Something worth politics

Identities are among the most fundamental reasons for existence in the political realm. In contrast, Turkey's political regime is founded on the denial of this most basic level of politics.

Members of parliament do not represent specific social segments, nor even exclusively the regions that elected them; on the contrary, they have an obligation to represent all of Turkey as a whole, along with all its segments. Therefore, from the outset, politics is surrendered to a logic that does not accept even theoretically the existence of different segments of society. The discourse of a unitary state and society imagines society as an "entity without classes, privileges, cliques, or ethnicities," and attempts at regional, ethnic, or religious representation are viewed as guaranteed to harm this integrity. Hence, the representative scope of MPs has been formulated as a kind of "deputyship for Turkey" that serves no actual function.

Although this is the official discourse, political practice has never remained bound by these limits, and political diversification has integrated precisely with these perceptions of ethnic, religious, or other identities.

In practice, CHP deputies have never represented the pious, headscarf-wearing Sunni population; on the contrary, on behalf of their own "particular" masses of people whom they represent, they have maintained a hostile attitude toward other masses of people.

This is one of the most extreme, yet unfortunately today most common, examples of conducting politics on the basis of a specific identity. Likewise, the MHP is not interested in the Kurdish people at all.

As for the DTP, it is interested in no one other than the Kurdish people, or rather, no one other than those among this people who are Kurdish nationalists.

Even though identity politics is one of the most legitimate options within the political sphere, it also constitutes the most natural limit to the expansion of the political parties that adopt it. Therefore, we can comfortably say that those pursuing politics based on ethnic, religious, class, or other identities in Turkey have no intention of coming to power.

However, despite the limits naturally imposed by having an identity, the AK Party was able to reach a level of support that allowed it to come to power alone. One reason for this is that the perception of identity it represents had already reached a sufficiently large majority; another reason is the flexible, empathetic, and non-closed nature of this "vague" identity. The "conservative democratic" configuration of the AK Party's identity possesses a frame of reference that defines politics as securing the happiness of the greatest possible number of people (tahsilu's-saade).

As we have noted earlier, this is an ethics of politics to which not everyone in politics is obligated. Even if the most basic level of politics rests on a dividing line between "us" and "them," in a politics pursued for a value, this dividing line is not an exhaustive level for politics. Politics cannot be reduced to Carl Schmitt's relationship of "friend" and "enemy." There is no politics without identity, but this does not prevent one from defining their identity with reference to universal, inclusive values. An understanding of politics nourished even to a small degree by Islam does not view anyone as an absolute "other"; it requires recognizing that every "other" has an intrinsic existence and, within this existence—that is, "within its untouched otherness"—has rights of its own.

In this context, it is worth mentioning two very important articles written in succession about two months ago by our friend Akif Emre, which I believe were not sufficiently evaluated. The articles pointed to a danger: the shift of the AK Party's political nature from an ethical pursuit to precisely this line of “identity.” This danger, which he termed “the politics of those who are one of us” or “clan politics,” signifies substituting a kind of Muslim nationalism (“Muslimism”) for a just politics that respects Islamic values. In Emre's words, “'Muslimism' emerges at precisely this point as a clan politics. It is the name given to the pursuit of a position in politics by non-central social segments that feed on a tradition where religious coloring predominates culturally and sociologically represent a level below a certain economic status. This should be read not so much through ideological reasons, but rather as a pursuit of power that carries the interests and quests for power of the social base on which they rely into politics” (Yeni Şafak, August 26).

Undoubtedly, every political group in Turkey may have an approach such as “pursuing only the interests of those who belong to their own,” and this approach is politically legitimate; however, the references that the AK Party implicitly or explicitly expresses—or does not express—do not permit them to conduct politics “only for themselves.”

Despite the grievances caused by the harsh, exclusionary, classist, and de facto identity-based understanding of secularism experienced in Turkey, or even as a response to this understanding, the AK Party's horizon of political action must extend beyond “those who are one of us” and aim, as far as possible, for the good and happiness of everyone.

Positioning “politics of service” against “identity politics” is a poor expression of this and one that at times damages political legitimacy; yet, once this drawback is eliminated, it is a correct formula to the extent that it bears traces of this goal.

This might sound like detaching the feet of politics—perceived as a Carl Schmittian “friend and enemy relationship”—from the ground, but after all, if there is anything that makes politics “worthwhile,” what else could it be?