be explained or understood with the existing rote formulas. It is of course clear that in recent years Turkey has been doing things far beyond these formulas. But truly, looking a bit more broadly, it is not only Turkey that is breaking the formulas. America, Europe and Russia too are doing things far outside certain rules that have been engraved into the formulas since the Cold War years.

Admittedly, it could be objected that this situation arises from the very nature of international relations anyway. This level of relations is in fact not as orderly as is supposed; it presents an extremely chaotic picture. Among thousands of variables, a balance forms through the constantly changing actors of those who govern countries. In these balances, a somewhat heavier actor can create storms and put the whole world into an environment of turbulence.

In the Cold War years there was a bipolar world and everyone's side was clear. There was the Eastern Bloc, the Western Bloc and an independent, non-aligned third-world bloc. Everyone's relations with one another had been settled with the bosses of the bloc countries being recognized as having the authority to have the last word. America and the USSR had divided the world between themselves without even needing to ask the other parties. At least that was the visible world. What other actors played what kinds of roles behind the scenes and affected the functioning of the system was a secondary matter.

The new situation that emerged after the end of the Cold War did not form a named, fixed, stable balance, but life went on regardless. Many called the situation a unipolar American order. The maxim of this new order, whose de facto framework was drawn with the American Iraq-Gulf intervention, was vague, and it did not last very long anyway.

Global developments opened a wide space to the idea that many actors could enter the field with absolutely unforeseeable effects. Every actor has a power and every actor has a power in the system. Countries became aware of this at different levels. Those who were aware either used these powers well enough for a more effective international politics or failed to. Those who were able to use them found the opportunity to emerge as new actors in world politics. The state of those who could not is plain to see.

There have been and are those who, although very powerful, use this power very badly. Arab-Islamic countries, for example, cannot use their existing power well enough. They are not even aware that they are a power, and they are still excessively attached, as to an article of faith, to the illusion that the sole and absolute boss of the world is America. They build all their politics on this.

Yet if they were aware of their own power, they have the means and powers to far surpass America. There are also their own internal power struggles and cultures, which prevent them from being aware of this power and lead them to consume themselves. This can be dwelt on separately. The policy of managing America in their own favor by giving it bribes serves no purpose other than reproducing, feeding and perpetuating America's position of mastery over them. If only they knew.

Yet one feature of today's world is this: Countries are not bound and registered to one another or to a bloc like a Catholic marriage. Turkey, especially since 2002, has made very good use of the opportunities created by this new world. It diversified its foreign policy. As the adopted helplessness of the old world order, it was excessively attached to the understanding that its relationship with a bloc required it to keep away from countries outside that bloc. This requirement was also instilled and enforced inside the country by the bloc's native guards. From 2002 on, it moved rapidly away from this understanding and the influence of its agents, and virtually broke its chains.

In recent days a foreign TV channel asked me whether "Turkey's buying S400 missiles from Russia or continuing its relations with Russia would be interpreted as Turkey moving away from NATO, taking a stance against NATO and breaking away from it."

It is very clear that what makes people ask these questions is a classic international relations rote formula. Why should Turkey feel itself between "either that one or the other" options between two countries that are not at war with each other and even have every kind of commercial, industrial, military and cultural relations with each other? There is no war. Turkey is a NATO country and fulfills all the obligations that this membership entails.

The problem at the moment is that the US and some other European NATO members are not fulfilling the obligations arising from this membership.

As a NATO member, instead of standing in solidarity with Turkey against the terrorist organizations fighting against it, they are in the mistake of doing business with those terrorist organizations. According to the NATO treaty it is they who are violating the rule. The NATO organization is not causing Turkey a problem in the present situation; some members, by violating the terms of this membership, are falling into the position of being guilty toward Turkey. Here Turkey has the diplomatic superiority not of leaving NATO but of reminding of the duties that NATO membership brings. The US is perhaps NATO's most powerful partner, but this does not give it the right to be NATO's sole ruler. Democratic functioning in institutions is a demand of Turkey, and this demand provides Turkey more advantage than is supposed.

French President Macron, who spoke in recent days of "having pulled Turkey away from Russia with the attack against Syria," apparently did not remember that even France's process of returning to NATO's military wing took place only with Turkey's approval. As is known, France had left NATO's military wing in 1966. That is, even in the hottest times of the Cold War it was not a member of NATO.

Shall we not now ask what the royalist meddlesomeness within NATO membership has to do with the cunning of gaining an unfair competitive advantage against Russia in the weapons it wants to sell to Turkey?

And by which international relations rote formula are we to interpret this cunning shopkeeper behavior?