Başbuğ's style of politics

General Başbuğ, as of the first week of his tenure, shows through his speeches and actions that he has no patience for drawing anything other than a different profile for a Chief of the General Staff. He makes it felt that he takes special care to distance himself from his predecessors. He has already succeeded in giving the impression of being a more intellectual, better-equipped personality compared to his predecessors. In his speeches, he makes references to thinkers like Habermas, Fukuyama, and Esposito, and occasionally does not neglect self-criticism on behalf of the policies pursued by the TSK.

Despite this, as we have mentioned before, despite his more intellectual style, the language dominating the content of his speeches cannot escape being a typical communal language. One cannot help but wonder: if, in the end, he insists on the same narrow understanding of secularism and remains within the same nationalist horizon, why would he need references to Habermas, Fukuyama, or other major intellectuals? Anyway, this is not our topic today.

Since the visit paid "on behalf of the TSK" to the retired generals who were Ergenekon suspects took place on his third day in office, and since this visit was officially claimed by the General Staff, we must attribute this act—with its style, meaning, and performance—to Başbuğ's account. This visit, which meant overt interference in what is perhaps the most important lawsuit in Turkey's history, was dwelt upon considerably, and should be dwelt upon even more. Turkey's legal conscience cannot tolerate a new Şemdinli incident. Indeed, I cannot recall any word or action by anyone else in Turkey that could tarnish the TSK as much as this visit made on behalf of the TSK.

However, this is only one side of the story. The other side consists of the visits Başbuğ has been making over the last two days, first to the 2nd Army, and from there to Diyarbakır and Van. In Diyarbakır, Başbuğ met one-on-one with representatives of civil society organizations, conveyed his views on terrorism and the development of the region, and listened to the representatives as well. In Van, he mixed with the public and was welcomed enthusiastically. Frankly, Başbuğ is trying to project a profile of an entrepreneurial, agenda-setting, and interventionist figure of a kind we are not accustomed to seeing in any Chief of the General Staff until now.

At first glance, there seems to be no problem. It is truly necessary to put a stop to a process that has lasted for years and created serious emotional distances between the TSK and the people of the region. The highest authority of the TSK taking such initiatives and listening to the people creates sympathy among the public, and perhaps as the military keeps its ears wide open to the people of the region, healthier dialogues can be established. Who could ever be harmed by dialogue, by listening to one another?

And yet, there is still something about this that looks far from normal. There is an abnormality in a Chief of the General Staff trying to project the profile of a political leader in the region or across the country. If the purpose of engaging in such close contact with the public is to dry up the sources of terrorism, everyone in Turkey by now knows that the biggest source of terrorism is Ergenekon. The source of PKK terrorism is not the people of Diyarbakır or Van, such that the way to eradicate terrorism would be to win them over to one's side.

The way to end PKK terrorism goes through ending Ergenekon. What we have experienced so far has demonstrated this very clearly by now. The actions carried out in the name of PKK terrorism have sufficiently shown that the PKK is not an organization with an independent existence of its own. On the contrary, there is a professional firm in question that constantly does things that could be meaningful for the politics of other centers of power, and has no relation whatsoever to the people of Diyarbakır or Van. Look at the timing of all the PKK's actions; all of them have been actions that serve a targeted purpose strictly in domestic politics and mostly feed, support, and strengthen the hands of militarist centers.

Perhaps politicians getting more intimately involved with the public could be a way to end PKK terrorism, but there is no situation that warrants a chief of general staff mingling among the public like a political leader. Whoever truly wants to put an end to terrorism must first dare to confront Ergenekon. Everyone now knows that after making (or having made) visits to Ergenekon suspects on behalf of the TAF, no matter how much you win over the people of Diyarbakır or Van to your side, terrorism cannot be brought to an end.

What, then, is the meaning of these visits, these spectacles of mingling with the public?

The profile revealed by Başbuğ's one week of actions is actually based on a simple strategy of politicizing the TAF and turning it into an active actor on the political scene. Breaking conventions is the best politics. In this respect, the TAF under the leadership of Başbuğ—having exhausted its opportunities for political intervention during the Büyükanıt era with its maneuvering space severely narrowed—is now attempting breakout maneuvers to open up broad areas for itself in the field of politics. It can be considered successful as politics, but this role does not belong to the military. It is a stolen role. Like all stolen roles, it is neither fair, democratic, nor legal. With this role, Başbuğ declares himself the owner of policy regarding the Southeast and the Kurdish question. While stealing this role, the approach he exhibits does not actually display a significant difference from his predecessors. While meeting with non-governmental organizations in Diyarbakır, he again implements an accreditation practice, explicitly vetoing, refusing to meet, and setting apart 3 NGO representatives in particular.

Once a politician turns a blind eye to the theft of this role, they start getting used to it after a while, watching with alienation as the role stolen from them is played out. And where they really ought to be doing politics, they are asked “what their real job actually is.”