The Gulf countries and the direction of change in Kuwait

The Arab world is in a total transformation, but this transformation does not unfold in the same way everywhere. There is nowhere the winds of the Arab Spring have not blown or somehow affected as they blew, but this effect in some places makes the systems somewhat sturdier, and in some places leads systems to get their act together or to take more effective, sustainable measures against the opposition. As we noted before, for example, Jordan displayed an attitude parallel to the waves of spring. Because it met the protests with an outwardly democratic maturity, these protests or demands did not lead to a rupture.

The Gulf countries too were not in a very identical stance on this matter. Although Qatar has supported the revolutions from the start, the United Arab Emirates does not seem at all pleased with what has happened in Egypt or in Tunisia. Moreover, it does not hesitate to openly express its concern that the success of the Brotherhood constitutes a threat to itself. In Bahrain, the reflections of this process anyway unfold at an entirely different level.

Those who rose up in Bahrain are playing an entirely different string from the elements that made revolutions in the other Arab Spring countries. More plainly, Bahrain functions like a message board that Iran keeps constantly open to respond to the events in Syria. It works as a field for developing arguments to enable Iran to justify its stance in Syria. To everyone who brings up Syria, the Iranians immediately draw attention to Bahrain. But while what Assad does is justified, the Bahraini government is to be hammered into the ground.

Truly, we are not in a position to defend any wrong said to have been done by the Bahraini government. Thank God, we have no commitment that requires us to defend anyone who oppresses his own people. But identifying Syria with Bahrain is also truly a complete example of shamelessness.

In essence, there is a significant Shiite presence in almost all of the Gulf countries, and Iran sees and presents this entire presence as a trump card that it can set in motion against the Gulf governments whenever it wishes. That is why relations of the Gulf countries with Iran, and with Shiism in general, are not at all pleasant. Still, it is not possible to say that all of them are in the same stance.

During the week we were in Kuwait to hold part of the series of workshops we had started earlier and organise together with the Prime Ministry's Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities. Kuwait looks like a country that watches this whole spring process a little more coolly than the other Gulf countries. It certainly does not have the comfort of thinking the process will not affect it at all, but it is relatively more at ease owing to its demographic structure and the support that many elements within it are in any case giving to the process.

The main feature of Kuwait's demographic structure is that only 1.1 million of its population of 3.5 million are citizens. The rest, mostly Far Asians and Iranians, make up two-thirds of Kuwait's population but do not have citizenship rights, and the great majority work in labour-intensive jobs. The country is in fact ruled by a certain family that dominated the region in the Ottoman period, and the agreements this family has reached with the other tribes over the distribution of the country's resources rest on a certain traditional notion of justice, and in essence no one objects to this.

There is a functioning parliament, but the electoral system is capable of producing any kind of result. One person can cast more than one vote, for example. While this leads to very different coalitions forming at the ballot box, it makes the results uncertain.

There is an environment of free debate and freedom of expression such as is not found in comparable Arab countries. It was even said that the diwan of a family head named Abu Khalid whom we visited serves as a kind of people's parliament, like its counterparts. This Diwan was in itself interesting enough for me, because such family diwans, where everything related to the country is discussed, provide a political environment to which the King can in no way remain indifferent. It is an institution that could be very interesting for socio-political scientists in search of Habermas's public sphere.

The Brotherhood's thought has a distinct weight in Kuwait. It is a weight not limited to the number of those belonging to the movement. It also makes itself felt in forming public opinion. Perhaps for this reason Kuwait supports the Arab revolutions in general and the Syrian revolution. A significant part of the support for Syria in particular comes through the direct aid of the Kuwaiti people. Turkey's support for Syria has aroused great sympathy, but many believe that Turkey can do more.

Likewise they are very pleased with Turkey's recent interest in the Arab world, but they still think relations are behind where they should be. American and British universities roam these parts every term to attract Kuwaiti students, but the lack of any visible work by Turkish universities in this direction is also a subject of criticism.

In short, there is still much to be done.