New impressions from the new Syria – 2

Syria, whose population is made up for the most part of Sunni Arabs, has a demographic structure composed of ethnic and religious elements: Nusayris, Kurds, Turkmens, Druze, Ismailis, Armenians, and Christians. But beyond these structures, Syria as a society still has a sociological structure in which tribes are very influential. The tribes are a sociological reality that political authority has always had to take into account at every stage. Of course, every regime has tried to create allies for itself among the different tribes, dividing them so that they do not come together and form a force against it. Of course, tribe also means continuing customs, usages, and traditions, a sociological fabric in which people's relations with one another are tightly bound to a certain code. We can say that although the 54-year Assad regime, in this war it waged against the Syrian people, tried first of all to build an alliance camp for itself from among the tribes, it could not fully penetrate them. Perhaps for this reason it was also in constant conflict and tension with the tribes. It tried to shake the authority of tribal chiefs by humiliating them in front of their own members.

We were invited to a meeting in Damascus attended by representatives of many tribes, including the Ukaydat, Shammar, Nuaym, Adwan, Ubayd, and others from Deir ez-Zor, Hama, and Homs. The tribal representatives not only said they were wholeheartedly committed to the revolution, they expressed their desire to be an active part of this process. A significant portion of these tribal sheikhs seem to have found themselves again, to have been relieved, with the fall of the Assad regime. All of them are so full of grievance that if you mention the humiliation they suffered under Assad, you will hear a thousand sighs. They especially underline that these tribes' clear stance in favor of the revolution contributed greatly to the rapid collapse of the 54-year despotic Assad regime in the face of Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Meanwhile, one may wonder what the reference of the office of tribal sheikh (sheikhdom here is not a religious but a political office, a chieftaincy) is. We can say that it is neither by election nor by chance, that the reference of this office is an arrangement and appointment of the Ottoman administration, that its origin goes back at least 500 years, and that even though states separated after the First World War, the statuses here have in practice continued according to the Ottoman records. That is, while the Ottomans ruled these lands for 500 years, they registered the representatives they chose from here as interlocutors in sheikhdom registers.

Some tribal representatives say that in this process the Ottoman archives should be opened so that the authenticity of these offices can be established and so that the office is not subject to abuse. What is particularly striking here is that however quickly we may have adopted the border that came between us 107 years ago, Ottomanness continues to constitute a founding basis in the memory and identity of this tribal culture. It seems that the overly oppressive-despotic regimes they lived under during this time have not made them forget who they are and their ties with Türkiye any more than the memory games played on us have. Somehow, we have come to regard this social structure, which does not see itself as separate from Türkiye, as foreign to ourselves because of the borders placed between us by the Sykes-Picot process. In this process, who has become more alienated, who has been more exposed to colonialism?

The sheikhs remember Türkiye's support to Syria during the revolution with great gratitude, but they say this support should continue more intensively after the revolution as well. The meeting is completed with a feast peculiar to the tribes and with the indispensable rituals and hospitality in which a chief beside you tears off meat with his own hand and offers it to those next to him.

While we were in Syria, in response to the demand for restructuring, meaning regional autonomy or federation, voiced at a meeting among the SDF leadership, the Syrian administration issued a statement rejecting it. The statement, referring to the agreement concluded between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the SDF leadership, which "took shape as a positive step on the path to a comprehensive national solution," said that the recent attitude and statements of the SDF leadership, reflecting attempts to impose federalism and create de facto partition, constitute a serious threat to the spirit of the agreement and to the unity of the country.

The Syrian Revolution, four and a half months on, has reached a certain relief, but the full weight of all the burdens of reconstruction has begun to make itself felt.

The US withdrawal of its troops has created great disappointment in Israel and, at the same time, an interesting situation in that it signals a parting of ways between Israeli and US policies. To compensate, Israel is trying to play various games through the Druze and the Kurds. It does not seem likely to leave the field entirely empty on this. The US has presented a package of proposals to lift sanctions and establish relations with Syria. One of these proposals is to normalize relations with Israel. Ahmed al-Sharaa rejected this in categorical terms. He said that a normalization step while his own land is under Israeli occupation is contrary to the very nature of the matter, but as policy he used a diplomatic language, saying Syria has no agenda of being used for hostility against the US or any country.

Syria under al-Sharaa states very clearly that it will not accept the Zionist regime's occupation in the Golan being turned into a fait accompli. He even hints that, unlike the Assad regime's passivity or habituation on this matter, he will make it a cause.

In a conversation with an important military official, I raise again a rumor circulating on this subject: After Assad's fall, Israel expanded its occupied areas inside Syria; does this show that this new regime is more in harmony with Israel? He answered with a smile laden with great reproach and disdain: Israel did not take the extra Syrian land it occupies today from the new regime. At the moment the Assad regime fell, the regime forces holding those places invited the Zionist regime's forces and handed them over to them themselves. After the new regime was established, Israel has not taken a single span of land. We know both the intentions and the souls of those who spread such rumors. Since 1967 they have not even made a proper diplomatic attempt to take back the Golan, which in fact they handed over with their own hands.

In Syria, the tombs of Nureddin Zengi and Saladin and the Umayyad Mosque are indispensable stops for both the people of Damascus and all outside visitors. Inside the mosque there are none of the barriers or curtains that we are used to in our mosques, which isolate women excessively. A large area right behind the shrine of the Prophet Yahya (John) is reserved for women and children. Beyond being a mosque, the place, in keeping with its historical role, is a spacious area for public conversation, gathering, education, and clearing one's head. Its magnificent courtyard was for years closed to the free use of the Sunni public, while Shiite demonstrations could very easily be held there. This in itself seems like an opening in which the air of freedom is breathed by the Syrian people, from which one can reach out to history and geography. An opening that had been kept closed, in one way or another, for 60-100 years.