A one-month balance sheet of the war: a strengthened regime in Iran, increasing chaos and quests for a new balance

At the end of one month of the aggression the US and Israel launched against Iran, the world stands on the horizon of a wholly different uncertainty and chaos. The US's launching of this war by following the line of Trump and Netanyahu was presented, in terms of short-term military logic, as a "preemptive strike"; but at the point reached, the possibility that it was a serious strategic error has strengthened. For the basic assumption at the start of the war was that the blows to be struck at the upper command structure would rapidly collapse Iran's military decision-making capacity and produce panic and disintegration within the regime, and that the intense air strikes accompanying them would paralyze its missile and drone capacity within a few weeks.

A MISCALCULATION, A LACK OF FORESIGHT, OR A CALCULATION WITHIN A CALCULATION?

Yet what is visible today is that these goals have been realized only to a limited extent. According to various intelligence assessments, only about a third of Iran's missile and drone inventory has been completely destroyed; a significant portion is damaged, concealed or moved to underground facilities. This suggests that the initial military planning underestimated Iran's dispersed, redundant and underground-buried war capacity.

As for Iran's reactions as well, it is hard to say that Washington and Tel Aviv foresaw all the consequences. It is seen that Iran's direct counterattack capacity has not been completely broken, and that, on the contrary, as the war has dragged on, it has used its "asymmetric expansion" tools more effectively. Pressure on Gulf infrastructure, regional base networks and maritime trade was an example of this. Moreover, the Houthis' actual entry into the war in Yemen showed that the conflict would not remain confined to the Iran-Israel-US triangle and could spread to the Red Sea-Bab al-Mandab line as well. This expansion can be considered one of the most important unexpected developments multiplying the cost of the war. If a war launched to collapse the other side's central capacity gives rise to new fronts and new areas of pressure, the claim of military success inevitably weakens.

The blows dealt to Iran's upper command structure and strategic decision-making centers created serious shock, especially in the first weeks. The visible data show heavy loss of life, widespread infrastructure destruction and pressure on the management mechanism inside Iran. But the same data also reveal that the regime, far from collapsing, has been able to organize mass pro-regime demonstrations, that the state apparatus has not disintegrated despite the loss of leadership, and that no serious internal unraveling has occurred.

THE EXPECTED REGIME CHANGE IS TAKING PLACE AS REGIME CONSOLIDATION

Let me relate a personal observation here. A few days ago I hosted several very sincere Iranian dissident friends. Each of them has in the past opposed the Iranian administration in many respects from an Islamist perspective, and though they are Shia, they are people with an outlook far beyond sectarianism. With these persons, from whom I have not heard a single positive word about the regime since the day I met them, I had also met during the opposition demonstrations before the US-Israeli attack began. I had heard them rail at length against the regime.

When I now ask what the situation is, what they say is this: Now is not the time for opposition, it is the time to close ranks against imperialist attacks on our own country. And what became of all that opposition? We are postponing it. We will settle accounts among ourselves later, but there is no chance that Israel and the US want what is good for us, they only want our oil, they do not care who, how many of us die, do we not know this?

Indeed this outlook is also a very obvious explanation of why the migration and refugee movement expected from Iran since the start of the war has not materialized at all. In the face of all these attacks, no one is leaving Iran; on the contrary, we see many dissidents returning to Iran. This reaction of the Iranian opposition could in fact have been foreseen when the war on Iran began. But it seems that this time everyone was saying it would be different. The opposition was highly motivated this time, and both Trump and Netanyahu openly addressed the opposition and sent messages of solidarity. Yet both in Iran and in Turkey, anyone who places the slightest value on a salvation coming from Israel is treated as a traitor, dishonorable, without dignity. For example, there is no more measured assessment today of Pahlavi, who had somehow begun to look acceptable before the war.

Therefore the expectation of a "regime change threshold" seems largely to have come to nothing. That is, Israel and the US wounded Iran; but could not paralyze it.

A SEARCH FOR NEW BALANCES TRIGGERED

The political consequence of this is even more critical. Iran's reactions toward the Gulf and its regional surroundings may, in the long run, deepen a new crisis of trust. On the one hand the Gulf countries are worried about Iran becoming more aggressive and unpredictable under the pressure of war; on the other hand they are also concerned that the US-Israeli war line is turning their own territories and energy infrastructures into targets.

This dual concern is drawing Gulf capitals away from acting solely on a "bloc against Iran" logic. Indeed behind the new diplomatic contacts involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan today lies precisely this shared sense of fragility. The search for a framework that does not corner Iran completely but brings the war down to a manageable level is gaining strength. That is why the four-way contact ground that began under Pakistan's hosting is also important: This platform can be read as an attempt by Muslim countries to build their own crisis management mechanism against the classical West-centered security architecture.

THE ENERGY SHOCK AND WASHINGTON'S LIMIT OF TOLERANCE

On the economic front, the question is very clear: With the Strait of Hormuz remaining closed and oil prices rising, how long can the world economy withstand this "great energy shock"?

Perhaps it can hold out for a while, but it is also very clear that the cost will accumulate rapidly. Hormuz is a critical strait for about one fifth of global oil flows. A long-term disruption here pushes up not only oil but also LNG, fertilizer, container shipping and insurance costs. That gasoline prices in the US have reached the psychological threshold of 4 dollars per gallon and that diesel is putting heavy pressure on the transport sector show that the shock has now reached the consumer level. Fed officials too are giving clear warnings that the war could damage the inflation and employment outlook. This means the war has become a dynamic that increases the risk of not only a regional but a global recession.

Washington's domestic political limit of tolerance also begins right here. US administrations can often defend foreign wars in the language of global order, deterrence or security; but the voter evaluates this by the price paid at the pump. A lasting rise in fuel prices, a renewed acceleration of inflation and a chain-like rise in transport costs increase the pressure on the White House. The sensitivity of low- and middle-income voters in particular to energy costs is very high. Therefore, as much as Washington's military limit of tolerance, its domestic economic limit of tolerance will also be decisive. If the de facto closure at Hormuz drags on and prices stay at this level for a few more months, then however much "partial success" the military goals produce, the political legitimacy of the war begins to erode at home.

Though one should not dismiss this possibility either: Even if the rise in oil prices causes such complications within the US in the short term, in the long run higher prices serve US interests. This also invites us, when necessary, to look at things differently as long as we live.