No hero comes from a terrorist against a terrorist

It must be admitted that the PKK's being treated as an interlocutor, even if indirectly, by the Republic of Turkey's state and government, above all through the resolution process, and its not carrying out a direct terrorist attack on the security forces for two and a half years, led to its "terrorist" character being overlooked to some extent.

In fact, had it made good use of the two and a half years of "non-conflict," and been sincere, had it entirely given up using arms against Turkey and the people of the region, and used the political field opened before it properly, in time no one would have found this normalization strange. A Kurdish nationalist party can very well make its presence felt on Turkey's present political ground. Far from us, of course. Just as we criticize other nationalisms and keep away from them, we of course keep away from Kurdish nationalism or any other ethnic nationalism, criticize it, and continue to set out our difference from it. But in democratic politics there is room for every kind of tendency and view: nationalist, left, right, liberal, socialist. Everyone continues their debate and struggle with the others on democratic ground.

Yet the PKK tried the shrewdness of treating the resolution process not as an opportunity for politicization but as an opportunity in which it could impose the de facto situation of being an armed organization that also has a "political party." During the resolution process it did not attack the state's security units directly, but it continued to practice every kind of terror against the people.

In fact, since village guards are also counted as a security unit, during the resolution process alone it ambushed and brutally killed nearly 20 village guards, threatened by kidnapping many of them and tried to bring them to the line it wanted. It regularly extorted businessmen and forced people it did not want to leave the region. Its armed cadres, which were expected to be laid down because of the resolution process, it multiplied several times over; it drew thousands of recruits, most under 18, into its mountain cadres, and, setting up what were practically outposts all over the region, kept establishing a pressure that made its threat felt even more over the people. Within the scope of terror activities run from these outposts, roads were cut, construction sites were raided, people were kidnapped and interrogated, killed, etc. The savagery and violence applied against Yasin Börü and his friends during the events of 6-7 October was not an exceptional, one-time situation.

After the elections, however, the PKK underwent a different state. Probably because of the "services" it displayed in its struggle (!) against the terrorist organization DAESH, it thought it had been completely rid of the "terrorist" label upon it. But this was not a deliverance achieved by completely giving up the terror it had been practicing. On the contrary, the PKK imagined that, in return for fighting DAESH, it had gained a "right to terror" within Turkey and Northern Iraq.

Because it had been recruited against DAESH, with its present terrorist character, the PKK fell into the delusion that it had obtained the right to spread terror as it pleased. To legitimize this right further and turn it into a fait accompli, it began accusing Turkey of supporting DAESH, and even, at a later stage, of being terrorist. It was sure this insolence would find enough customers among the coalition forces, in Europe. Truly, it did not fail to find good customers. Unfortunately, this story that the PKK told, with the open support of the parallel media as well, found quite a lot of readers and customers in the world.

That these customers learned that the news they received from this PKK-Parallel joint production was rotten became possible with Turkey's declaring war on both DAESH and the PKK at the same time.

They repeated quite easily and insistently the lie that Turkey would not even call DAESH terrorist, but Turkey, which has no complex whatsoever in this matter, not only called DAESH terrorist but also declared war, and made this lie come to nothing. It also declared that it would take part in every struggle against DAESH. In any case, this war was in fact continuing both against DAESH and against the forces behind it. But Turkey also clearly showed this: the war against DAESH, as a terrorist organization, cannot be outsourced to another terrorist organization that shows the shrewdness of obtaining a "right to terror" for itself. No heroes or freedom fighters emerge, or can emerge, from the PKK or the PYD because they fought DAESH. Because it fought DAESH, the PKK also does not obtain a right to release from its terror crimes in Turkey, nor, especially in Rojawa and Northern Iraq, a right to terror against other Kurds.

Frankly, the PKK demanded such a right from the US and Europe in return for the services it showed against DAESH, and to some extent received a response to its demand. The situation that the US and European countries must now pay particular attention to is whether they will regard as an ally a terrorist organization that poses a threat to Turkey in a war taking place far from their own borders. If they attempt to make an ally out of this bloody-handed terrorist organization, they will have fallen into the position of a country supporting terror.