…And Demirtaş finds his role model in Moscow

The crises that occur from time to time in Turkish foreign policy seriously affect the intellectual orientations of Turkey's "always-opposition" intellectual. In the manner of this influence, what is decisive is not moral orientations, intellectual sensitivities and consistencies, but the content of the relationship established with the government. In other words, if the party in power has been approved by them, they stand beside the government; if it has not been approved by them, they are invariably positioned on the opposite side. Many examples of this can be given. Perhaps one example may help make the matter clearer.

One of the issues at the very top of the agenda in the 1960s was Cyprus. Following a number of social events that took place in Cyprus in the first half of the 1960s, representatives of Turkey's "always-opposition intellectual" type, also under the influence of their anger at İsmet İnönü's coalition choices, began to whip up the Cyprus issue. On the Cyprus question the government's hand was weak; moreover, it did not have the power to intervene militarily in Cyprus, and, as would later emerge, it was threatened by NATO, indeed by US President Johnson himself.

What happened would seriously affect the atmosphere of this period intellectually. The government would be accused of selling out Cyprus and the Cyprus cause. But that the same intellectual tradition later began to see the Turkish army as an occupier in Cyprus, expressing orientations such as "The fascist army is in Cyprus," is interesting in showing the dimensions of the contradiction. What was actually happening was nothing other than this type of intellectual positioning itself in line with political preferences.

We have the opportunity in recent days to observe at close quarters far more caricatured examples of this situation. There have been those who went so far as to say that Putin's behaviour was believer-like. Others who meet them at the same level have settled on a position that blows up the ground of the argument they lean on.

The love and gratitude felt for Putin, who is known to be a major obstacle to every kind of freedom of expression in Russia, by those who leave no ash on the barbecue when it comes to democratic rights and freedoms, is merely an example of how like finds like. After all, the pilgrim finds the pilgrim in Mecca. Our Demirtaş too finds his role model in Moscow. The crimes against humanity that Putin has committed from Russia to Syria, the massacres on the scale of genocide, do not even enter, at this meeting, among the topics that would be discussed in passing, like small talk about the weather or memories.

As who is seeking what is exposed in this way on this meeting ground, talking about intellectual ethics turns into a kind of fantasy. A person's thinking, and worse, doing politics, on the basis of something he does not truly believe in can bring him to such pitiable states.

In this framework, Demirtaş's visit to Russia during the past week, whom this "always-opposition intellectual" type has carved into a mate for their fantasies, also constitutes an interesting example of presenting oneself as a gift to anyone who says "I have a trap against the Turkey run by the AK Parti." Demirtaş tried to "explain" the remarks put to him in astonishment, as if saying "what is this state of affairs?", with the expressions "that the whole world respects them, that they are trying to normalise Turkish-Russian relations," like an inexperienced womaniser. Yet there is nothing to explain; everything is plain as day. There is a seduction that came about while one was carried away.

In such a situation, there can be no question of anyone respecting them. On the contrary, it is nothing but a cheap relationship of being used.

The defence that this visit, carried out at a time when the crisis in Turkish-Russian relations was being experienced deeply, was aimed at softening relations between Turkey and Russia is not enough to cover up the shamefulness and waywardness of this reality, plain as day.

Demirtaş's visit, which confirms the much-used saying of recent days, "when the thief is from inside, the lock does not hold the door," brings to mind another figure from history. Mahmud Nedim Pasha was a statesman who served in difficult periods of the Ottoman State and who declared the state's bankruptcy by proclaiming the memorandum of 1875. Because of his close relationship with the Russian statesman Ignatiev, who served in Istanbul for a long time, and his excessive inclination toward Russian politics, he is said to have been called in Istanbul by the name Nedimov, or, according to some sources, Mahmudov.

After a lapse of nearly 150 years, we have another politician who declares allegiance to Russia. The clearest message of Demirtaş's visit to Russia is this: at a time when Duran Kalkan and PKK terrorists were commenting on Russian television through live links, the HDP Co-Chair visited Moscow and declared his allegiance to Lavrov, with whom Turkey's relations had been spoiled. Still, let us not deprive him of his due: since Demirtaş makes this allegiance not only to Russia but to every power centre hostile to Turkey, it would be wrong to evaluate him exclusively as pro-Russian.