What convinced the CHP was not an intelligence report but an alliance protocol

The CHP's real big problem is probably the deep gap between its official discourse and its de facto politics. In its official discourse the CHP was against the F-type structure from the very beginning, but in practice it always followed a path in the same lanes as it, hitting the same targets. Until 17 December, some people within the CHP had for quite some time been harshly criticizing the AK Party over the F-type structure. The strange thing in this was that probably even most CHP members did not know that all politics within the CHP was determined by this F-type.

We know better today that the tape operation that brought Kılıçdaroğlu to the head of the CHP was carried out by FETÖ members. Despite this, on the surface, despite this debt to FETÖ, Kılıçdaroğlu on the surface did not shrink from criticisms directed at the F-type structure. But whatever happened, when on 17 December the F-type structure he had criticized so harshly evolved into the parallel structure, he began, along with his party, to behave like a duty foot soldier of that structure.

Interestingly, from 17 December until 15 July the CHP's and Kılıçdaroğlu's discourse and politics regarding the parallel structure were one: full support for the parallel structure against the AK Party. Kılıçdaroğlu continued the role of Ergenekon advocate that had been handed over to him by the previous party leadership together with the role of advocate for the parallel structure.

If there is anyone smart who can find his way out of this strange tangle of relations, let him come here; I personally cannot.

In the area where the CHP's official view and de facto politics diverge most, especially after 15 July, clues that will illuminate this strangeness can be found. As is known, on 15 July CHP members, like everyone, vehemently opposed the coup attempt, and CHP deputies, together with AK Party and MHP deputies, displayed a clear stance against the coup in the TBMM. We all saw together that Kılıçdaroğlu shared the same stance on that day and in the following period.

Although in images that emerged later we see with what interest Kılıçdaroğlu watched how the coup would turn out, his official discourse was always to be against the 15 July coup attempt. But in terms of his de facto politics Kılıçdaroğlu displayed a complete example of solidarity with the FETÖ coup plotters.

With the discourse he puts forth, Kılıçdaroğlu leads to the deterioration of Turkey's perception abroad, to the dilution of Turkey's entirely rightful struggle against FETÖ and to its being perceived against Turkey.

To all the lies and propaganda to which FETÖ members cling in order to defend themselves and gain a position against Turkey, he either gives the first foot or supports them. Support for a thoroughly rightful struggle against a clear crime such as a coup is not given like this. Frankly, by this means Kılıçdaroğlu provides the greatest support in acquiring all the black propaganda power the coup plotters need.

Lastly, Kılıçdaroğlu had announced that he supports Turkey's Operation Olive Branch. It was appreciated by everyone as a good statement completing an image of national unity. But what he said within the very same speech showed how reluctant even this support was.

While graciously saying that, in his official view, he stands beside the TSK in Turkey's fight against terrorism, he does not neglect to put beside it a few words that nullify this favor. He says Turkey has the right to fight terrorism but encourages its enemy by saying its gunpowder has run out.

He does not see the 5000 TIR, 2000 planes' worth of weapons America gave the PYD, but he continues to defend to the end the FETÖ operation that presents to the world the two TIRs Turkey sent to the Bayırbucak Turkmens, who are also a part of the Syrian Army, as support given to terrorist organizations. In doing so he distorts the perception of Turkey in public view as a country supporting terror.

Kılıçdaroğlu is not alone in the party, of course. His party's spokespersons too do not refrain from displaying an astonishing difference between official discourse and de facto politics. Selin Sayek Böke says she has no intelligence information that would define the PYD, which is the PKK, the terrorist organization Turkey has been fighting for 35 years, under a changed name in Syria, as a terrorist organization.

But the same Böke and other CHP spokespersons can easily say that the ÖSO is a terrorist organization.

So from which intelligence report would the CHP members see and be convinced that the PYD is a terrorist organization, would you say? Or looking at which intelligence report did they decide that the ÖSO is a terrorist organization?

If they have some qualities of nationalness, the intelligence they trust first should be that of Turkey's official intelligence institutions or authorities.

Yet there is no intelligence organization that does not see the PYD as a terrorist organization; even the CIA reveals that the PYD and PKK are identical to each other.

That is, even the US, which does business with the PYD, knows what kind of goods its ally is, yet expects that a temporary alliance with the PYD for the fight against DAEŞ, which it cares about and focuses on so much, will be received almost with understanding.

Of course we do not receive it with understanding. This is a perverse form of relationship and will cause big trouble for everyone in the region.

As far as we know, there is no one who does not see the PYD as identical to the PKK, and the only ones who do not see the PKK as terror are the PKK itself and the HDP. In this case it becomes clear on which intelligence reports CHP officials rely when they characterize the ÖSO as a terrorist organization.

It is understood that what exists, rather than an intelligence report that would convince Böke or CHP members, is an alliance protocol between the CHP and the PKK-PYD, or between their owners.