From 1973 to the Hormuz crisis: the geopolitics of oil at a theo-political crossroads

The 1973 oil crisis is regarded as one of the founding moments of modern energy geopolitics. It is an event in which King Faisal, who, with the reaction he showed against the burning of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1969, convened the Islamic Conference and thereby effectively rose to the leadership position of both the Arab and the Islamic world after Nasser, returned to the stage most effectively.

The direct trigger of the crisis was the Yom Kippur War. In the war that Egypt and Syria launched against Israel in October 1973, the US and some Western countries gave open support to Israel. This caused a great reaction in the Arab world. Under Saudi Arabia's leadership, with King Faisal at the forefront, Arab oil producers decided to develop an economic counter-move against the West. This decision was not merely a protest but at the same time the proclamation of a new strategic thinking: oil is no longer merely a trade commodity but an instrument of geopolitical power.

DRAWING GEO-POLITICAL PROFITS FROM A THEO-POLITICAL RATIONALE

In this framework, Arab countries began to impose an oil embargo on the US and some European countries that supported Israel. At the same time production was gradually reduced and prices were raised in a coordinated manner. Oil prices, which stood at about 3 dollars per barrel before the crisis, rose in a short time to the range of 11-12 dollars per barrel. This was not merely an economic leap but a lasting redefinition of the relationship between energy and politics.

In this process, oil-producing countries, especially the OPEC members, were able for the first time to steer global markets as a collective actor. In the short term, Arab countries multiplied their revenues and acquired significant economic and political power. But in the long term the picture that emerged was more complex. The West, quickly drawing a lesson from this shock, turned toward reducing its energy dependence; it built strategic reserves, increased energy efficiency, and accelerated the search for alternative sources. More importantly, with oil revenues being recirculated within the global financial system, the "petrodollar order" was strengthened.

Looking back, it is seen more clearly that the greatest strategic winner of oil's rise from 3 dollars to 12 dollars and then to higher levels was the US. Arab countries made gains in the short term; but these gains were largely reintegrated into the Western system within the financial order that was established. In other words, the crisis increased the Arabs' power but did not change the US-centered system; it reinforced the system.

WHOM WILL THIS CRISIS RUIN, WHOM WILL IT MAKE PROSPEROUS?

The crisis taking shape around the Strait of Hormuz today carries, at first glance, the potential of an energy shock reminiscent of 1973. But this similarity is superficial. There are decisive differences between the two periods.

The 1973 crisis was the product of a conscious and coordinated political decision. Supply had been cut in line with a certain strategic goal. Today, by contrast, supply disruptions arise as a result of war, sanctions, and struggles for de facto control over sea lanes. That is, at that time the crisis was being managed; today the crisis presents a fluid, multi-actor, and unpredictable structure.

The second important difference is OPEC's position. OPEC, a strong and coordinated structure in 1973, is undergoing serious erosion today. The UAE's departure from OPEC is the most concrete indicator of this process. Iran's being constrained by sanctions, Venezuela's crises, and the Gulf countries' export difficulties weaken the organization's capacity for collective action. OPEC is now turning from a price-setting center into an actor seeking balance within a dispersed system.

The third difference emerges in the role of the US. The US, which was an oil importer in 1973, has today become a significant producer and exporter thanks to shale oil. This makes the crisis's effect two-directional: while high prices give an advantage to producers, they create inflationary pressure in the domestic market. Indeed, although such crises provide the US with geopolitical gains, they can produce serious costs in domestic politics.

At the same time, it is likely that the rise in oil prices will again produce results in the US's favor in the long term. The redirection of energy flows and the global market's becoming more dependent on American oil is one of the most critical dimensions of this process.

THE UAE'S DEPARTURE FROM OPEC

This departure, which will produce new balances, should be watched carefully in this context. This step is not only a search to be rid of production quotas; it is also an effort to take a more independent position in regional power rivalry. An indirect search for balance against Saudi Arabia's weight within the organization also lies in the background of this decision.

This development shows that central control mechanisms in the energy market have begun to dissolve and are giving way to a more fragmented, competitive, and flexible order.

On the other hand, the most important feature of today's crisis is that the energy market is no longer decisive on its own. In 1973 oil was almost an absolute instrument of power; today LNG, renewable energy, and technological transformation disperse this power. For this reason crises now produce more complex, multi-layered, and hard-to-predict results.

THE CRISIS'S EFFECTS ON TURKEY

From Turkey's standpoint, this crisis harbors both risk and opportunity. As an economy dependent on energy imports, Turkey is directly affected by increases in oil and natural gas prices; pressure arises on the current account deficit and on inflation. On the other hand, the growing importance of the pipelines passing through Ceyhan and of alternative overland routes turns Turkey into a strategic transit country in energy logistics. While the reduction of dependence on Hormuz increases Turkey's geopolitical value, the possibility of regional instability spreading raises security costs. In this process Turkey must strike a delicate balance between gain and fragility.

IS OIL STILL A POWER, OR A NEW FIELD IN WHICH POWER CIRCULATES?

Between the 1973 oil crisis and today's energy tension there is both continuity and rupture. Oil is still one of the important instruments of global politics; but it is no longer decisive on its own.

In 1973, the crisis was the result of a decision taken by a relatively independent bloc determining its own strategy. Today we face a constantly changing geopolitical situation formed by the interaction of many actors.

The UAE's departure from OPEC is one of the most concrete indicators of this transformation. The issue is no longer merely who produces how much oil. What is truly decisive is who can move more flexibly, who can steer crises, and who can reshape global energy flows.

And perhaps the most critical question now is this:

Is oil still a power, or a new field in which power circulates?