The secret of success in development

In 2008, when the world economic crisis was striking the whole world, to those who feared that the waves of this crisis would hit Turkey too, President Erdoğan, in his then capacity as AK Parti Chairman and Prime Minister, said "the crisis will only graze us," both reassuring citizens and challenging the crisis brokers.

Two years later, a situation arose in which Erdoğan emerged from this challenge victorious. Turkey had emerged from the crisis stronger, having even paid its debt to the IMF without any delay, and moreover having run its own economic management with its own people.

Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, whom we invited to a conference at the Institute for Strategic Thinking, which I chair, to explain this economic situation, explained the secret of it in brief, in his then capacity as Minister of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications, as follows:

"In times of crisis, the first reflex of all economic administrations is to resort immediately to austerity measures. And what is understood by austerity measures is immediately halting investments. Yet when you stop investment, you also freeze the economy. Since a frozen economy does not produce value, there is no chance to repair the economy and bring it back together. We, however, did not cut back at all, especially on infrastructure investments. Because our infrastructure investments are the engine of our economy. Thanks to these investments we keep all economic sectors alive. Living economies do not feel the crisis deeply, and as a result there are none of the layoffs and bankruptcies, which especially hit low-income people, that occur in other countries."

Indeed, this was the most reasonable and most profound assessment I had heard so far of the AK Parti's economic policies. It truly gave the secret of the matter in all its dimensions.

I believe that afterwards too the AK Parti continued its infrastructure investments for a long time without much deviation from this line, despite all the economic crises, and that these investments ultimately kept the traffic in the state's treasury flowing by producing taxes and value added. The taxes collected were redirected again to infrastructure investments, social service policies, and R&D expenditures and incentives for the more effective functioning of the state. Over time this formed a cycle that recharges and feeds itself with energy. In the course of implementing these policies, a know-how peculiar to Turkey took shape.

For that reason, "cutting back on investments" is in no way an item to be thought of as an austerity measure.

As we have mentioned before, there was not a relatively large obstacle before infrastructure investments. The obstacles that did exist were removed through good management of resources, the prevention of corruption, and a charismatic energy. There was always an oppositional grumbling arising from some policies not being understood, but this could not prevent the realization of investments and changes in infrastructure.

What is actually strange here (of course, the worry over this strangeness should belong not to us but to the Marxists) is that the resistance to steps aiming at change in the superstructure, compared with change in the infrastructure, was also more intense and harsher.

The infrastructure part of the economic and social development achieved over 15 years came about without notable resistance. But when it touches the ideological, cultural, mentality and symbolic-capital dimension of the matter, a much more rigid resistance is encountered. After all, the essence of the changes of the thirties in Turkey has been characterized as a wardrobe revolution, and indeed we have a tradition that considers wearing hats, changing clothing, and changing the alphabet and units of measurement to be "revolution."

Within the same society, the headscarf was for decades seen as a symbol to which the fate of the regime was tied. The resistance that was not seen and not shown in the distribution of capital or in economic circulation appeared when the symbols of the headscarf and secularism were touched.

It is not that there were no people who voiced that the cover (örtü) actually has a side that implies an objection to the changes in the infrastructure, that "covers it up" (örtbas). But when one looked at the ideological or emotional meanings that those who resisted the freedom of the headscarf attributed to the matter, it was impossible not to see that secularism, as a superstructure institution, had become thoroughly religionized and tabooized. For the sake of preserving even these taboos, many of their own interests were squandered.

As we said, let the worry over this strange infrastructure-superstructure relationship belong to the leftists.

Today, at the end of 15 years, although not at the same speed and scale as the development in the economy

(whatever the scale of this matter, that is, of justice, that is, of values, may be!), important developments have also taken place in justice and values. In particular, on the point of "justice," what did the AK Parti do and what could it not do in the 15 years it has been in power?

Let us seek an answer to this question a little. In the next piece, of course.