Afghanistan inside and outside the web of the news

Frankly, when we first went to Afghanistan, much of what we had heard beforehand weighed on our minds as well. We could not, of course, have expected an administration that took office 2.5 years ago in this country, which had not seen daylight for half a century, to have settled everything in such a short time. However, no one is in the business of receiving the Taliban with understanding; in fact no one has any such concern. Everyone is sufficiently content to consume the news placed before them as it was placed, according to their own tastes and expectations.

Yet a movement that put an end to a 20-year US occupation, and then, within a period of about 2.5 years, solved both the drug problem and social peace in an almost unbelievable way, always and everywhere deserves attention and interest. That is why, when we first went a year and a half ago, there was an Afghanistan "in the net of news," to use the phrase that is the title of Edward Said's book. What was behind this net? What was the Taliban, which terrified people to the point of driving them to flee by clinging to the wings and wheels of US aircraft, and what did its arrival mean? Why were people fleeing in desperation? Why, when the Taliban, from which they fled in desperation, took office, was the first thing it did to declare a general amnesty, and how did it manage to implement this amnesty?

We had gone to see the truth of the matter. We relayed what we saw, and what we saw was very different from what we had heard. Merely laying out this difference was enough to arouse astonishment in people. But there is a universal truth that some are always more inclined to believe what they have heard. If fish had even a slightly stronger perception of reality, would they fall to nets or fishing lines?

Then, on our second trip, we recorded a course of events that reinforced still further our impressions from earlier visits and even confirmed the continuity of the current situation. Relaying what we see is, of course, not independent of the manner of seeing. It is true that we have a different manner of seeing. There is also seeing everything from its worst side, which shows everything otherwise. Everything in Afghanistan was already as bad as it could be. There was occupation, there were drugs, great cost of living, unemployment, low quality of life, and it was forcing the Afghan people into migration en masse. In all these fields there are now developments that are leading to the return of migrants. We note the improvements that have occurred with this second coming of the Taliban. Is everything rosy, then; was there nothing negative at all? Could there not be?

What we have relayed so far was of course concerned with the commonplace negative prejudices about Afghanistan and the Taliban, and the truth of the matter was far from those prejudices. Saying this surely does not mean saying that a perfect order has been established in Afghanistan and that all the people are very happy and content.

Some of the existing problems are of course related to Afghanistan's sociological, cultural and historical conditions. They are not related to the current Taliban administration. For example, the obligation to wear a burqa or veil does not exist, at least in Kabul. In Kabul one encounters everywhere women walking alone with their heads half-covered or covered but their faces uncovered, or beardless men. No one interferes. Compulsion to wear the burqa is practiced in some provincial cities, but even this is a traditional practice rather than something brought by the Taliban. On many issues concerning women's rights, the Taliban, in reference to Islamic standards, establishes a strong guarantee against the customs of tribal society. It is a very long subject; I had shown it through many examples in my earlier articles as well. For example, a woman who, because her husband died, was forced by custom to be married to his brother applies to a court run by one of the Taliban, and the court rules that, even if a woman's place is in the custom, no one can be married off against her will. Many issues like this.

On all these matters we tried to relay the facts, contrary to prejudices, but we also noted that there are very serious problems awaiting the Taliban administration and some serious regulations that need to be made. We also tried to express these in a language of attentiveness and tenderness that does not fall short of the respect due to a community that waged an honorable and heroic struggle against the occupiers. We noted, for example, that serious inexperience in state administration and bureaucratic procedures still continues. Proceeding from the maxim that the essence of religion is nasiha (sincerity and counsel) to God, His Book, His Messenger, the leaders of the Muslims and their community (a hadith in Bukhari and Muslim), we expressed these recommendations of ours on various occasions too. Here as well, based on some of our observations, let us express them a little more compactly:

First: the instability of the systems and laws governing investment and economic activities, and the dependence of many matters on personal relations with those responsible for economic decision-making mechanisms. This situation can lead to injustice and, by eliminating the confidence-building transparency in the functioning of processes, can hinder opportunities for investment and participation in society.

Second: now, four years after the overthrow of the oppressors and their masters, the time has come to develop the necessary development plans, to announce them to the public, and to open the door of participation to everyone who wishes to take part. This should not remain limited to amateurs or opportunists; rather, institutionalization and good governance should be applied in all fields, especially in the field of the economy, which is the focal point of the society's awakening.

Third: perhaps institutional measures should be taken so that the tear-jerkingly beautiful examples of avoiding extravagance that we have observed among state institutions and the managers of these institutions do not remain a temporary behavior peculiar to the early years of the revolution. Because the exercise of power can change people's habits over time. For poverty among the people can create a resentment against the elites and can drag society into another needless cycle, neither now nor in the future.

Fourth: since the scholars have agreed on not applying taxes and penalties (of course, this can be reassessed according to a different fiqh ijtihad), opening the door to the establishment of social solidarity funds at the neighborhood, city and province levels under the supervision of trustworthy mujahideen will serve society and ease the poverty and suffering the Afghans experience.

Fifth: it is necessary to speed up the enactment of new laws regulating the state's and society's course toward a clear institutionalization. Because many regulations that need to be made in this regard are still progressing very slowly.

Sixth: of course, for the Afghan experience to be more successful so that it may serve as an example for all Muslims, it is very important that it hold the necessary consultations and that a sincere, respectful consultation mechanism be established with the Muslim world, especially with Türkiye and the Islamic scholars.