The HDP's two faces, strangers to each other

The HDP has built its entire election strategy on showing two different faces to two parts of Turkey and on erecting a wall of insulation between the two. The face the HDP displays in the East and Southeast is very different from the one on the Western side. Using the Kobani events as a pretext, 51 of our citizens lost their lives as a result of the acts of violence displayed in the events of October 6-8.

In fact, all of Turkey, East and West, had seen this face of the HDP. It is impossible for Turkey to forget that terrifying face. The cries of Selahattin Demirtaş, who was treated like a pure Nişantaşı kid during the presidential election process, inciting the streets to move, openly calling for violence, are still in our ears. Above all, there is the shamelessness he displayed after the massacre in which 51 people died, coming out and trying to shrug off responsibility for the events even though he was sweating profusely.

The defense he has kept putting forward as if he were the creditor, after the massacre he caused in the name of solidarity with the people of Kobani, served only to swell his record further. The spirit of Yasin Börü and his friends, bestially slaughtered by frenzied murderers, will continue to hover over him.

This face of the HDP, which is more effective in the East, continues to be effective without slowing down. To exceed the natural limit reached in the East in order to pass the 10 percent threshold, reminding people of violence, and if that is not enough, displaying it, appears to be the most customary way.

The October 6-8 events, which normally discredited the HDP and its PKK considerably in the East and had an eroding effect on their legitimacy and rightness among the Kurdish people, the HDP members have turned into a propaganda tool in which they bring the element of threat to the fore. The message that the October 6-8 events will be repeated if the HDP does not pass the threshold is somehow being attempted to be conveyed.

The HDP youths sent to homes and workplaces under the pretext of a survey immediately turn the job into propaganda and profiling in the homes. While normally even this procedure is enough to spread fear in the city, some workplaces that give the wrong answer or openly state that they will support the AK Parti are immediately afterward subjected to stone attacks, as a warning to all.

The posters with bleeding taps displayed on billboards in Van give the message in the clearest way.

The only thing the HDP promises people in the region in order to pass the threshold is not to shed blood.

It has become certain that the PKK is behind the brutal murder of the village headman known for his closeness to the AK Parti, who was ambushed in Eruh.

The PKK does not hesitate to use under the table, as an element of intimidation against people, a murder it has not openly claimed.

Thus the real reason why it never agrees to lay down its weapon during the solution process becomes still clearer. The PKK aims to use its weapon not against the state but, first of all, against the Kurdish people. It has no tool other than the weapon to make the Kurdish people obey it.

Those who are already voluntarily attached to it and act as militants for the party do not suffice as a people to be governed. And if the ordinary people do not obey voluntarily, they will be made to obey by force.

They know very well that no one will take an organization that lays down its weapon seriously. The HDP, which has no propaganda tool other than the fear unleashed by that armed force, does not want the organization to lay down its weapon either, because it has no promise or program that would persuade the Kurds to vote for it.

That this face of the HDP, which carries the October 6-8 massacre in its baggage even in its recent past, that is, even in the period in which the solution process was continuing, and shows not the slightest sign of regret or self-criticism, is beginning to be forgotten so quickly in the West is the really instructive point. The people who saw that violence, that vandalism, of course did not forget them.

But the campaign trying to polish the HDP is built on making people forget this.

That this face, displayed with all its horror and violence in one part of Turkey at the same time, is being so skillfully hidden from the media oriented toward the West gives an important idea about the conspiratorial intent and capacity of the perception managers. However, this undoubtedly does not guarantee that this conspiracy will show the same performance in achieving its result.

Many elections have been entered before with these perception managements. The results reached were always out of proportion to the intrigues and campaigns displayed for perception management.

Those results alone constitute a sufficient historical preface for those who want to take a lesson.