Revolution and tradition in Yemen

Although there is a general belief that the revolution in Yemen has in a sense been stolen by outside powers, in my view this is a premature conclusion about a process that has not yet ended. We know how the US uses the presence of al-Qaeda as a pretext to retain a permanent right of intervention in Yemen. While Saudi Arabia perceives the Houthi disturbance here as a threat to itself and thereby secures a right of intervention (which, strangely, has at times also taken the form of support), Iran, on the same grounds, regards it as an important opportunity to take an interest in the country.

Yet although the Houthis belong to the Zaydis, who are considered Shiite in terms of sect, this has nothing at all to do with Twelver or Ja'fari Shiism. The Zaydis follow the Shafi'i school of Sunnism entirely in creed and practice. Meanwhile, they give no credit at all to the belief in wilayat al-faqih, which Iran pioneered. Therefore the Houthis or the Zaydis are nothing more than a potential pretext for competition or scrambling over Yemen, for both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In Yemen, tribal customs still give a sense of historically uninterrupted continuity. The Yemenis, who have also become thoroughly acquainted with the modern world, are aware of this, and often tell a joke to define themselves. According to the joke, the Prophet Adam wanted to return to the world in modern times and see his grandchildren. He could not recognize his children and the things they were doing in every part of the world, and met them in astonishment. But when he stopped by Yemen and saw the Yemenis, he recognized them immediately, and moreover, looking at what they did, he said, "I found everything just as I left it."

Indeed, Yemen presents a structure in which tradition has not changed even in the cities, from the architecture of cities and houses to dress and customs. The daggers that Yemenis never leave out of their belts, despite the new understanding of security in the modern age, are one of the manifestations of this traditional continuity. Carrying these daggers can actually be considered quite burdensome, and moreover they are never used. There is a rule that once a dagger is drawn from its sheath, blood must be shed, and perhaps this turns into a complete test of will for Yemeni men: that dagger is always carried but never leaves its sheath.

In the North-South division, those on the socialist side once tried to play a destructive role against traditions, but this both ruined their chances and, when unification was achieved in the early nineties, the former communists became the strongest practitioners of traditions in the new era.

The unchanging traditions of the Yemenis proved decisive in the revolutionary process as well. As I said earlier, the bombing of a scholar's house by the dictator Saleh constituted a turning point in the revolutionary process. What is decisive here is not only that the one whose house was bombed was a scholar, but the bombing of the house itself. Because Yemenis place great importance on fighting by the rules even when they fight. And violation of the rules means one no longer has a place to lie down. As long as these rules are not violated, a consensus reached in government can therefore remain valid for a long time. It is fair to say that a dictator's ruling for some 32 years was also due in part to the consensus among these tribes, which never deviate from the duties that tradition places on them. Saleh also took care to establish a balance among the tribes in government. Indeed, one of the most important balances he watched over was this one.

Of course, it is not possible to say that he always worked in harmony with all these tribes; there was therefore always an opposition against him as well, but this opposition did not grow large enough to overthrow him, until the front against him grew through his own violations of tradition during the revolutionary process.

That a revolution has come out of this traditional structure, which expresses continuity and stability, is of course a matter that needs explanation. Perhaps what gives the impression that the revolution has been stolen is, in fact, the particular forms of consensus of the tribes, which again have traditional roots. Yet most of the revolutionaries in Yemen do not think that their revolution has been stolen or could be stolen.

For example, the words of Nasser Yahya, a writer from the Muslim Brotherhood, are cautionary not only about Yemen but about all the Arab revolutions, and even about the nature of revolution:

"The most dangerous thing that any process of change, and revolutions in particular, encounters is people forgetting that all these revolutions are made by people. People are neither angels nor devils, and they can make mistakes. That is why there is no need to think that some people have stolen the role of angels and are the purest, cleanest people in the world, while others are devils behind every kind of conspiracy. The revolution has happened, the dictators have been toppled, and what comes after is a debate among beings, whom we must accept as human, with certain interests and demands, to establish a legal order among themselves. One must not deviate from the main goal. The main goal is the establishment of a political order based on the supremacy of law and the constitution. And this is, compared with before the revolution, no longer an unattainable, distant goal at all."