It is not only about Yemen: Saudi Arabia's return to the stage

The unexpected reaction of Saudi Arabia (SA) to what happened in eastern Yemen in the last days of last year suddenly exposed a great plan that had been quietly at work across the whole Middle East. Within the exposed plan lay a story of betrayal, of encirclement, and of an ally that for a long time worked for itself and, working for itself, worked against its other partners. This great plan in Yemen, which surprised everyone because of SA's silence until now, was in fact something everyone was aware of.

Everyone knew very well that the UAE was in reality not a loyal ally of SA, and that it was working only for itself. Everyone could see that the Operation Decisive Storm, which began ostensibly against the Houthis and entered the scene supposedly to bring stability to Yemen, no longer had anything to do with decisiveness, and that Yemen was step by step turning into a complete partition, into unending chaos and a security problem on SA's borders.

This course was not a situation produced by the Coalition acting together. On the contrary, it was the result of a secret plan by one of the partners (the UAE) against the other partner. But the matter is not merely an "internal Yemeni" power struggle or one confined to Yemen; it was the emergence into view of a broader chessboard aimed at rebuilding the architecture of influence along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden–Horn of Africa line.

SA's move around Mukalla and the diplomatic ruptures that followed show that Riyadh has turned a rivalry it long conducted "covertly" into open state policy. Indeed, developments such as SA's accusation that the UAE helped the Yemeni separatist leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi escape; the claims that Zubaidi reached the UAE from Aden by sea to Somaliland and from there via Somalia; and, in parallel, the pushing back of the STC (Southern Transitional Council) on the Yemeni field, point to a new phase in Riyadh–Abu Dhabi relations in which, in place of "alliance," there is full rivalry and even enmity.

The fact that the scenario the UAE put into play in Yemen has been worked out in the same way in Syria, Sudan and Somalia showed that there is a grand design in which the UAE plays the lead roles but whose outcome serves Israel entirely. It is impossible that SA has not noticed this either. Indeed, its move in Yemen, which seemed a surprise to everyone, showed that it had been aware of this for some time and that the time had come to say stop.

In fact, as we said before, solving the problem in Yemen, establishing a stable administration and creating a secure border for SA was not difficult at all. The anti-Brotherhood sensitivity shared among the UAE, SA and Egypt led them away from a much nearer and easier solution in Yemen. Yet it appears that this sensitivity was exploited in a very different way, especially by the UAE, in order to manipulate both countries better. Otherwise the Brotherhood is an organic fabric that can never be uprooted from the social depth of Yemen. The sensitivity displayed against it can bring one to the point of tilting at windmills. This sensitivity disabled every rational strategic solution and gradually led to the further encirclement of both SA and Egypt, until they were finally confronted with the real and important threat.

The space the UAE opened to armed militias in Yemen in the name of the Southern Transitional Administration, and the space it opened in Sudan by arming the Rapid Support Forces, proceed on the same model as Israel's investments in the SDF in Syria. In the end, neither Israel nor the UAE has any sociological weight or depth in these regions. But with these moves, what they aim at is to leave Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye alone with border problems that will keep them constantly occupied, and to encircle them. It is already clear that this is Israel's style of strategic game-playing. It does not want a strong country in the region. Even if there are good relations with SA, with an apparent hope of "normalization" and under U.S. mediation, it is impossible for Israel to see SA as a natural ally. The games they play through the thoroughly exposed relationship with the UAE are also gradually revealing this hostile relationship.

Until now, especially because of its positive approach to normalization and the Abraham Accords, SA had begun to be seen almost as a country under Israel's guidance. But the present course shows that it is impossible that SA fails to see the Israeli threat, or fails to notice what role the UAE plays in it.

In this context, SA's latest moves in Yemen are not merely a tactical military intervention; they are the expression of a belated but critical awareness against this model of fragmentation. Riyadh has realized that keeping Yemen weak directly threatens its own southern borders and regional position; it has seen that the proxy politics conducted by the UAE has ultimately turned into a strategy of encirclement serving Israel's interests.

In conclusion, the cases of the RSF in Sudan, the SDF in Syria, the STC in Yemen and Somaliland in the Horn of Africa are parts of a systematic model of fragmentation operated by the UAE and consolidating Israel's regional interests. This model aims to turn the Arab world from a sum of strong states into a whole of manageable, fragile zones. Therefore the matter is not the internal problems of individual countries; it is a strategic orientation on a scale that will determine the future of regional sovereignty. Every resistance developed against this model will affect the political fate not of a single country but of an entire region.

There is no doubt that this move by SA is a candidate to reshape the whole map of alliances that has been valid in the region until now. Perhaps it is a picture of SA's return to the stage of regional politics.