PKK tutelage over Kurdish politics

The debates that took place last week over the interpretation of Prime Minister Erdoğan's words during his Southeast trips as "love it or leave it" contain very serious lessons on the way political hermeneutics works.

However much the Prime Minister himself tries to explain that his words never meant this, those words cannot escape resounding in the political atmosphere of the region in a way that produces these meanings. Indeed, in a speech that did not contain exactly this sentence but did contain, in abundance, the notions "one flag, one country, one nation," and that also included, as an outcome, an offer of "go!" to certain people, it is impossible not to be caught in the sphere of influence of the sentence "love it or leave it." Whatever he himself intends by it, this is a language that has been used and found its meaning long ago, and not even the Prime Minister's good will is enough to restore this language's credibility.

On the trips we made last week to many of the Southeast's cities, we ourselves witnessed how these words resounded among the people, partisan and nonpartisan alike. Although it is clearly seen that the figure of Erdoğan is entirely an object of hope in the region on many matters, it is also seen how fragile this hope is. A significant portion of the people who voted for the AKP are hurt and angry because of these words of Erdoğan.

Still, it is hard to say that this anger brings the people of the region closer to the DTP. On the contrary, a similar anger toward the AKP is also directed at the DTP. Interestingly, at present it does not seem possible either that the votes likely to break away from both parties would bring a third party to the fore. For now the votes that break away are leaving the ballot box, that is, politics.

An equal measure of the reaction shown to the Prime Minister is shown to the DTP, because on one side resound Erdoğan's words, understood as "love it or leave it" although not said openly; on another side, the DTP's threatening call to the prime minister, "do not come to the region at all." Frankly, the DTP and the PKK, who do not hesitate to resort to violence if need be to keep out any politician they wish to keep out, who have thought of controlling entries to and exits from Diyarbakır or the region through terror, indeed who have carried it out, do not cede the role of "fascism" to anyone else. Moreover, this role makes one feel, in all its gloom, a fascism far worse than what the sentence "love it or leave it" contains.

By this means the DTP is trying to put all political channels of representation in the region under mortgage, and, relying on an armed force, to suppress and intimidate all other political formations. The show of force it displayed earlier by not letting the Abant Platform's dialogue initiative into Diyarbakır may have been effective, but no one can say that this effect justifies it. The only thing that can be said at this stage is that this fascism, which it claims to pursue on behalf of the Kurdish people, makes the solution of the Kurdish question far more impossible. The DTP is trying to produce a tyrannical Kurd out of the long-oppressed Kurd of the years. And this serves nothing but squandering the Kurdish people's struggle for rights as a mere instrument of power balances.

On the other hand, there is another discourse that even DTP officials themselves do not shy away from voicing, which installs a complete "armed PKK tutelage" over Kurdish politics. If it only wanted to remain under this tutelage itself, perhaps nothing more would be said, but its insistence on putting all Kurdish politics, indeed all Turkish politics, under the mortgage of this tutelage is becoming dangerous in every respect.

The excuse for this PKK tutelage, to which DTP politics appears to have surrendered, is worse than the fault. It is said that if the Kurdish question can be expressed so comfortably today, that is, if some distance has been covered on it, it is thanks to the PKK's armed actions, and that even the DTP's presence in the political sphere is thanks to the PKK's armed strength. That is why it is presented as normal, even necessary, for the PKK to be determinative over all Kurdish politics in general and over the DTP in particular. The PKK, for its part, repays this loyal submission shown to it by bearing down on all dimensions of Kurdish politics, by blocking the channels of politics, and by continuing the Ergenekon game it has been playing for years with its nationalist allies.

Do you realize? This regime of tutelage that the PKK has established over Kurdish politics imitates the military tutelage that has been established over Turkish politics for years. Of course it is a bad imitation.

The strongest excuse discourse of the military tutelage regime over democracy is built on the sacrifices the military makes in the defense of the homeland, when necessary as martyrs and veterans. The martyrs given, which should be an occasion to discuss certain shortcomings, certain faults in the method or practice of the fight against terror, are instead used to establish a tutelage over democracy and over every stage of society. The more martyrs are given, the more military power is obtained.

In the Southeast too, the effort of the DTP or the PKK to take politics hostage with a bad imitation of Turkish militarism is without doubt far beyond even this military tutelage. Because, for better or worse, in Turkey military tutelage can be questioned and invited to democratic oversight.

The tutelage that the PKK has established and the DTP has accepted rests on no law, and it has neither a code nor a morality.

This lawlessness is increasingly felt in the Southeast today and is accumulating great anger against both the DTP and the PKK.