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The spoils and losses of the war in the US and Iran

The war launched by the US and Israel against Iran, whose scope is gradually widening, is transforming not only the front lines but also the internal structure, decision-making mechanisms, and ideological orientations of states. The most striking example of this transformation is being lived today in the US and Iran. To see what it has led to in the US, perhaps we should wait for the results of the midterm elections a few months from now.
FOR WHOM ARE THE CAULDRONS BOILING IN THE US?
Trump looks at the war in terms of spoils to be won through the most archaic impulses. He speaks of seizing oil, of the most savage, most primitive war gains for the US. But the loss occurs mainly within his own ranks. Already the cauldrons are boiling in US domestic politics. Who will be scalded in these cauldrons, what kind of US politics will emerge, and where it will seat the US among the world balances: we face a dynamic open to every kind of development.
In Iran, on the other hand, assassinations, leadership changes, increasing military pressure, and international encirclement are reshaping Iran not only externally but internally as well. At the start of the war, it had been calculated that a change of leader would, within a few hours, lead to Iran's surrender, as in Venezuela. After all, there was supposedly a ready, risen-up opposition populace waiting to salute the US aircraft.
THE CALCULATIONS IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND TEL AVIV DID NOT FIT TEHRAN
As a result of several tiers of assassination attacks, nearly the entire first and second leadership cadres of Iran were liquidated. This is an unprecedented form of war. But those who came after the old radical cadres, who were liquidated, who could not be talked to, who could not be reached, far from being more moderate, have taken up a much more radical line. Everyone who has a relationship with Iran is facing a far more radical cadre at the level of intention and direction. Yet the picture emerging in the process is nonetheless paradoxical: Iran is radicalizing on one hand and losing capacity on the other. This dual situation directly affects both the course of the war and the future of regional policies.
The latest developments in Iran, especially with the targeting of leadership cadres and the elimination of high-level figures, have necessitated serious restructuring within the system. The tendency historically observed in such situations has shown itself here too: those who replaced them were not more cautious but harsher. For wartime conditions feed not the search for compromise but securitarian reflexes. In Iran too, the line described as "religious moderation" is seen to have retreated, while the decisiveness of the military-bureaucratic structure centered on the Revolutionary Guards has increased.
THE IRAN PARADOX: RADICALIZATION DOES NOT MEAN STRENGTHENING
However, this radicalization does not always mean an increase in power. On the contrary, there is a marked erosion in Iran's war capacity. In particular, the loss of the cadres that form important elements of its external operations capability, coordination problems, and logistical difficulties limit Iran's effectiveness on the ground. The sustainability of the strategy run through proxy forces also becomes debatable in this context. That is, the tools in Iran's hands are hardening, but its capacity to use these tools effectively is weakening.
This situation reflects directly on the course of the war. A more radical leadership makes backing down harder; but the loss of capacity prevents this radicalism from producing results. Thus a balance of high rhetoric and limited effect emerges. The gap between Iran's hardening at the level of discourse and its limitations on the ground leads to a dynamic that prolongs the conflict but produces no decisive result.
THE US PARADOX: GAINING AN UNPREDICTABLE ENEMY
This picture carries a critical meaning also in terms of the US's expectations of the war. One of Washington's basic goals was either to force Iran to the negotiating table or to limit its regional influence. Although current developments appear to serve some of these goals partially, the picture is not so clear.
On one hand, Iran's loss of capacity and its being under internal pressure coincide with the US's strategic goals. But on the other hand, the system's drift to a more radical line weakens the possibility of negotiation. This gives rise to a classic dilemma for the US: a weakened Iran also becomes a more unpredictable Iran. For this reason, instead of producing a quick "change of behavior" as Washington expected, the war is producing a more complex and long-term instability.
Iran's regional policies are also being reshaped within this framework. The sphere of influence established in the earlier period through ideological and strategic depth is now turning into a structure based more on defensive reflex. This does not mean that Iran's influence in the region has disappeared entirely; but the nature of this influence is changing. The policy that was previously based on expansion and establishing influence is gradually shifting toward the axis of protection and holding on.
At this point the discourse Iran uses also gains separate importance. Iran still presents itself as the center of the "axis of resistance." But this discourse is a subject whose credibility has almost completely vanished, especially in the Arab-Islamic world. And the date of this is not current; it goes back to the role Iran played during the Arab Spring.
IRAN'S RECORD WAS SPOILED REALLY IN THE ARAB SPRING
The Arab Spring was a moment in which demands for freedom, justice, and political participation rose. In this process Iran's stance revealed a serious contradiction with its own discourse. Iran, which foregrounded Palestine and the discourse of resistance, sided with the regimes against popular movements in some countries, Syria first of all. This strengthened the criticisms that Iran's "resistance" discourse was an instrument based on geopolitical interest rather than a universal vision of freedom.
The Iranian discourse rising again today in the context of the war cannot, of course, be read independently of this past. Although Iran's struggle against Israel arouses sympathy in many circles, for societies that lived through the Arab Spring experience this sympathy is not unlimited. For the memory is still alive: a period in which demands for freedom were suppressed, revolutions were broken, and struggles for regional influence got ahead of the will of peoples has not yet closed.
RISING ANTI-US-ISRAEL SENTIMENT
Despite this, the fact that the US attack on Iran is together with Israel has also pushed anti-US-Israel sentiment and hatred in the Arab-Islamic world to the extreme because of this attack. This paradox is of course not incomprehensible. In the end, whatever has happened, the matter between Iran and the rest of the Islamic world is acquiring the character of a family matter vis-à-vis the US and Israel, and is being postponed.
In conclusion, the war being lived today is transforming Iran in three ways: radicalizing it internally, weakening it in terms of capacity, and limiting it at the level of discourse; but on the other hand, as a fourth element, it is also strengthening anti-Zio-US sentiment in the Islamic world. This fourth element, added to the triple transformation, will determine not only Iran's future but also the general balance of the region.
From the US's point of view, this process oscillates between partial success and strategic uncertainty. Although Iran's weakening coincides with Washington's goals, the harsher and unpredictable structure that has emerged produces new risks. For the region the matter is deeper: this war is redefining not only the balances of power but also the relationship between freedom and resistance, and relations in dispelling the hesitations between colonial intervention and the ideal of Islamic unity.
As for Iran, it will in this war neither be defeated nor win; it will be transformed, and the outcome of this transformation will redefine not only Iran but the entire region.