Nail drives out nail; this is its remedy

The politics of opening, which now advances from domestic politics to foreign policy at a dizzying speed, cannot be kept up with in interpretation. The correction, within a short time, of the name of a policy that was initially confined to the limits of a very positional label such as the "Kurdish opening" to the "democratic opening" did not satisfy many circles. They placed their hopes in all the possible bad connotations and uses of the Kurdish opening, once it had been uttered.

The Armenian opening, undertaken as if "one nail drives out another" in the face of the fierce opposition displayed regardless of which way society's expectations lay, then the enthusiastic opening of the Syrian border, and, not content with that, the series of memoranda signed with Iraq gave a very clear message that the strategy of opening cannot leave its own momentum and support solely to the mercy of the opposition. It looks as though when one opening is expected to end, it neither ends nor lets the turn of the others come. Yet openings undertaken back to back also increase the momentum of the earlier ones. So "this is its remedy" after all.

CHP leader Baykal's "fantasies with cameras," proposed while staying in the shallowest seas of domestic politics, will be passed over as an utterly childish political move. He is probably unaware that the democratic opening process has by now far exceeded even Turkey's domestic dynamics. Had he been aware, he could not have ignored the possibility that the investment he has made, with the opposition he displays, in a chauvinist discourse to gather a considerable proportion of nationalist-ultranationalist and perhaps anti-Kurdish potential would, even if it seems to yield results in the short term, turn within a short time into a completely dead investment.

It is evident that both the CHP and the MHP have built all their calculations on enlarging the risks of the AK Parti, which has undertaken to solve the Kurdish question. They appear to have convinced themselves that there is a sufficient field of political profit in playing to rising nationalism or ultranationalism in Turkey, but we are obliged to warn that developments that will dampen their morale are not very far off.

The wind that a process which will begin with the PKK groups coming from Kandil and from Europe and expected to surrender to the security forces today may blow in society will completely frustrate the expectations of "political profit" that the process was supposed to produce.

The openings the government has realized in many fields one after another relate to Turkey's becoming a strong regional actor, but the steps taken make it even stronger, and moreover this strength disturbs no one. On the contrary, Turkey's position as an energy transit route or element of regional stability that it has assumed for the US, Russia, the EU and all Middle Eastern countries in a way condemns it to this strong position. The process also obliges Turkey to solve its own internal issues by more democratic means and to bring its democracy to a higher standard. Of course, let those who wish to conclude from this that we should forgo being strong because someone wants or approves of our being strong, or because our being strong suits someone, go on drawing that conclusion.

That so favorable a world environment has formed today for this kind of openings, which have been in the government's program and philosophy from the start, can be read as the fortune of the AK Parti government. The problems the government experienced in domestic politics during Sezer's presidency and the problems experienced especially in the Middle East during Bush's US presidency are in a way parallel.

A relief parallel to the atmosphere of relief that Gül's becoming President created in Turkey seems to have been experienced for Turkey, in the working environment with its neighbors and with Israel, with Obama's coming to head America.

It is understood that the Obama-led US has foreseen the AK Parti's Middle East policy in terms of its own interests. In this respect it is very clear that the recent tensions with Israel, and the cancellation of the exercise planned to be held over Konya's skies because of Israel, do not mean a clash with US policy either. It is a very clear sign that in the Obama-led US's calculations for the region there is no longer a place for an aggressive, Zionist Israel. For those who, from the very first minute Obama was elected, prophesied that this would lead to no change in America's policy, this situation, in my view, offers a good opportunity to review their outlook, but that is a separate subject.

The democratic opening has ceased to be Turkey's internal problem. The opening concerns Turkey setting sail on a great journey that will carry it to being a regional and even global actor. The time has long since come for opposition leaders too to adapt to this great development by seeking roles for themselves suited to the requirements of being the opposition of a country of this caliber.

Perhaps they can begin by welcoming the PKK members expected to surrender today with a maturity suited to the requirements of being the opposition of such a country.