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FETÖ, politics and sociology

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In the light of the facts that have now become thoroughly exposed, everyone sees clearly that FETÖ, from its very beginning, is a formation whose intention, plan and program are entirely different from what it projected outward. There are indeed those who had noticed this characteristic of it in some way before. There were always those who identified and said that there was always a distance, a difference, even a contradiction between what the movement did and what it said. But up to a point, since such statements can be made about any religious structure or political movement, not having foreseen among them that the Gülen movement was in fact a FETÖ is an understandable situation.

There are undoubtedly many explanations for the weakness of reflex that intelligence or politics displayed in seeing the FETÖ within the movement in all its dimensions earlier and doing what was required. The entrenchment of this structure within the intelligence and security apparatuses that were expected to take measures on this matter means it was already ready to neutralize immediately the measures taken in advance. And the fact that a part of politics always saw the movement as a potential ally has always been one of the fields of opportunity that this structure exploited best.

Indeed, the CHP, HDP and partly the MHP, which until December 17 had seen the movement as an ally of the AK Parti, regarded FETÖ's judicial coup as a golden opportunity for deliverance from Erdoğan and all together took it under their protection.

It is true that the AK Parti maintained an alliance with the structure until December 17 (in fact until February 7, 2012, and in one respect even until May 31, 2010, as the day of the Mavi Marmara). But it is also a fact that, without looking at the reasons why the ruptures that had begun earlier, on those dates, turned into a full-scale war on December 17, the opposition parties clung to FETÖ as an ally against the AK Parti and thereby obstructed the struggle against it.

Had the opposition on December 17 seen and accepted that the event was not a fight against corruption but had a coup dimension, perhaps the historic opportunity seized against FETÖ could have been used very well. Even today, every time the CHP leader opens his mouth, he does not refrain even for a day from asking, "weren't you together? Weren't you the ones who gave them whatever they wanted?" But when the AK Parti exposed their true face with evidence on December 17 and abandoned them with their crimes, he does not ask the question of on what grounds they then took them under their wing.

Fine, say the AK Parti did not know, and supported them thinking they were really contributing to Turkey's culture, education, international promotion and civil society ground. But what did you stand by them for after December 17, moreover when all units of the state had exposed their true face, intentions and connections? Before December 17 the government was asleep and you were awake. What happened that, when the government woke up on December 17, you fell into a much deeper sleep?

The truth is that FETÖ began its activities exactly 35 years before the AK Parti was founded and always found a way to take the politicians of all periods into its "service". By the time the AK Parti came to power, the movement, with the extremely hypocritical attitude it displayed and its already entrenched presence in all institutions, had gone far too far to be a structure that the AK Parti could cope with at first instance.

Despite this, it must be clearly known that the movement's stumbling and coming up against a certain limit also happened largely thanks to the AK Parti and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

In the face of the organization's insidious structuring, which spans up to 50 years and has permeated all units of the state and society, it is much better understood today that no one other than Erdoğan could have begun such a struggle, and even had they begun it, could not have won it. Therefore everyone needs to see what kind of catastrophe we would have faced otherwise and to assess their stance accordingly.

Perhaps up to a point this structure latched on to the AK Parti just as it had latched on to earlier politicians. In the AK Parti's support for this structure, which had promoted itself as a civil society, education and service volunteer, there is no problem at this stage of the matter. In fact, the AK Parti is expected to give the same support to every movement that promotes itself in this way,

because civil society, volunteerism, entrepreneurship and organization are the most important, strongest and most productive values of a society.

Had these values not been abused in this way, there would be no problem in the support given.

Even though I have personally always had problems with the Gülen movement's understanding of religion, especially with its dimensions reaching infallibility, taqiyya-ism, Mahdi-ism and a personality cult, there are many more communities or circles with which I have problems in these dimensions. Today there are many circles that regard the personality cult, infallibility and Mahdi-ism on which FETÖ rests, and especially dreams and miracles, as an indisputable source of religious knowledge.

But even if our right to call them wrong or our own criticisms is reserved, we cannot be in a position such as imposing an understanding of religion on anyone.

Of course the attitude would be different if such an understanding of religion threatened national security, but whether this is an inevitable outcome is also a sociologically interesting question.

Of course, apart from FETÖ's having misled only politicians, it is necessary to note, since the occasion arises, that it has also badly misled the academics who study it scientifically.

In fact, to study such a structure sociologically is almost impossible, because it is never possible to get among them in a way that could produce objective knowledge. When they are the subject of sociological observation, they find a way to show themselves not as they are but as they wish.

That is why these days it is a fact that a series of sociological studies done earlier on the Gülen movement are also in need of serious revision.

That too has a separate story and will be the subject of another article.