The DTP's problem is that it does not do politics

In a sense, politics is the sum of initiatives or maneuvers undertaken by parties recognizing one another to resolve problems and obtain an outcome in line with their own demands. Even in this simple definition, a dimension that should first draw attention is that politics fundamentally requires the existence of people who define themselves as parties.

Being a party can also be a dynamic condition that constantly shifts depending on specific situations; however, taking a side is the most fundamental state of political action, and this state also constitutes a foundational level of the concept of "identity." Therefore, politics is the name of a process conducted alongside those whom people define as "us" against those coded as "them." Politics cannot be conducted without taking a side, that is, without being "for" some people and "against" others. Since politics cannot be pursued without differentiating and distinguishing oneself from others, politics itself is heavily dependent on the existence of identities.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Erdoğan's accusation against the DTP of "engaging in identity politics" is highly problematic in terms of political perception, and in my view, this might be the very last criticism that could be directed at the DTP.

We can observe that this problematic perception of politics stems from the discursive pressure of a so-called neoliberal (yet in Turkey, simultaneously Kemalist) style of politics that assigns virtually the same role to all parties in politics. This style of politics demands that parties adhere to the same economic, social, and ideological programs on every issue without establishing any distinction, permitting them to demonstrate only a difference in performance. This identity-less, characterless style of politics eventually renders the organizations and programs of all parties similar to one another. Of course, despite these structural differences, "identities that continue to exist"—even though their articulation is persistently avoided—nevertheless continue to constitute the differences among parties.

Everyone knows that the parties are different, yet everyone continues to exert pressure on others to appear different from what they are and ultimately to align with an official discursive line. Frankly, what makes the AK Party the AK Party today is not merely its technical performance; it is its identity, which—even if the party itself denies it under the same discursive pressures—its electorate by no means refrains from discerning. The communicative language formed between the AK Party and its electorate through its discourse and stance on many events constantly continues to support this identity, this distinction.

While Prime Minister Erdoğan invites all parties to become a "party of Turkey," he is in fact recommending to everyone—in propaganda mode—a single "identity" that has perhaps led him to success. In this respect, it is understandable. Indeed, his own party's vision and identity perception possess the distinction of embracing the whole of Turkey, and this seems to have rewarded it sufficiently as a mass party. However, it must be known that not all parties have the chance to become mass parties, nor do they have such an obligation. Some people possess an identity due to specific problems they experience or feel.

Special sensitivities toward workers' rights, women's rights, environmental issues, and other topics delineate the framework of an identity, and those focused on these issues may pursue politics centered solely around them. Particularly when a major grievance has emerged regarding a specific issue, it would not be fair to blame a politics that prioritizes the redress of this grievance and acquires an identity through it. Today, Kurdish identity is not merely a problem produced by those pursuing a fantasy identity; it is an identity inevitably generated by a chauvinist and denialist politics of nationalism. Pursuing a kind of politics of "recognition" against denialist discourse and policies is more than sufficient reason to exist in the political domain. Expecting those who primarily feel this problem to also embrace all the problems of the whole of Turkey, while certainly desirable, cannot be imposed as a condition. Politics is precisely the domain where such specific problems are articulated and where identities formed around these specific issues wage their struggle for rights.

However, as the prime minister put it, the problem with the DTP is not that it engages in “identity politics,” but rather, on the contrary, that it does not engage in politics at all. At the very least, it bypasses politics and relies on a kind of war diplomacy.

The DTP seems to have chosen to destroy the political ground attained regarding the resolution of the Kurdish issue by squandering it to the PKK and the forces it serves. What it is doing has nothing to do with any form of politics, let alone identity politics.

Ultimately, since the presence of the DTP in the political sphere largely eliminates the PKK’s grounds for legitimacy, the PKK wants the DTP to be closed down, thereby reproducing its comfortable excuse for armed struggle and radicalization.

On the other hand, there is a DTP struggling like a suicide bomber to fulfill even this desire of the PKK.

From this picture, it follows that the only thing this PKK-DTP coalition does not want is the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

It is no coincidence that every step taken by the AK Party toward a discourse of the “Kurdish issue” and “solution” is met with an escalation of terrorism.