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Turkey and politicsYeni Şafak

Political communication and the courage to change

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Haliç'ten Galata Kulesi ve İstanbul siluet

Successful political communication is often more important than successful political action. It may be possible to win the public's vote by presenting a bad policy well. Or, conversely, a policy that is exceedingly beneficial to the public may fail because it could not be explained to them properly.

One of the most important rules of political communication is to know this: the public never has the aptitude, the time or the patience to listen thoroughly, to weigh matters with fine scrutiny, and to decide after examining the evidence and the differing views.

One of the most frequent criticisms of the government's at times revolutionary undertakings is that they are not explained to the public well enough. Even when everyone is mobilized, with the prime minister, the ministers and the media all explaining them and all the means of the media and of political communication in use, a picture can emerge that leads to the conclusion that "this could not be explained to the public well enough."

Yet how can it be said that Ergenekon, for example, has not been explained to the public well enough? What other way of explaining could there be beyond the weapons sprouting from the earth, the series of testimonies and evidence emerging every day, and their coverage in the media? Even so, with three indictments running to five thousand pages and more than a thousand folders of evidence on one side, there is truly nothing to explain to those who casually dismiss all of it in one breath as a sham. What can be explained to someone who, with an indifferent attitude, has plugged his ears and shut his eyes?

In fact, the matter is not whether the subject has been explained or not; it is much simpler than that and is directly related to the nature of politics. Being "persuaded" in politics often has nothing to do with the evidence presented; it has to do with taking a side or not taking one. If you are on a side, you are already listening in order to be persuaded; if you are not, you are listening in order to reject. Still, let us hope that those who are decision-makers in matters concerning the law will act not on this basis but in a way that lets them shape their opinions truly with evidence and judge what is right with their reasoning.

It is also frequently said that there is a problem of communication with regard to the "democratic opening." The government is said not to have explained the democratic opening to the public well enough. Yet it appears quite clear that those who have been speaking on this matter from the start have no intention of being persuaded by anything they hear. That is why they do not want to do the unnecessary and perhaps burdensome work of meeting with one another. The possibility or risk of being persuaded, of encountering a persuasive argument or piece of evidence and being unable to give a suitable answer, is always frightening. The safest and surest way to get over this fear is to cut the ties in advance and to enter into no communication or dialogue at all. When you do not meet, you can feel more certain of your ideas and attitudes. Meeting and keeping one's ideas open to change is a matter of courage, and unfortunately we have politicians who do not possess this courage.

Yet when those who speak on this matter are set aside, it turns out that the public is far more open than the politicians to politics, to change and to communication on this question. The survey "Perception of the Kurdish Question in Turkey," carried out jointly by the SETA Foundation and Pollmark, lays bare this courage for change among the public. The survey was conducted with a total of 10,577 people at 2,497 points in 601 villages and neighborhoods determined by multi-stage sampling to represent Turkey as a whole.

While 55.3 percent of participants answered "yes" to the question of whether the "Kurdish question" is an important problem of the country, in the responses to this question the proportion of Turks who believe in the existence of the Kurdish question is 51.2 percent, while among Kurds this rises to 75.8 percent. For most of the questions the answers were broken down by Kurds and Turks, and "very slight differences" were found between Kurds and Turks in their approach to many issues. Frankly, it is from these differences that a degree of social support, enough to make the problem felt, arises for Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, perhaps for their chauvinisms. There is not much sense in basing the whole of politics on these minority views.

Although the survey contains a not insignificant mass of undecided respondents, it is seen that society in general supports the opening process (48.1 percent). Here too, while the support is higher among Kurds by ethnic origin (75.7 percent), it is seen that those of Turkish origin also approve of the process at a not insignificant rate (42.7 percent), and that those who remain undecided (16.5 percent) make up an important total.

Without doubt, these differences and the undecided should be expected to reshape themselves according to the shape the process takes. Therefore it may not be necessary to explain certain things to politicians, but one needs to look carefully at ways of explaining certain things well to society. For this, it is essential to carry out a strong political communication effort.