The Mecca Alliance: the Islamic world taking charge of its own security

The most striking or most emphasized provision of the Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca among Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was that this alliance is not directed against any particular country or party. That is, so to speak, a defense cooperation agreement that will come into play "if need be" or in case of attack. Yet it was seen that this agreement alarmed many countries at first glance.

Truthfully, from our standpoint, the first question to be asked about this agreement is not "Who is this alliance against?" but why three important countries of the Islamic world, indeed even more of its countries, have not until today established a solidarity mechanism of this scale regarding their own security. For this is what is really overdue.

For about a century, the security of the Muslim world has been conceived largely within systems established by others, as part of others' security conceptions. The security of the Gulf was linked to the American security umbrella, that of the Mediterranean to NATO, that of the Indian Ocean to the navies of the global great powers; the safety of energy routes, again, to the military presence of external actors. Muslim countries, for their part, have often been compelled, instead of producing security with one another, to buy security against one another from other powers.

This is where the real historical value of the Mecca Agreement lies. Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan accept that an armed attack on any one of them will be considered an attack on all three. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has also stated plainly that this mechanism is, technically, similar to Article 5 of NATO, but does not target any country. Moreover, the mechanism need not remain limited to three countries; the participation of other countries, Egypt foremost among them, is also on the agenda.

Here is a development at which the Muslim world should rejoice. Türkiye's military and technological capacity, Pakistan's military power and nuclear deterrence, and Saudi Arabia's economic, financial and energy capacity should no longer be thought of merely as the sum of three separate national powers. The logic of cooperation is, after all, not to add powers but to multiply them by one another. The synergy that can emerge in the fields of the defense industry, intelligence, training, logistics, energy security, sea lanes, technology and finance can produce results far beyond the capacity the three countries possess on their own.

The matter is not limited to this either. It is possible that a broad geography, from Azerbaijan to Qatar, from Syria to Iraq, from Egypt to Jordan, may in time enter into relations of varying degrees with such a security architecture. In this respect it is important that Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif has also said that the agreement should not be a "closed club" and that it could evolve into a broader collective security mechanism encompassing Islamic countries.

ISRAEL'S ANXIETY IS, OF COURSE, MEANINGFUL

Israel is not named in the agreement. Neither are Iran, India or Greece. They should not be, in any case. The strength of a defense architecture comes not from its constantly inventing enemies for itself, but from its ability to produce security without needing an enemy.

But the discomfort with the agreement on the part of Israel, which regards Türkiye as its chief enemy, and of Greece, a categorical rival, is of course noteworthy.

What this discomfort tells us is not that the agreement was "established against Israel." It tells us something more important: Israel is worried about the possibility that the disarray that has so far conferred an advantage in the distribution of power in the region may diminish.

Israel's regional superiority stems not only from its military technology. It also feeds on the fragmentation of the Arab and Islamic world, on the mutual distrust among countries, and on every state's trying to secure its security alone or under outside patronage. When a region emerges opposite Israel that can coordinate its diplomatic, economic, military and technological capacity at the same time, the balance of power will naturally change.

Türkiye's presence here is also important. With what is happening in Palestine plain for all to see, it is unthinkable for Türkiye to be part of any alliance that supports Israel's pursuit of regional hegemony. Therefore, reading the Mecca Agreement as an extension of an Israel-centered security project loses touch with reality from the very start.

SO WHY IS IRAN TAKING IT PERSONALLY?

What is really interesting are some of the reactions coming from Iran.

Ankara stated plainly that the agreement is not against Iran or any country. Even so, Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of the Iranian Parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that Saudi Arabia's cooperation with Türkiye and Pakistan would not guarantee its security, while Ebrahim Rezaei from the same committee belittled the agreement, describing it as a "paper agreement."

This reaction is truly thought-provoking. Because Türkiye and Pakistan are not countries with hostile relations with Iran. On the contrary, in the recent diplomatic processes conducted between Iran and the United States, the mediating and tension-reducing roles of Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt have also been recorded by Iran's official news agency.

Moreover, considered from the standpoint of Iran's long-term interests, it would be far more meaningful to see the opportunity the Mecca Agreement carries than to be categorically disturbed by it.

What is the basic security problem Iran voices at every opportunity today? Is it not that the region is constantly open to the intervention of the United States, Israel or other outside powers? Does Iran not define its own security largely through a strategy built against this threat of outside intervention?

If so, the increasing production of their own security by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq and the other countries of the region should, in theory, be in Iran's interest as well. But if Iran has another agenda and circle of alliances that it is hiding from everyone, the accounting for that should also be done separately.