They never wanted a strong Parliament

We have accumulated some 70 years of experience, for better or worse, with the current parliamentary system. It is precisely this experience that has brought us to the point where this system can no longer carry Turkey any further. The CHP leader, with a perfectly naive and shameless air of feigned innocence, asks, "But this system has brought us this far, so what problem have you seen?", thinking in his own mind to set people chasing a shoal of fish in muddy water.

Yet there is no shoal of fish, and there is no solid place this reasoning can lead to. For 70 years this country has come from one place to another, but we all lived and saw together how it came. We experienced direct coups exactly 4 times. And between all the coups, because of the constant threat of a military coup, we got this far under a regime that was in the absolute tutelage of non-political centers of power.

The system they call the parliamentary system was in fact never lived in Turkey.

Parliament never had the influence and authority even as much as was written for it in the constitution, nor could it.

Until recently, the tutelary institutions always managed to carry out whatever manipulations they wanted on the parliamentary system. That is why they love the parliamentary system so much.

On paper "sovereignty belonged unconditionally to the nation" and this nation was to exercise its sovereignty through parliament, but even a decision that came out of this parliament with 411 deputies, that is, with the highest-ratio consensus imaginable, was wiped away with a stroke of the pen because it ran against the wishes of the tutelary institutions.

At the same time, they shamelessly refrained not at all from putting on a democratic facade by exalting in rhetoric the Parliament they had thoroughly pacified. They love the parliamentary system because they love the possibility of managing it very well from the outside.

The CHP, which opposed the presidential system by putting forward the concern that it would weaken Parliament and thus lead to dictatorship, did not recognize even a decision that Parliament had taken with 411 deputies, and had it annulled by taking it to the Constitutional Court, which it knew very well to be on its side.

That what they want is not a strong Parliament can be understood clearly enough from this example alone.

If the CHP later did not oppose some corrections on the headscarf issue, it was not because it had reached a political maturity on this matter or had suddenly evolved into a libertarian line, but because it could no longer hold out the hope of being a stumbling block on this issue.

Otherwise, if the CHP had held even a little hope of obtaining from the Constitutional Court a decision in favor of the ban on the headscarf, it would never have missed this opportunity.

The 367 trick was also played within this parliamentary system, and in essence it had no meaning other than disregarding the moral personality of Parliament and mocking it. As long as the Constitutional Court and the other external tutelary centers were on their side,

what is this talk of parliamentary authority?!

Moreover, while doing this, they never refrained from heaping praise on the parliamentary system.

Because they truly always loved those sides of this parliament that were open to their tutelage. The possibility of exercising a power they did not possess through out-of-the-game intervention in parliament...

Now the doors of parliament that are open to their tutelage are closing.

Many doors had been closed for quite some time, to be sure, but there is still a serious open door, and they want to keep it open.

The presidential system will not weaken Parliament; on the contrary, it will strengthen it even more.

The way will be closed to manipulations carried out through Parliament dragging the country into instability.

Thus the playgrounds against the nation and against the country will be thoroughly narrowed.

The possibility of opposition for the country and within the country, contrary to what is supposed, will on the other hand be widened immensely,

whatever anyone says. Parliament will legislate, will supervise, will pass the budget, and in the meantime will be able to act far more independently of the government, because the government's ministers will not be from within Parliament.

When a government is excessively dependent on the distribution of seats in Parliament, it is not possible for a strong executive power to form.

Yet an overly fragmented distribution in parliament makes governments weak and short-lived, and it becomes inevitable for other centers to fill the vacuum this creates. Contrary to what is supposed, this brings about not a stronger but an even weaker Parliament

. Because the visible strength of Parliament produces an effect that also works against its own existence and undermines itself, that is, one that weakens politics and strengthens the bureaucracy.

A Parliament or executive power standing on a knife's edge, or in the idiom of American politics a perpetual lame duck, leaves the country under the absolute tutelage of the bureaucracy.

Bureaucrats see governments or politicians, that is, the will of the people, as something transient that need not be taken seriously, and institutionalize the audacity of doing everything as they see fit.

Therefore, in such a process parliament is in effect non-existent, and this is very good for opportunists who do not derive their power from the nation.

Kılıçdaroğlu asks, for example,

"You have been governing this country for the last 15 years; what did you want that this system obstructed?"

Thus he tops off his shamelessness that mocks our memories. If he wants to hear it, let us tell him. For the last 15 years the AK Parti has brought this country a revolution in every field. Every step, every stage of this revolution took place despite the CHP obstructing it with the opportunities it found within the parliamentary system.

The CHP leader took his party and ran to every

"I have a coup" caller.

He missed neither 27 April, nor 7 February, nor the Gezi uprising, nor the 17-25 December coup attempts; he did not refrain from taking his party and running to all of them. Each of these coup attempts cost the country much time, energy and assets.

One way of making up for all these losses is to separate the executive power completely from the legislative power and to strengthen it for a fixed term of power. Is there any other way to explain this?