From Hormuz to Gaza, from Turkey to Sumud: where the sea ends for the US and Israel

The developments unfolding in the Middle East today cannot, without doubt, be explained merely by a chronology of wars or by the current positions of the actors. Perhaps it is a dynamic process, triggered by the October 7 Al-Aqsa Flood, which will in the end have moved far from the starting point of the entire order. The minute-by-minute shifts in Trump's statements can be seen as something more than mere inconsistencies attributable to Trump's own peculiar style; they may be seen as natural reflexes displayed in the rush to respond to this dynamic process.

The energy crisis knotted up in the Strait of Hormuz, the ongoing destruction in Gaza, the continuing military balance in southern Lebanon, and Israeli interventionism that shows itself even in international waters are all signs of a much deeper transformation: the region has reached the limits of an order imposed from outside and has come to the threshold of producing its own strategic reason.

THE NEW WILL IN THE GULF: HORMUZ IS NO LONGER JUST A SEA PASSAGE

One of the most critical indicators of this transformation is the Gulf response to the Hormuz crisis. At the extraordinary consultative summit held in Jeddah on April 28, the approach of the Gulf leaders went beyond classical crisis management and revealed a will to turn pressure into an opportunity. Hormuz is no longer just a sea passage; it is a geopolitical laboratory in which it is being tested whether the region can determine its own destiny.

In a sense, the Gulf leaders seem to perceive the problem as lying beyond the control of Hormuz, and to have opened onto a horizon that extends to eliminating dependence on Hormuz. The alternative pipelines, overland logistics networks and joint strategic stockpile systems that the Gulf states have put on the agenda represent an approach that reverses classical sea-power theories. The issue is no longer to control a passage; it is to make it impossible for that passage to be used as a weapon.

THE US IS NOT THE GULF'S PROTECTOR BUT ITS THREAT

This approach in fact points to a regional paradigm shift. While the American-Israeli axis tries to obtain results through its military power, the regional actors are, for the first time, turning toward producing structural deterrence. This is not merely a defensive reflex; it is also a claim to build a new order, and, as far as can be seen, it is a precaution not only against Iran but against the US as well. Even if the countries of the region still keep their relations at a certain level, they have so far understood very well that the real threat directed at them comes from the US-Israel axis. Iran may be a threat not to the Gulf but to the expansionist and colonial presence of the US in the region, and even its being a threat to the Gulf countries stems only from the US using the Gulf countries as a shield for itself. The US presence or its protective power offers the Gulf no advantage whatsoever. It is like a bad dog guarding the Gulf: all it does is bring the wolf to the flock. The Gulf has no need of such a protector.

These things were of course not spoken openly at the Jeddah meeting, but it is understood that this picture is becoming increasingly clear at that table. As this picture becomes clearer, a new horizon opens not only for the region but for the entire Turkish-Arab-Islamic Union. The point the Gulf has reached today is a serious awareness that the Zionist finger at the root of the deadlocks in Gaza, Lebanon, Libya and Sudan poses a greater threat to Arab existence and unity than Iran does. This awareness is forcing the Gulf toward new policies and formations that will gradually render the existing ones obsolete. For now, the most concrete search it leads to is for ways that will reduce dependence on Hormuz. At this point it is quite clear that Turkey offers an important possibility and horizon.

TURKEY'S FOUNDING MISSION

As is known, Turkey had developed, with the Black Sea Grain Corridor, a model capable of protecting global supply chains even under wartime conditions. Today a similar model can be applied along the line stretching from Hormuz to Gaza. But this time the matter is not merely technical mediation; it is the construction of a broader Turkish-Arab strategic integration.

For it is plainly seen today that the Arab League cannot carry this burden alone. Likewise, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, in its present form, is far from producing political influence. By contrast, the reality emerging on the ground is different: Iran's resistance, Palestine's continuity, the balance in Lebanon and the Gulf's strategic repositioning create a fragmented but potentially unifiable field of power.

This field does not yet have an institutional counterpart. This is precisely where Turkey's historical mission emerges: to produce a new regional reason that binds the Arab League and the Islamic world to one another through energy security, trade, logistics and humanitarian diplomacy.

SUMUD: WHERE THE SEA ENDS FOR ISRAEL AND THE US

The new initiative of the Sumud Flotilla, and Israel's interception in Greek waters in response to it, show that the sea is running out for the world centered on the Israel-US axis.

Flotillas of this kind, which aim to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza, carry not only aid; they also carry the conscience and legitimacy of the international system into the field. Israel's intervention against these ships in international waters or in areas close to Greece is not a show of force but, on the contrary, a sign of strategic entrapment.

For real power does not fear a civilian aid ship. These interventions show not so much Israel's military capacity as the erosion of its political legitimacy. An actor trying to block humanitarian initiatives even at sea is in fact trying to make up, by violating the law, for the result it could not achieve in the land war.

This reveals a broader reality: the American-Israeli axis may still be strong, but its capacity to produce results is now weakening.

No result in Gaza. No decisive superiority in Lebanon. No regime change possible in Iran. No absolute control in Hormuz.

WHERE THE SEA BEGINS FOR THE REGION

By contrast, the region is for the first time moving in a different direction. The vision that emerged in Jeddah contains concrete steps toward diversifying energy routes, strengthening land connections and building joint strategic stockpiles. This is a step that could change the destiny not only of the Gulf but of the entire region.

At this point, the model proposed by Turkey can bring these pieces together: a Hormuz-centered energy security initiative, land and rail networks extending to Europe via Turkey, permanent humanitarian corridors for Gaza, and coordinated diplomacy between the Arab and Islamic worlds

When these four elements come together, what emerges is not a classical alliance but a new civilizational geopolitics.

This geopolitics does not rest on military blocs; on the contrary, it expands the space of freedom by reducing dependencies. When the Gulf strategy of reducing dependence on Hormuz is combined with Turkey's vision of a logistics hub, the region may, for the first time, approach an order of its own making rather than one determined by outside powers.

In conclusion, what is happening today is not a sum of crises; it is a founding moment.

THE QUESTION BEFORE TURKEY

Trump's contradictions, Israel's aggression and the gridlock of the global system show that the old order has collapsed. In response, the new strategic reason taking shape in Jeddah, the dynamics of resistance on the ground and Turkey's position in this process demonstrate that an alternative order is possible.

The question before Turkey is now this: will it be a passive spectator of this new order, or its founding actor? The answer lies not only in diplomatic choices but in boldly putting forward the vision that will unite the region. For the matter is no longer just Hormuz, Gaza or Lebanon. The matter is whether the Arab and Islamic world can write its own destiny with its own hands.