In the UN draft, whom does "equidistance between the parties" serve in Sudan?

Some time ago we wrote that describing what is happening in Sudan as "a civil war between two sides" veils the truth, and that the picture before us is increasingly clearly turning into an externally backed attempt at occupation by proxy. The working draft dated 30 July 2026 that has been circulating in the UN Security Council carries the conceptual problem we drew attention to in that article, this time, to the level of the international law and sanctions regime, and unfortunately it does so as a result of the lobbying activities of the powers behind the proxy occupying party among those supposed "two sides."

At first glance the UN draft uses extremely reasonable expressions: "unwavering commitment" to Sudan's sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity is reaffirmed; the protection of civilians is requested; the flow of arms, ammunition and military assistance into the country from outside is condemned; and concern is expressed in particular about the dispatch and operation of UAVs and unmanned aerial systems from third countries.

Of course, all of this is true. The problem begins where the perpetrator becomes increasingly invisible. The draft constantly says "warring parties." It demands that external military assistance to "the parties" be cut off and opens the way to the uniform extension of the existing Darfur arms embargo to the whole of Sudan and to all the parties operating there.

Here the very question from our previous article confronts us again: since when have the Sudanese state and a militia formation trying to bring it down become two legally and politically equal "parties"?

EQUATING THE STATE WITH THE MILITIA

Of course, it cannot be said that everything the Sudanese Armed Forces do is lawful in advance. The state army, too, is bound by international humanitarian law; violations committed against civilians must be investigated whoever commits them. But accountability is one thing and equating legal statuses is another.

On one side are the armed forces of Sudan's internationally recognized state; on the other are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which, with outright plunder motives, are attempting rebellion and occupation against the legitimate state administration with forces recruited and brought in from outside. The RSF's record, stretching from Darfur to El Fasher, includes charges of massacre, plunder, forced displacement, arbitrary detention and very grave human rights violations. Moreover, the Sudanese administration has long been showing, with evidence, that this formation is armed and financed from outside.

If what is now proposed as the solution is to limit the state's defense capacity as well by extending the arms embargo to the whole of Sudan, a very strange outcome emerges. The militia, fed by illicit arms networks, already does not comply with UN resolutions. The external networks that feed it also pierce the existing embargo. By contrast, the state, which has to operate within the international system, is further restricted in procuring arms and defense systems. That is, the sanction is equal for everyone in theory but in practice works against the one who abides by the rule.

THE REAL QUESTION: WHERE DO THE WEAPONS COME FROM?

Moreover, the draft itself admits something very important. It says that there is a "continuous flow of external military assistance, arms and ammunition" into Sudan and even that UAV systems are launched and operated from third countries. Right here one must ask, then: which third countries?

Where do the weapons come from? Who buys them? Who finances them? Which airports, ports and land corridors are used? Which companies and financial networks mediate these transfers? Without investigating these, would restricting the Sudanese state's procurement of arms not be like cutting off the fire brigade's water instead of looking for whoever started the fire?

In our previous article we said that the military, financial and logistical support the UAE is alleged to provide to the RSF must absolutely be clarified. Abu Dhabi denies these accusations. Then what needs to be done is even clearer: let the UN's expert mechanisms bring the external supply chains fully to light; whichever state, company or network is violating the embargo, let the sanction be applied directly to it.

Indeed, that the new draft envisages increasing the panel of experts' coordination with the sanctions-monitoring mechanisms on Libya, South Sudan, Somalia and elsewhere in the region shows that even the UN can no longer ignore the logistical arteries of the war outside Sudan's borders.

But in that case the solution is not to put the Sudanese state in the same sanctions bag, but to cut the arteries outside.

WEAKENING SOVEREIGNTY WHILE DEFENDING IT

Another contradiction of the draft emerges here. On the one hand, unwavering commitment to Sudan's "sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity" is declared; on the other, limiting the defense capacity of the state institution charged with defending this sovereignty and territorial integrity is put on the agenda.

Furthermore, it is not clear when the new measures will end. A sanctions regime that began as specific to Darfur may thus turn into an open-ended mechanism covering the whole country. This shows why Sudan's objection should be taken seriously.

What the Sudanese administration is saying is in fact simple: do not exempt us from accountability; but do not equate our state with the armed formation trying to dismantle it either. This demand is the most reasonable option under the present conditions.

The road to peace in Sudan runs not through liquidating the state but through making the state function again. All armed formations, including the RSF, must be subject to state authority, external arms and financing channels must be cut, everyone who commits crimes against civilians must be held accountable, and then the Sudanese people must be able to freely establish their own political order.

If the international community truly wants Sudan's territorial integrity, it must first recall this simple distinction again: the state and the armed formation trying to bring the state down are not the same thing.

When this distinction is lost, "neutrality" does not produce peace. On the contrary, it bestows on externally fed proxy formations the equality they need vis-à-vis the legitimate state.

It must not be forgotten that in such situations standing at an equal distance from everyone also means equalizing the distance between the aggressor and the one attacked.