How did a homeland become "Arab deserts"? A soldier loses the war first in his mind

The discourse of "lands that are not ours," which had come into circulation among Ottoman officers even before the Second Constitutional Era took place, is an approach showing that, from Syria and Iraq onward, all Arab and North African lands had been written off since that time. Although the saying "the Turkish child will no longer shed his blood for the Arab deserts" cannot be attributed literally to any particular person, it represents a view that gradually became current within the Committee of Union and Progress and a certain segment of Ottoman officers.

Both the expression "lands that are not ours" and the words "Arab deserts" actually show how the notion of "homeland" had acquired an un-national content within the Ottoman intelligentsia at that time. How should it be regarded, from a soldier's standpoint, not to see all the lands under Ottoman rule as homeland soil? In those days it was not only the Turkish child who did military service in the Arab deserts; in the Ottoman armies in Anatolia, at Gallipoli, on the Caucasus front, there were Arab children levied from the Arab deserts in the same proportion. That is, the place called the Arab desert was, in terms of its belonging and loyalty to the Ottoman Sublime State, not very different from the Konya steppes. The Ottomans had formed a central army, a central administration and a conception of homeland out of the people of all these lands and with it had successfully governed them for a full 400 years, without making any distinction among the children of the homeland. What was happening now?

How should one look at someone today who, because terror incidents are occurring there, might describe Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin as "lands that are not ours"? However one would look at such a person, in that period too Syria, Iraq, Hejaz, Palestine, Yemen, Egypt and Libya were not actually regarded differently.

Governing these places was of course difficult, but the Ottomans had overcome this difficulty for 400 years and had the greatness and vast experience to go on overcoming it. Moreover, thanks to the underground wealth now discovered, financing the administration of these places would also be easier. To see the administration of these places as a burden on the Turk should, first of all, have meant an insult to the Turk's thousand-year unparalleled administrative ability. After the Turk had governed these places for 400-600 years, without oil, with difficulties of communication and transport, with a proud and admirable great skill, there could of course be nothing national about seeing these places as a burden when everything had now become easier. This is a viewpoint that should arouse all sensitivities connected with nationalism.

Despite this, how was such a viewpoint able to find so many supporters? Moreover, how was it able to be accepted among circles that considered themselves quite "nationalist"? When everything had become even easier, how did the idea of liquidating the Ottomans, arising in the name of Turkism and concentrated among the circles within the Committee of Union and Progress, come to be seen as the only way to Turkey's salvation? What kind of salvation is this, which required giving up nearly nine-tenths of the Ottoman geography?

According to one thesis, an Andalusia syndrome was being experienced among Ottoman officers and the intelligentsia in those days. A fear was spreading that what had befallen the Muslims who had ruled Andalusia for 700 years would be repeated among the Ottomans. It is even said that it was this fear that led Ziya Pasha to have the History of Andalusia written. Of course there is no problem with drawing attention to Andalusia so that history will not repeat itself or so as to take a lesson from the history lived there. But presenting Andalusia as a threat that might be repeated for the Ottomans, and seeing the liquidation of the Ottomans as a way of "salvation" from this imaginary threat, that is the truly instructive situation. Thus the Ottomans were losing all the wars in the head before even entering a war. And at the hands of their own officers, their own intellectuals. After this point, which war could the Ottoman armies, administered by these officers, be expected to emerge from victorious?

Note that at the time the liquidation of the Ottomans was being talked about, not to mention the First World War, not even the Balkan War had yet been entered. With the viewpoint that saw the liquidation of the Ottomans as the only way for the Turkish state to survive, wagers were being made on carrying out this liquidation with one's own hands, without leaving the liquidation of the state to the enemy.

In fact, throughout the First World War the Ottoman armies fought heroically and won great victories on so many fronts. This was something that sufficiently showed that the Andalusia fear was an imaginary threat. What happened happened on the Palestine front. Precisely on the front commanded by the officers (Ali Fuat Cebesoy, İsmet İnönü, Fevzi Çakmak, Rıfat Bele) who spoke of the liquidation of the Ottomans being necessary for survival. There, we withdrew from the whole Arab geography, which had already long been written off as "lands that are not ours" and belittled by being called "desert." Thus the liquidation of the Ottomans was also completed.

To the place we withdrew from, the British, French and Italians settled with all their appetite, without saying "Arab desert," without saying "not ours." But for them to be comfortable there, we had to cut our ties with these lands and give up our claims. A cause of emotional resentment also had to come between us. For example, the Arabs must have stabbed us in the back, the reason for our giving up those lands must have been our inability to get along with them. The Arabs, too, must have come to see us as having exploited them throughout the centuries we spent together. Everything had to be flawless and without a fishbone for the British, and so it was.