What the AKP in particular should see in the South-East

In his recent statements, made both during his trips to the Southeast and on other occasions, Prime Minister Erdoğan outlines the broad strokes of his strategy regarding the terrorism problem. This strategy relies roughly on the assumption that if he takes local administrations away from the DTP, he will also rescue the people of the region from the terror organization's sphere of influence.

More explicitly, if he can take the municipalities of Diyarbakır and Tunceli in particular away from the DTP, he is preparing to use this as a sign that the terror organization is, at the very least, not approved of by the public.

The label "stronghold" attributed to Diyarbakır long ago shows that the AKP is not merely preparing for an election where it will compete with other parties in the region over its achievements as a political party, but that it also attributes "a meaning far exceeding itself" to this election. Thinking that the ground on which terrorism feeds will automatically disappear if the economic investments the ruling party makes in the region or the discourse of brotherhood it pursues gather enough votes from the region is, frankly, not a grand or clever invention. Far from being an invention, this is a discourse or policy whose counter-arguments have been produced even more strongly in the region through its overused application up to now.

While saying that the PKK is bothered by the investments made in the region, the Prime Minister is certainly not wrong. However, let him now be thoroughly assured of this: what will truly end the PKK is not these investments, but rather a more empathetic and relaxed approach to the Kurdish question. Truth be told, the regional backwardness of the Southeast can no longer serve as a satisfying explanation for the existence and continuation of terrorism. The organization has already been building the necessary discursive fortifications for years against policies aimed at resolving this problem through investments, and it effectively operates a propaganda mechanism that neutralizes this style of politics. Even for many Kurdish citizens who have no connection whatsoever to the PKK, these discourses can be seen as "humiliating" and even as a kind of "offer of a bribe." Regardless of how well-intentioned the steps taken without articulating the Kurdish question, recognizing this issue, and orienting toward a policy in line with acknowledging this issue may be, they are perceived as a simple "patronage policy" expecting "thanks and loyalty" from them in exchange for "filling their stomachs." Naturally, no matter how substantial the investments are, defeating them with simple propaganda does not prove very difficult.

The Prime Minister's call to "abandon identity politics" during his Tunceli speech indicates that he has not gauged the region's pulse well enough. Identity politics is, of course, a matter of choice in politics. As a party, you can explain your own stance on "ethnic identity" politics in a sufficiently convincing manner and prove that you are much more "contemporary, progressive, and efficient." However, you can neither ignore nor underestimate the choice of those who base their political preference on an "ethnic option."

Moreover, in a country like Turkey, which established its national identity by suppressing all potential sub-identities, viewing the suppressed identities' efforts at a "comeback" or even "survival" as a "luxurious and fanciful identity politics" is a great injustice. Essentially, a productive policy regarding the region cannot be conducted without understanding this context.

Indeed, for a more productive policy, there are a few important points that need to be taken into account at this stage.

1. Today, it is necessary to realize that the identity politics conducted around the Kurdish question has turned into a regional "sentiment and consciousness" independent of terrorism or the PKK. Considering that the DTP's vote share does not decrease at all even in places where municipal services are delivered the least, one sees how secondary factors like jobs and livelihood can sometimes become in political preference, and that the identity factor is decisive in political choice.

2. Even if this point has been reached partly due to the agenda driven by terrorism, it is now necessary to recognize that even if terrorism were to end today, the public's expectations arising from this context will not cease. Unless this is addressed in parallel with the development of a contemporary democratic citizenship culture, it emerges as an increasingly urgent need with each passing day.

3. As the Prime Minister noted, rather than state investments in the region, what will truly finish off the PKK—and therefore what will truly worry the PKK—is for the state to genuinely recognize the Kurdish issue and take steps toward its resolution.

4. The AKP also needs to stop devoting all its energy to capturing municipalities held by the DTP (and in other places, the CHP) by viewing them as "strongholds." If the AKP were to win these municipalities in a less tense election, that would be well and good; however, engaging in a struggle of this nature escalates tensions in the region even further. Ultimately, if the AKP wins, although this might signify a weakening of the mass support for terrorism, there is no doubt that it will also signify a further increase in tension. Ultimately, the image of a country where all municipalities are in the hands of the AKP and no space is left for the opposition is concerning in many respects.

Since I have run out of space, I cannot go into detail, but I must note that striving so fiercely for such an image is not particularly auspicious.